On Rehearing.
CRAMER, Justice.Appellee’s motion for rehearing assigns error in our holding that appellants’ grocery and liquor business was Property within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Statutes; asserting that “Appellants’ grocery and liquor business is not ‘property’ within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Statutes.” In the case of Milam County v. Akers, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W. 2d 719, 721, writ ref., in answer to the contention that “Injury to Akers’ business was not a recoverable item of damage,” the Austin Court of Civil Appeals overruled such contention (paragraphs 4, 5), stating: “The second contention is overruled upon the authority of Hart Bros. v. Dallas County, Tex.Com.App., 279 S.W. 1111; Pieratt v. La Grange, Tex.Civ.App., 171 S.W.2d 377, approved as to this point, [142 Tex. 23], 175 S.W.2d 243. The assign*1021ment upon which this contention is based complains of the overruling of an exception to Akers’ answer setting forth the injury inflicted by the new construction upon his cattle business. The injury was not asserted as a separate item of damage but only as affecting the market value of the farm for the uses to which it was adapted and being put. As such it was a proper subject of pleading and proof. The same is true with reference to evidence of the cost of the residence and of its removal to another location (contention 3, above). These were matters having evidentiary bearing upon the issue whether and to what extent the market value of the farm had been depreciated 'by the new highway; the widening, rerouting and reconstruction of the old. They did not constitute the •measure of damage, which was the depreciation in market value, but were proper elements for consideration in arriving at that measure. This subject is fully treated with review of authorities in State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 195 and 979. The point is too well settled to require elaboration.” See, also, 16 Tex.Jur., Eminent Domain, secs. 339, 343 and 349; Powell v. Houston & T. 219, 135 S.W. 1153, syls. 5 and 6, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 1615.
It is clear to us that the court submitted appellants’ case to the jury on an erroneous theory and that our judgment of reversal and remand was proper. The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.