dissenting.
This automatic appeal1 results from a conviction for the offense of capital murder pursuant to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.-03(a)(2).2 Upon the jury’s return of affirm*782ative findings to two special issues submitted at the punishment phase, Article 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P., appellant’s punishment was assessed at death. Article 37.-071(e), supra.
Complaint is made of the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury at the punishment phase as to the definition of “deliberately” as that term is employed in the first special issue.3 Appellant presented a written instruction in this regard and requested its submission to the jury, but the charge was refused by the trial court. Article 36.15, Y.A.C.C.P.
Appellant now contends that a definition of “deliberate” was essential to assist the jury in making a rational inquiry as to the first special issue. More specifically, he argues “that the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1 must logically focus on something other than ... whether the killing was intentional, which question was answered by the jury prior to the punishment phase,” and assails, among others, this Court’s opinion in King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), as having “failed to properly distinguish between the requirement of an intentional killing at the guilt-innocence phase and the deliberateness inquiry of special issue number 1.”
This attack on King is misplaced. The holding of King —that the trial court need not provide special definitions for several terms contained in Article 37.071(b)4 — was bottomed upon the recognition that: the words had not been specially defined by the Legislature; jurors are supposed to know the common meaning of terms, simple in themselves; and the Supreme Court of the United States, in determining our special issues adequately guide the capital jury's deliberations on the matter of punishment, did not require special definitions of the terms in question. The reasoning of King is sound and I would adhere to it today.
Appellant’s contention and supporting arguments, however, do raise a fair question as to whether developments within the last six years — matters not necessarily available to the Court or contemplated at the writing of King — have modified some or all of the underpinnings (as opposed to reasoning) of that decision as regards the term “deliberately.” Illustrative is appellant’s suggestion that “deliberately,” though a simple word of and by itself, has now taken on a “technical” meaning;5 that the “common” word has become “uncommon” in the context of our capital murder procedure.
Therefore, it is appropriate to first consider whether the word “deliberately” has taken on in any material fashion a “special definition.”6
*783Obviously, in view of the fact that “deliberately” was not defined by the Legislature, the focus of the Court’s analysis began on what it is not. In Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) the Court, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the special issue findings in general, made clear by implication that the fact a defendant is not the “trig-german” in the murder is not of and by itself dispositive of the first special issue. Though guilty of the offense of capital murder only through application of the law of parties,7 Smith’s individual conduct which “aided” and “encouraged” another in the commission of the murder was correctly held to support the jury’s finding on the first special issue: Smith was the first to attempt to shoot the victim, and when his weapon misfired, he called to his confederate, “Get him.” In Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), rejecting a contention that the affirmative answer to special issue number 1 was insufficiently supported by evidence because it did not show that the killing was “premeditated,” this Court held, “The statutory requirement that a killer’s conduct be committed deliberately does not mean that it must be a premeditated act.” [Emphasis original]
Meanwhile, the battle raged over whether “intentionally” and “deliberately” were the same or different, and if different, in what way. A great deal of confusion between the two words, their meanings and import in the Texas capital murder scheme was clearly extant among lawyers and judges, as well as legal scholars,8 since before the Supreme Court approved the facial constitutionality of that scheme and its application by the Texas courts in Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Moreover, virtually every member of this Court has at one time or another confronted a record of capital voir dire examination in which either the trial judge or prosecutor informs a venire-member that “deliberately” means the same thing as “intentionally.” And though it was held by implication that the words are not equivalents early on,9 the controversy ultimately necessitated this Court’s recent decision in Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In Heckert, supra, after the jury found the defendant guilty of intentionally causing the death of his victim while in the course of burglary, that same jury returned a negative finding on the first punishment issue. Contending on appeal that “deliberately” and “intentionally” are “linguistic equivalents,” Heckert argued that the jury’s verdicts on guilt and punishment could not be reconciled and presented a fatal variance requiring reversal. In rejecting Heckert’s contention, we held:
“If this Court were to adopt appellant’s argument that deliberately and intentionally or knowingly were linguistic equivalents, it would render Art. 37.071(b)(1), supra, a nullity. Under sueh a holding [the deliberateness question] would be a useless thing in that a finding of an intentional or knowing murder would be irreconcilable with a finding that the defendant’s conduct was not committed deliberately. We will presume that the Legislature would not have enacted Art. 37.071(b)(1), supra, had it intended for a finding of deliberateness to be *784based upon the same standard as that of intentional or knowing.”
612 S.W.2d at 550, 551. But see Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 327, n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
If, as King, supra, instructs, we are to take the common meaning of a simple word in its ordinary usage, any handy dictionary will confirm that “deliberately” means just that — a manner of doing an act that is “characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration,” “characterized by awareness of the consequences; willful,” “slow, unhurried, and steady as though allowing time for a decision.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1977).10 That definition has not varied from the one approved by this Court more than eighty years ago in Ferguson v. State, 36 Tex.Cr.R. 60, 35 S.W. 369, 370 (Tex.Cr.App.1896):
“ ‘Deliberately’ means ‘with careful consideration or deliberation; with full intent; not hastily or carelessly, — as a deliberately formed purpose.’ ”
This definition was in turn reiterated with approval sixty five years ago in Welch v. State, 71 Tex.Cr.R. 17, 157 S.W. 946 (Tex.Cr.App.1913).
Most recently, in Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577, 584 and 584 n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) (Opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing), we characterized “deliberately” as “the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct,” and described “the person who engages in certain conduct deliberately” as one who “has upon consideration said to himself, ‘Let’s do it.’ ”
I would adhere to the Granviel holding and continue to say that conduct committed “deliberately” need not be “premeditated,” for deliberation is but an element of premeditation. As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 1968) at 1343:
“Premeditation differs essentially from will, which constitutes the crime; because it supposes, besides an actual will, a deliberation, and a continued persistence.” [Emphasis original]
See also Fearance at 584, n. 6.
Similarly, I would adhere to the rejection by Granviel, supra, of the notion that a killing committed in a purported “frenzy” cannot be effected deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result. See also Fearance, supra; Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
In short, I believe that the first premise underlying the conclusion in King, is still viable today: “deliberately” is a word simple in itself and as used in Article 37.-071(b)(1), is to be understood in its ordinary meaning. It has taken on a technical or special definition only in the sense enunciated in Heckert, supra: “deliberately” is neither the linguistic nor connotative equivalent of “intentionally.” And as Heckert acknowledges, this distinction is crucial, for a failure to regard it would render the first special issue a nullity.
But King also teaches that words which are used in their ordinary sense are “not necessarily to be defined in the charge to the jury,” because “jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms,” citing Joubert v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 219, 124 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1939). It is accordingly necessary to consider whether there exists at this point in the evolution of our capital murder law, any compelling reason to require that “deliberately” be defined in its ordinary sense, in the court’s instructions to the jury at punishment, should such a definition be requested.
*785Before reaching the questions of whether Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Louisiana had enacted constitutional procedures for imposition of the death penalty, the Supreme Court of the United States was obliged to first determine whether the “punishment of death always, regardless of the enormity of the offense or the procedure followed in imposing the sentence, is cruel and unusual in violation of the Constitution,” an issue previously presented to the Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), but not at that time resolved. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,168-169, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922-2923, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). In rejecting Gregg’s contention in this regard, the Supreme Court considered, among other things, whether death is a punishment disproportionate to the crime:
“There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed. But we are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes. [citations omitted].”
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 187, 96 S.Ct. at 2931.11 Having determined that death is a suitable punishment in deliberate killings, the Supreme Court observed that Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body, that discretion must be “directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg, supra, at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. In addition to a fair procedure, the Constitution requires “accurate sentencing information12 [as] an indispensible prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die... ” Gregg, supra, at 190, 96 S.Ct. at 2933.
After praising the procedure of bifurcating the issues of guilt and punishment, the Court concluded:
“But the provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be properly used ... by a jury, [the members of which are] unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given.”
Gregg, supra, at 192, 96 S.Ct. at 2934. Conceding that the problem of appropriate use of relevant information by juries “may not be totally correctible,” the Court noted that “[i]t seems clear ... that the problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance13 regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant_” Id.
Having determined the requisites of constitutional imposition of the death penalty, the Supreme Court proceeded to measure several state statutes against those requisites. In both Gregg, supra, and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 *786L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), the Court rejected “vagueness and overbreadth” attacks on the Georgia and Florida statutory “aggravating circumstances,” repeatedly referencing the manner in which the State Supreme Courts had construed provisions up to that point,14 and declining to presume they would adopt “open-ended constructions” in the future.
Viewing the Texas proscriptions of the offense, capital murder, themselves as serving the same purpose as the aggravating circumstances codified by Georgia and Florida law, the Supreme Court in Jurek, supra, saw the constitutionality of the Texas procedure dependent on whether the special issues embodied in Article 37.071(b), supra, “allow consideration of particularized mitigating factors.”15 Jurek, supra, 428 U.S. at 272, 96 S.Ct. at 2956. The Court concluded:
“It thus appears that, as in Georgia and Florida, the Texas capital sentencing procedure guides and focuses the jury’s objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender_”
Jurek, supra, at 273-274, 96 S.Ct. at 2957.
The Supreme Court made clear its understanding of the role of the second special issue,16 as construed by this Court, to be a focus on the “particular circumstances” of the “individual offender,” his character and propensities. The other prong of the constitutionally mandated sentencing inquiry —“objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense” — seems particularly well met by our first and third special statutory issues.17 Unlike the second special issue, the first and third focus the jury’s attention upon historical facts surrounding commission of the offense. The first special issue, unlike the third, is submitted in all capital cases in which the accused is found guilty; it could be labeled a “mitigating factor” since a negative jury finding thereon automatically operates to “mitigate” the punishment to life. Conversely, the focus of the “deliberateness” inquiry might be better characterized an “aggravating circumstance” because an affirmative finding on it is a prerequisite to imposition of a sentence of death.
Apparent, then, is the crucial function of the “deliberateness question” in the Texas capital murder scheme: potentially the difference between life imprisonment and death. It follows that the jury’s consideration of this question must be focused on the individual conduct of the defendant in the capital murder transaction and that the jury comprehend its meaning as distinct from other inquiries in the case. As the Supreme Court reiterated, Furman’s “basic requirement” is to “replace[ ] arbitrary ... jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sen*787tence of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). Because of the qualitative difference between death and other punishments, “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson, supra, at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991.
It has come to this Court’s attention from numerous and diverse sources that the term “deliberately” as employed in the first special punishment issue in our statutory capital murder scheme has created a great deal of confusion, calling into question the reliability of jury findings made thereon. See n. 8, ante, and accompanying text. It is now unreasonable to assume that jurors will be able to determine the issue reliably without further assistance when legal scholars and members of the bench and bar have debated the subject continuously for more than seven years.18 The meaning of the word “deliberately” is now settled; thus, assistance to the jury is available. Accordingly, we should now employ that power reserved to us by the Supreme Court in Jurek,19 supra, and hold that upon timely request by a capital murder defendant or the State, that party is entitled to have the jury instructed at the punishment phase20 to the effect of the following:
(1) as employed in the first special issue, the word “deliberately” has a meaning different and distinct from the word “intentionally,” as that word was previously defined in the charge on guilt, and
(2) instead, as employed in the first special issue, the word “deliberately” means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration; characterized by awareness of the consequences; willful, slow, unhurried, and steady as though allowing time for a decision.21
In the instant case though the appellant requested it, the jury was not instructed in any fashion upon the meaning of “deliberately” and how it differs from the meaning of “intentionally.” Having determined such an instruction is essential to the reliability of the jury’s arbitration of that issue submitted at punishment in capital eases, I would hold it was prejudicial error to deny such guidance in this case.
To the majority’s failure to so hold, I dissent.
. See Article 37.071(f), V.A.C.C.P.
. Section 19.03, supra, provides in germane part:
"(a) A person commits an offense if he [intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual] under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and:
******
(2) the person commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit ... robbery ...;
*782******
. Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
******
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; * * * ”
(All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)
. These terms are: "deliberately;” "probability;” "criminal acts of violence;" "continuing threat to society.”
. Indeed, this Court has held that "deliberately” is something distinct from “intentionally." Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
. Article 3.01, V.A.C.C.P. provides that,
“All words, phrases and terms used in this Code are to be taken and understood in their usual acceptation in common language, except where speciallyi defined."
In a related context, the Code of Construction Act, Article 5429b-2, V.A.C.S., several sections of which apply to our penal code, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.05(b), provides in part:
“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”
Section 2.01, id.
. Now V.T.C.A. Penal Code, §§ 7.01 and 7.02. At the time Smith committed the offense, the law of "principals" was contained in Vernon's Ann.P.C. Articles 65, 66, 68 and 69.
. E.g., Practice Commentary following V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.03; oral argument on the constitutionality of Texas death penalty procedure in Jurek v. Texas, infra, 19 CrL 4007 (1976); Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 327 n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 Cath.U.L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977); Crump, Capital Murder: The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous.L.Rev. 551, 555 (1977); Goldstein, "Objections to the Court’s Charge on Punishment;” “Objection No. 16" at G-191 (printed in Capital Murder Defense Course Materials prepared for the Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Project, December 1978); and Wilder v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
.E.g., Ex parte Sierra, 514 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Brown v. State, 554 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
. Webster’s New Word Dictionary, McMillan Students Ed., the McMillan Company, New York (1969) defines the adjective "deliberate" as "carefully thought out or formed; done on purpose,” or “careful in considering; not rash or hasty,” or "slow; unhurried.”
It also discloses the word "deliberate” made its first appearance in Old English, having been borrowed from the Latin word "deliberatus,” the past participle of the irregular infinitive “deliberare,” meaning "to weigh in mind, ponder,” which in turn is derived from de + libra, meaning "scale.”
This was the basic thrust of the charge requested by appellant in the instant case. See majority opinion at 779.
. Judgment of the Court announced by opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens [hereinafter "the Supreme Court” consistent with all other decisions of this Court since July 2, 1976].
. The exercise of informed sentencing discretion, according to the Court in Gregg, requires taking into account: (1) the circumstances of the offense; (2) the character; and, (3) the propensity of the offender. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 621, 98 S.Ct. 2981, 57 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1978), [holding “individualized sentencing” is constitutionally required in capital cases].
. Particularly relevant to the issue before us today is the following rationale;
"The idea that a jury should be given guidance in its decisionmaking is also hardly a novel proposition. Juries are invariably given careful instructions on the law and how to apply it before they are authorized to decide the merits of a lawsuit. It would be virtually unthinkable to follow any other course in a legal system that has traditionally operated by following prior precedents and fixed rules of law.... When erroneous instructions are given, retrial is often required. It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations.”
Gregg, supra, at 193, 96 S.Ct. at 2934.
. In Gregg, supra, the Court pointed to the Georgia Supreme Court’s striking one of the statutory aggravating circumstances for failure to provide “clear and objective standards,” and that Court’s demonstration of “a concern that the new sentencing procedures provide guidance to juries."
Similarly, in Proffitt, supra, the Court observed that under Florida Supreme Court decisions, statutory provisions were not "impermis-sibly vague” and had been "construed in a manner providing adequate guidance.”
. Observing that systems allowing only consideration of aggravating circumstances are unconstitutional for failure to provide individualized sentencing determinations, the Court stated,
"A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.”
Jurek, supra, at 271, 96 S.Ct. at 2956. Accord Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
. "Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Article 37.071(b)(2), V.A.C.C.P.
. See n. 3, ante, for recitation of the "deliberateness question," the first special issue. The third special issue inquires:
"If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.”
See Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) [wherein third punishment issue was construed "to permit the jury to consider particularized mitigating circumstances’’].
. The majority avoids the critical issue by pretending the word is “easily comprehended by everyone” and therefore "jurors can be fairly presumed to know and apply such meaning,” then faulting appellant for making no showing that guidance to the factfinder on this issue is necessary.
I too have pondered the consequences of the holding I suggest and though I find it unpalatable, it is preferable to having even more capital convictions vacated by the federal courts because of grossly uneven applications of our sentencing procedure down the line. Compare, e.g., Blansett, supra, with Wilder, supra. I would have "the buck stop[ ] here."
. While it is true, as observed in King, supra, that the United States Supreme Court did not require that we construe particular words and phrases extant in the special punishment issues, that Court intimated the necessity to construe certain words might arise, and reserved that construction for this Court. Jurek, supra, 428 U.S. at 271, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. at 2956, n. 6.
. Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., requires:
"... [I]n each felony case ... the judge shall, before the argument begins, deliver to the jury, ... a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case;_”
See also Article 36.15, V.A.C.C.P., and compare Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (wherein the trial court’s failure to give instruction at the capital punishment phase was held not reversible error absent an objection or requested instruction).
. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1977).