Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion emphasizes the central question: whether the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Act grants an officer a right to appeal a temporary disciplinary suspension after the Civil Service Commission conducts a hearing pursuant to § 17 of the Act. Section 20, amended in 1979, effective after the Blanchard opinion, Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Service Commission of the City of Fort Worth v. Blanchard, 582 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.1979) provides:
Disciplinary Suspensions
The head of either the Fire or Police Department shall have the power to suspend any officer or employee under his jurisdiction or supervision for disciplinary purposes, for reasonable periods, not to exceed fifteen (15) days; provided, that in every such case, the department head shall file with the Commission within one hundred and twenty (120) hours, a written statement of action, and the Commission shall, upon appeal from the suspended officer or employee, hold a public hearing under Section 17 of this Act. The Commission shall determine whether just cause exists therefor. In the event the department head fails to file said statement with the Commission within one hundred and twenty (120) hours, the suspension shall be void and the employee shall be entitled to his full salary. The Commission shall have the power to reverse the decision of the department head and to instruct him immediately to restore such employee to his position and to repay the employee for any lost wages. If the Commission finds that the period of disciplinary suspension should be reduced, it may order a reduction in the period of suspension. In the event such department head refuses to obey the order of the Commission, then the provisions with reference to salaries of the employees and to the discharge of the department head as well as the other provisions of Section 16, pertaining to such refusal of the department head, shall apply.
Section 16 governs indefinite suspensions (dismissals). The differences between the two statutes become readily apparent. Upon indefinite suspension, the Chief or department head must file a written statement with the Commission giving the reasons for such suspension and deliver a copy to the suspended employee. The written statement must inform the employee of his right to appeal to the Commission within 10 days, and that the appeal must be in writing. After the mandatory hearing, the Commission must render its decision in writing, not less than 30 days after the notice of appeal was given. The written decision must state whether the suspension shall be a permanent dismissal, a temporary dismissal, or whether the employee is restored to his former position or status in the classified service in the department. If he is restored, he shall receive the amount that would have been his full rate of pay, compensating him for the actual time lost as a result of the suspension. The written statement must provide notice of specific acts showing violation of the civil service rule or rules. The department head cannot *529amend his original written statement and charges, nor may any violation be alleged which occurred more than six months before the date of suspension. To uphold a suspension or dismissal the Commission shall find violation of a civil service rule or rules and shall find the specific charges are true.
When the Legislature amended § 20 to provide for the protection of an appeal with a public hearing before the Commission, it failed to provide for any of the other parallel rights outlined in § 16. Other than the § 17 public hearing, the Legislature extended to the Commission the power to reduce a disciplinary suspension period. It defined the function of the Commission on appeal pursuant to § 20: to determine whether just cause exists for the disciplinary suspension.
Nowhere in the disciplinary suspension section is the Commission required to issue a written decision as in § 16. It can be presumed that the employee is not entitled to a written decision, for § 17 does not so provide.
The obvious conclusion is that the Legislature simply sought to protect the employee from abuses suffered at the hands of a dilatory Commission which would refuse to investigate or to hear his appeal. That employee now has the right to a public hearing with the right to subpoena books, records, documents, papers, accounts, or witnesses. Only evidence submitted at the hearing may be considered, and a permanent public record of the proceedings must be maintained.
Determining “just cause” for a disciplinary suspension not exceeding 15 days and, on the other hand, rendering a written decision which might well be the basis for an appeal to district court are two distinct duties of the Commission arising under two very different statutes. An example of this difference is offered in the present case. Nowhere in this record is there a “written decision” of the Commission of the City of Laredo. Attached to the employee’s original petition is the three-day suspension letter of notice from the department head. There is no written decision of the Commission. Will pleading allegations alone be relied upon to perfect appeals to district court in this kind of case? In this case also there was no further evidence presented to substantiate what the action of the Commission was; there are only the pleadings and the discussions of the attorneys. It can be deduced that the Legislature would have provided the exact and procedurally proper method for appeal in disciplinary suspension matters had it so intended.
I believe the Legislature still intends to leave § 20 disciplinary suspension actions, that is, suspensions of less than 15 days for disciplinary purposes only, in the hands of the department heads. If he desires, the employee then may appeal to the Commission and if he does, has the protection of a public hearing. This procedure enables the disciplinary processes to move rapidly without disruption of a vital city department for long periods of time with pending court proceedings. Had the Legislature intended to open up the panoply of appellate procedure to employees disciplined under the provisions of § 20, it would have enacted a plain amendment so stating. I cannot read this meaning into § 20 as it is now written. I would hold that a district court has no jurisdiction to hear a § 20 appeal from the Commission.
Even if reasonableness of attorney fees is not correctly before the court in the appeal by the City, this appellate court may, in looking at the entire record (a 12-page statement of facts with no testimony of the officer, uncomplicated pleadings, a pretrial order the attorneys signed) determine whether the attorney fees might be excessive considering the one-day suspension order, and the recovery of one day’s wages. See McFadden v. Bresler Malls, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, no writ). I would suggest, if the jurisdiction of the district court is upheld, this court examine that question. TEX.R.CIV.P. 440.