dissenting. In Sturdy v. Hall, 201 Ark. 38, 143 S. W. 2d 547 the court discussed at length the far-reaching implications of the power conferred by Initiative and Referendum Amendment No. 7 and seemingly indicated that we should be cautious about reading more into the enactment than clearly appears therein to give it effect. The concluding thought is expressed in these words:
“It appears, therefore, that a very small per cent, of our population may, at each general election, assemble the electorate into both a general assembly, and a constitutional convention. The law must, therefore, be, and is, that if a power so great may be exercised by a number so small, a substantial compliance with the provisions of the Constitution conferring these powers should be required. ’ ’
In my opinion the above pronouncement portrays sound and practical reasoning, and it should not be ignored when considering the three issues decided by the majority. I am unable to bring myself in accord with either of the three conclusions, as indicated below.
1. The words “for correction and amendment” should not be interpreted to confer the right to add additional names to referendum petitions after they have been declared “insufficient” [for the lack of sufficient names], (a) If the authors of Amendment No. 7, being-zealous as they manifestly were to extend and protect these rights to the people, had intended to give the sponsors a second chance to secure needed signatures they would have made that intention known in no uncertain language. Since the language does leave a serious doubt as to the extent of its meaning it should, it seems to me, be resolved against the respondents in this case, (b) Our own court has already placed its interpretation on the language here under consideration in the case of Dixon v. Hall, 210 Ark. 891, 198 S. W. 2d 1002. There the same amendment was involved and the court, in refusing to allow additional names to be added, used this language: “Correction and amendment go to form and error.” I can not conceive how it can be logically insisted that the addition of new names to a petition would come under either form or error. In the absence of any good reason to the contrary suggested or occurring to me I prefer to follow the path so clearly indicated by our own former decision.
2. With the majority holding that a failure to file certified poll lists with the petitions is not fatal, I also do not agree. It may be conceded that such a defect could be remedied under form or error on the first filing, but where no additional time can be extended, as in this case, a very different situation presents itself. Act 195 of 1943, § 3, provides: “. , . when a part is delivered to the Secretary of State, the sponsors shall also deliver a duly certified list of poll tax-payers of the county in which the particular part [petition] was circulated. ” We said in Pafford v. Hall, 217 Ark. 734, 233 S. W. 2d 72, this act was constitutional and valid, and in the Sturdy case, supra, we said there must be a substantial compliance. Here there was absolutely no compliance.
3. Likewise I cannot agree with the majority holding that a fraudulent affidavit [regardless of how corrupt or to what extent it reaches] merely shifts the burden to the respondents to establish valid signatures. Such an affidavit invalidates the entire petition and leaves no remedy to the respondents, as, in my judgment, this court lias already indicated in three separate cases, viz: Sturdy v. Hall, supra; Sturdy v. Hall, 204 Ark. 785, 164 S. W. 2d 884; and Pafford v. Hall, supra. The second Sturdy case in no way relaxed the rule announced in the first one, but clearly distinguished it on the facts. The rule followed by the majority here may be referred to as the “Oregon Buie.” In this the majority may be sustained by plausible reasoning, but the fact is that this very rule was considered and rejected in both the Sturdy cases. About this there can be little doubt because, in the first the court, after carefully considering and posing the question, it has said:
“The cases which have considered the question, as will presently appear, are to the effect that petitions verified by an affidavit shown to be false are treated as petitions having no affidavit. In other words, the false affidavit is no affidavit.”
Then the opinion leaves no doubt about the fate of a petition with no affidavit for it further states: “No one would contend that names should be counted which appear upon petitions containing no verifying affidavit.”
Thus, it seems to me, the court has clearly indicated what our decision should be on this issue. No peculiar facts or circumstances have been suggested in this case, to warrant a departure from a course so clearly defined, and it would appear to me to be a strained conclusion that disregards the clear pronouncements of our own court to follow a foreign rule which we have heretobefore refused to accept.