dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s decision regarding appellee Armando Yara, I cannot agree with that portion of the decision affirming the take-nothing judgment as to Joseph Kail, director of the City’s Animal Control Facility. In the instant case the plaintiffs did not seek to hold Kail liable merely for the negligence of his employees. Plaintiffs’ petition alleged, among other things, that Kail was negligent in failing to properly supervise and train his employees and in failing to maintain adequate safeguards against the premature destruction of biting dogs. Dr. Rothe testified that Kail was responsible for directing the day-to-day operations of the Facility. Rothe further testified that he directs Kail to enforce the provisions of both the State statutes and city ordinance which require a ten-day quarantine of dogs that the local health authority has probable cause to believe is rabid or has attacked an individual.
Kail testified that although a log book of complaints about biting dogs was kept by clerks at the Facility, he did not review the book each day to insure that the Facility would not destroy dogs that had reportedly bitten someone. He also stated that the Facility would honor an owner’s wishes and euthanize a dog if the owner stated the dog had not bitten anyone in the preceding ten days. Kail acknowledged that in such cases it was possible for the Facility to receive a police report of a dog bite after the dog had already been destroyed. Kail also testified that police reports about biting incidents . are generally picked up each morning, but that sometimes the reports are not picked up for two days. Finally, the testimony established that there is no definite procedure whereby the log book of complaints about biting dogs is checked against the paperwork on non-wanted dogs to insure that biting dogs are not killed before the expiration of the quarantine period.
The facts in this case lead me to conclude that the court’s judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Despite the provision in § 6-35 of the City Code allowing for a 24 hour period in which to report dog bites, Kail, with his responsibility as supervisor, neither instituted nor enforced any procedures whereby a dog would be kept long enough to determine if a biting complaint had been submitted to the police within the proscribed time period. *181Given the importance of rabies control, and the fact that the ordinance in question is designed in part to protect the public from the type of injuries sustained by plaintiffs, see Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4477-6a, § 102 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983), I can only conclude that Kail’s failure to either institute or enforce such safeguards amounts to negligence. See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979); cf. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4477-6a, § 5.01 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983) (violation of animal quarantine requirement classified as Class C misdemeanor). For all of the foregoing reasons, I would sustain appellants’ point of error as to appellee Kail.