OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.Appeal is taken from a conviction for murder. The jury assessed punishment at 99 years and a fine of $10,000.00. The conviction was affirmed by the Beaumont Court of Appeals, Ninth Supreme Judicial District. We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review in order to examine the Court of Appeals’ holding that neither the indictment nor the trial court’s charge is fundamentally defective and that the felony murder merger doctrine does not apply in this case.
The indictment alleges appellant, on February 9, 1980, “did then and there commit the felony offense of arson by then and there starting a fire in a habitation ... owned by Clyde Clifton Murphy, with intent to damage and destroy said habitation and to collect insurance for such damage and destruction, and while in the course of and furtherance of the commission of said offense did then and there commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit: did start a fire in a habitation, and did thereby cause the death of an individual, John Thomas Johnson.”
Appellant contends the indictment is fundamentally defective “because the State erroneously set out the constitutent elements of the underlying arson under a partially repealed version” of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 28.02. Effective Sept. 1, 1979, Sec. 28.02, supra, was amended to read as follows:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage any building, habitation, or vehicle:
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“(2) knowing that it is insured against damage or destruction;”1
Because it omits the phrase “knowing it [the habitation] is insured against damage or destruction,” appellant argues the indictment is fundamentally defective.
If a charging instrument omits specific reference to a word, term, or phrase that is a constituent element of the offense but, from reading the indictment as a whole, that element is supplied by necessary inclusion within an expressed word, term, or phrase, then the failure to specifically plead the word, term, or phrase will not render the charging instrument fundamentally defective. Dennis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). See also Art. 21.17, V.A.C.C.P. In order to possess the intent to collect insurance for the damage and destruction as alleged in the indictment, appellant necessarily had to know the house was insured. The constituent element of “knowing the habitation is insured” therefore is supplied by necessary inclusion within an expressed word, term, or phrase in the charging instrument. We find the indictment is not fundamentally defective.
Appellant also contends the trial court’s charge is fundamentally defective because it too instructed the jury in the language of prior Sec. 28.02, supra. The court charged the jury as follows:
“A person commits the offense of arson if he starts a fire with intent to destroy *119or damage any building to collect insurance for the damage or destruction.
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“Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Clyde Clifton Murphy, did ... commit the felony offense of Arson by then and there starting a fire in a habitation located in Angelina County, Texas, owned by Clyde Clifton Murphy, with intent to damage and destroy said habitation and to collect insurance for such damage and destruction, and while in the course of and furtherance of the commission of said offense did then and there commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, to wit: did start a fire in a habitation, and did thereby cause the death of an individual, John Thomas Johnson, you will find the defendant guilty.”
Because the court’s charge required the jury to find appellant had the intent to collect insurance for the damage and destruction to the habitation, it necessarily required the jury to find appellant knew the habitation was insured. We find the trial court’s charge is not fundamentally defective.
Appellant further maintains the merger doctrine operates as a bar to his prosecution for felony murder. He argues, “the conduct that allegedly constituted the gist of the underlying felony, namely, ‘starting a fire,’ was the exact same act alleged to have been clearly dangerous to human life and thus was ‘inherent in the homicide.’ ”
Sec. 19.02(a)(3), supra, the “felony murder rule,” provides that a person commits an offense if he:
“commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt ... he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.”
In Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Cr.App.1978), however, we held that the felony murder doctrine does not apply where the precedent felony is an assault inherent in the homicide. Garrett’s conviction could not stand because the underlying aggravated assault and the act resulting in the homicide were one and the same. This limitation on the felony-murder rule is known as the merger doctrine.
In the instant cause, the indictment alleges and the proof shows that appellant was engaged in felonious criminal conduct, namely, arson at the time the deceased was killed. Therefore, as required in Garrett, there was a showing of felonious criminal conduct other than the assault which caused the homicide. Unlike Garrett, appellant’s act of arson in setting a habitation on fire and the resulting homicide of the victim were not one in the same. In this case, appellant attempted to set fire to a house in order to destroy it and collect insurance money, a property offense, and in the furtherance of such offense, the deceased was killed.
That the felony murder rule was intended by the Legislature to be applied to homicides perpetrated in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of arson is clear from the Practice Commentary to See. 28.02:
“Causing the death [of any person] ... ordinarily would constitute murder under Section 19.02(a)(3) and be punishable as a first-degree felony.”
Appellant is incorrect in his assertion that Garrett requires the reversal of his conviction.
Lastly, appellant contends both the indictment and the trial court’s charge are fundamentally defective for failure “to ascribe any culpable mental state to the conduct attributed to appellant.” He maintains the indictment failed to allege, and the court’s charge failed to instruct the jury to find, (a) he intentionally or knowingly committed arson; (b) he intentionally or knowingly committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.
The Practice Commentary notes that “the mental element required under *120Sec. 28.02 is intent;” that is, “starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage ... knowing ...” No mental state, therefore, is required under Sec. 28.02, supra, for “starting a fire.”
Furthermore, a felony murder situation implicates the theory of transferred intent. Kuykendall v. State, 609 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The culpable mental state for the act of murder is supplied by the mental state accompanying the underlying felony giving rise to the act. Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The mental state of intent accompanying the underlying felony of arson thus supplies the mental state for the act of felony murder. It is unnecessary to allege additional mental states in the indictment or to instruct the jury they must find appellant “intentionally or knowingly committed arson” and “intentionally or knowingly committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.” No error is shown.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
. Prior to amendment Sec. 28.02, supra, read as follows:
"(a) A- person commits an offense if he starts a fire or causes an explosion:
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"(2) with intent to destroy or damage a building or habitation to collect insurance for the damage or destruction."