(dissenting).
The majority overrules the State’s motion for rehearing without written opinion.1
The majority still does not apply Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, which is the constitutional law of the United States. The State is being denied due process of law. A state has constitutional rights. See State of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).
The majority is not following previously decided cases by this Court. Gomez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 871, written by one of the majority in this case, upheld a search of a car at the police station after a search was made at the time of arrest. The arrest was made upon information given by an informant who stated that Gomez and Torres were preparing heroin for distribution and that the two would be leaving in a “ ’60 Pontiac, blue and white.”
In the Gomez case, it is written:
“The appellant also complains that the search of the automobile was illegal because the search was conducted without a warrant at the police station later, and not immediately at the site of the arrest. Gann’s testimony relevant to this matter was as follows:
“ ‘Q. Now, Officer, when you got to the police station, what did you do?
“ ‘A. Sgt. Hersom took Gloria Olivio upstairs, and Sgt. Taylor and myself remained and conducted the search of the vehicle, of the ’60 Pontiac.
“ ‘Q. Now, officer, why was it necessary to continue the search down at the police station ?
<< < ⅜ ⅝ ⅝
“ ‘A. It was impossible to conduct a search there at that location due *260to the crowd and the circumstances. We felt we were blocking traffic, and the crowd that had gathered there, it seemed imperative that we continue the search at some place where we might be sure we had not missed anyone or anything.’
“ ‘The relevant test, in cases like that at bar, is whether the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances, for it is only unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.’ Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 403. A search is not tmreasonable if the automobile is searched at another place if the subsequent search is a part of a series of events constituting one continuous happening. Taylor v. State, supra.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the Taylor case, supra, this Court upheld the search of an automobile after a traffic arrest. The arrest was for a traffic violation at Waskom, some eight miles from the courthouse at Marshall. Probable cause was shown to search the car. An officer took the keys from Taylor. The officer searched the trunk of the car without a warrant after they reached the magistrate’s office at the courthouse. He found marihuana in a coffee can. This Court held that search was legal and the marihuana was admissible and wrote:
“[t]he removal of this automobile to Marshall, and the subsequent search were a series of events constituting one continuous happening.”
and,
“As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. State of California [386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730], and in Preston v. United States [376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777], the question there decided was not whether the search was authorized by state law, but whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Both opinions make it clear that whether a search is reasonable depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”
In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, it is written:
“It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for ‘[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.’ United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653, 660.”
In Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938, this Court upheld the search of the trunk of an automobile that Brown had been driving which was made in his absence without a warrant some twelve hours after officers received information of the crime of murder.
We will look at the facts to see if the officers had probable cause to search the automobile. The majority does not question the right to arrest. Appellant was arrested in his car at the First National Bank in Amarillo where he had attempted to pass as true four forged checks with a deposit slip listing the checks. Had he been successful in passing these checks he would have collected $279 cash. He did not have an account at the bank.
Arlain Miller testified that she worked at the American National Bank in Amarillo. Appellant had four out-of-town checks listed on a deposit slip. He had no account at that bank under his name and there was no account number as he had listed on the deposit slip. She kept a copy of the deposit slip and returned two copies and the checks to appellant.
Maxine Bayless testified that she was a teller at the American National Bank and that appellant had on the deposit slip the four checks and the total amount less cash but he had no account in the bank.
Joyce Cross, a teller at the American National Bank, testified that appellant tried to make a deposit of checks but there *261was no account in that name or number. There were four out-of-town checks to he deposited and he wanted back $279 in cash. She called Marvin Keith Herring, a security officer at the First National Bank, and the Amarillo Police Department, and “I told them that we had a man there attempting to deposit some checks; that we had made a routine check and we did not have an account in the name that he was trying to deposit the checks in or the number.”
Detective Jimmy Stephens of the Amarillo Police Department testified that he received a call from Herring who related that he had received a call from a Mrs. Cross from another bank that a fellow tried to pass some checks and that he was now at the drive-up window.
After arriving at the bank, officers had appellant move his car from the drive-up window. Herring, the assistant cashier of the First National Bank, saw appellant make a motion from the glove compartment to the area of the front seat divider. He saw wrinkled or crumpled papers in the fold of the seat.
Detective Crowell who was at the bank at the time of the arrest testified that Herring told him about seeing movements of appellant’s hand from the glove compartment to the seat. Crowell advised Herring that he saw it also and later told Detective Stephens about it. Crowell drove appellant’s car some six or seven blocks to the police station.
The car was searched at the police station approximately forty to fifty minutes after the arrest and the other checks complained to be the result of an illegal search were found.
Officer Crowell testified that he did not know how many checks were supposedly passed. He testified that appellant was taken out of his car when it was verified there was “no such account and no such number.”
The following occurred:
“Q. (Prosecutor) Did you have authority to impound the car ?
“A. Yes, sir, we did.
“Q. And the normal procedure is for you to search the car before you impound it?
“A. Yes, sir; we are required to take the person out of the car; that we are responsible for the car and its contents; therefore, we search the vehicle for any valuables. (Emphasis súpplied)
“Q. What do you do with the valuables?
“A. We book them in.
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“Q. Who gave you authority to impound the car ?
“A. No, sir, we impounded it due to the fact that we took him out of the car during the arrest.”
Detective Jimmy Stephens testified that when the officers arrived at the First National Bank they saw the appellant in a ’66 Continental four-door blue hard top. This matched the description he got from the American National Bank. While at that bank, Stephens obtained from the teller the deposit slips and the checks that appellant attempted to pass.
Stephens testified that he advised appellant of his rights. Then the following occurred :
“Q. (Prosecutor) Was it also normal detective procedure to ask a suspect like that when you think a search might be in order, to ask the suspect if he wants to consent to the search ?
“A. Yes, I sure did.
*262“ * * *
“Q. And did he consent or not ?
“A. No, sir, he refused.”
After this, Stephens and Crowell searched the car. Stephens found four checks folded and stuffed “between the fold down console and the seat itself.”
On cross-examination Stephens was asked what he was looking for when he conducted the search. He stated:
“Well, we had known that he had attempted to pass checks at the American National, and we had recovered the checks from the First National, the First National Drive-up Window.
“And I felt as though there would be possibly other checks from the American National. .
t< * * *
“And he had presented the American National deposit slip at the American National. This is what I was looking for.
if * * *
“Yes, sir, I had reason to believe that there were American National deposit slips in there.”
Stephens, when asked if he had to look around to find the checks, stated: “I had to look inside the car. I saw them. * * * When I stuck my head in the car I saw them.” And, “Well, I saw what appeared to be checks to me and then I reached down and got them.”
On cross-examination he was asked, “So you were just looking for anything that you might run across in the car?” He answered, “I guess just a general search.” On redirect he testified, “I felt as though he probably would have had to have an American deposit slip to make the deposit. I think that is standard procedure at banks. They said he already had the deposit made up. It was already made up.” Stephens also testified that he found the checks where Detective Crowell indicated he had seen appellant appear to be placing something in the area to the right of where he was' sitting.
Appellant’s counsel in making his objection asked the trial judge if she was aware of the case of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. He then stated that the search in that case was reasonable because officers had a report that a robbery had been committed and that the car was stopped at night. He pointed out that in the present case the facts were different because the arrest was made in the daytime and the car was not purported to be occupied by robbers, and that Chambers v. Maroney was not applicable.
When the trial judge ordered the checks admitted into evidence she stated:
“I will find there was probable cause for the arrest and probable cause for the search as well.2
“ * * *
“Under the doctrine of Chambers v. Maroney, I will find that the fruits of the search, even though it was made at a later point at the police station, are admissible in evidence.”
The trial judge has sufficient evidence and authority upon which to base her ruling.
This is like the Taylor case, supra. The officers took the forged checks from the bank. The possession of forged checks with intent to pass them is a felony. The officers had probable cause and the offi*263cers had appellant move his car from the teller’s window “to clear the driveway.”
This cause is being reversed upon the grounds that Chambers, supra, is not applicable.
Recently, Justice Powell, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), wrote:
“Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate’s review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, Beck v. Ohio, supra, 379 U.S. at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 228 [379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142]; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-482, 83 S.Ct. 407, 412-414, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948).”
There was probable cause in the present case but no search warrant for the car was obtained. The present case is stronger in favor of the search than Taylor v. State, supra, but the majority does not even distinguish the two.
The passing of Taylor and Gomez should be noted by the majority and their interment should be conducted with more dignity.
There is no legal or logical reason to hold that a search could not be made at the police station a short time after the arrest when a search could have been made at the bank.
The exclusionary rule which, in part, prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained in a search because an officer makes a mistake has nothing to do with an accused’s guilt or innocence. The rule does not punish the officer, it only hurts the law-abiding public when a guilty person goes free because an officer makes an honest mistake. We should not extend the exclusionary rule where it is not required by the Supreme Court of the United States or other constituted authority. Some acceptable substitute for such a rule should be considered by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Legislature of Texas. See Wright, Must The Criminal Go Free If The Constable Blunders, Tex.L. Rev., Volume 50, Page 736 (1971); American Criminal Law Review, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, Volume 13, Page 507 (1975). Even though the Supreme Court, in my opinion, does not require the exclusion of the checks in question from evidence, this Court holds the exclusionary rule applies and reverses the conviction.
Decisions such as the one in this cause should cause a reappraisal of the rule.
Chambers v. Maroney is still alive, except in Texas. It should be followed and the judgment affirmed.
. The dissenting opinion on the original submission is withdrawn.
. Even the employees at either bank had the right to arrest appellant under the facts of this case. Article 14.01, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., provides:
“(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace.
“(b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.”