dissenting.
This is an appeal from an order reinstating respondent as an officer of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department. While an officer in the Kansas City Police Department, respondent made a $1,000 contribution to the campaign committee of John Carnes, a candidate for election to the United States House of Representatives. Respondent was charged with violating § 84.-830, RSMo 1978, which prohibits any Kansas City police officer from contributing to any political party, club or purpose:
“No officer or employee in the service of said police department shall directly or indirectly give, pay, lend, or contribute any part of his salary or compensation or any money or other valuable thing to any person on account of, or to be applied to, the promotion of any political party, political club, or any political purpose whatever.”
After affording respondent a hearing on the matter, the Board of Police Commissioners ordered him discharged from the police force. Respondent petitioned the Circuit Court of Jackson County for injunc-tive and declaratory relief. Respondent challenged the constitutionality of § 84.-830, alleging it violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in that it deprives him of freedom of expression and association and freedom to partici*344pate in the political process. The trial court raised sua sponte the issue of whether the Federal Election Campaign Act preempts § 84.830.
The essential question on appeal is: May § 84.830, RSMo 1978, be used to deprive a Kansas City police officer of his right to make a campaign contribution to a candidate for election to the United States House of Representatives?
The Preemption Issue: On November 1, 1983, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of preemption in Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 291, 78 L.Ed.2d 10 (1983). The teaching of Aloha is that when this Court is confronted with a federal statute which unambiguously preempts state law, it may not “avoid this direct conflict by looking beyond the language of [the federal statute] to Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute.”
In my view, preemption as to election to Federal office must be found from the explicit language of 2 U.S.C. § 453, which reads as follows:
“The provisions of this Act, and of rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office.”
This Court cannot create an ambiguity where none exists. The proscriptions of § 84.830 may not be imposed in this case.
The Constitutional Issue: It is well settled that a limitation on campaign contributions involves substantial First Amendment rights. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). In this constitutionally sensitive area, a State must justify challenged applications of its laws. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2683, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), the United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether a State may force a public employee to relinquish his right to political association as the price of holding a public job, and articulated the test which should be applied on this appeal: “In short, if conditioning the retention of public employment on [non-participation in the political process] is to survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights.”
The “vital government end” asserted by appellants in their brief is as follows:
“When the political neutrality of a police department is compromised, there is a tendency for control of the department to be thereby transferred from the Chief of Police to the politicians in power at the time. * * * The public interest is jeopardized by the risk that this politicalization will adversely affect the goals of law enforcement officials, * * * and by the harm to the community engendered by the diminished reputation of its police department. * * * The department itself suffers, because this politicalization is inimical to the maintenance of a merit system of hiring and promotion, * * * and makes employment on the department less attractive to qualified recruits, * * 4 and because the department thereby loses the confidence and trust of the public. Permitting partisan political contributions can also have a debilitating effect on the morale, discipline, and es-pirit de corps of the department.
“The performance of the individual officer is adversely affected by his participation in partisan politics, because he fears persistent conflicts between the unbiased discharge of his official duties and the partisan interests of the politicians to whom he has pledged support. * * 4 These conflicts are particularly dangerous in light of a police officer’s direct contact with the electorate and the electoral process.
“Finally, where as in this case, the officer who makes a public partisan political contribution functions in a supervisory capacity, the contribution has a chilling affect on the First Amendment rights of those officers under his command who are of a different political persuasion. 4 4
*345In my view, no state interests suggested are sufficient to justify the restriction on constitutional rights challenged on this appeal. We need not paint with a broad brush in this case. See Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 355, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885). We need not hold § 84.830 unconstitutional. We can “tailor and apply” § 84.830 “in a manner that avoids” such a result. God-frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). I would hold only that § 84.830 may not be used to deprive respondent of his right to make a contribution to a candidate for election to the United States House of Representatives. Section 84.830 would remain a viable constraint on political activity not related to election to Federal office.
I dissent.