delivered a concurring opinion in which MEYERS and JOHNSON, J.J., joined.
I concur only in the judgment. I write separately to explain my reasons for doing so. After having had the opportunity to reexamine the record on rehearing, I agree with the majority’s holding that appellant failed to preserve error under Criminal Rule 612(b)1 (now Tex.R. Evid. 613). During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant called Elmer Pelfry as a witness. At the time, Pelfrey was under indictment for two felonies pending in the same court as the instant case. Before Pelfrey testified, his attorney, Bradford Shaw, presented the following motion:
MR. SHAW: My name is Bradford Shaw. I’m an attorney for Elmer Pel-frey. He has been charged with two felony indictments in this particular Court, and I would motion the Court, at this time, to enter an order prohibiting the State’s attorneys from asking him any questions concerning his guilt in these two offenses that are currently pending, based on his Fifth Amendment rights and under Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
That would also include asking whether or not he is charged with these offenses. As you are well aware, he presumed to be innocent, and that the rules of evidence provide that a person may be — testimony may be impeached by the admission or the asking of a felony conviction. And in this instance, he has not been convicted. These cases are pending. We would ask the Court enter an order in accordance with my request.
THE COURT: I will order the State not to ask him anything factually about the charges against hem as far as guilt-innocence or anything like that. So that portion of your request is granted.
I will deny your request — I think that under bias and motive, they can go into the fact that he does have pending charges against him.
So that is the order of the court. Anything further?
Following the trial court’s ruling, appellant’s attorney then proceeded to conduct direct examination of Mr. Pelfrey. Upon cross-examination, the State attempted to question Pelfrey regarding his two pending charges. At this point, appellant’s counsel objected, stating, “I’m going to object to that Your Honor.” The Court again overruled the objection, explaining, “For the reasons stated previously, I will overrule the objection.”
Throughout this entire colloquy, neither the trial judge nor appellant ever cited any specific rules of evidence. However, a close reading of the record supports the conclusion that while appellant’s objection to evidence of “pending cases” relied upon Rules 608(b) and 609, the trial court’s deci*275sion to overrule the objection “under bias and motive” was based on Texas Criminal Evidence Rule 612 (now Tex.R. Evid. 613). Therefore, when the trial court indicated that it would allow the evidence of Pel-frey’s pending charges to show bias and motive, appellant’s counsel should have registered another objection arguing that the evidence was also inadmissible to show bias and motive. Because he did not, he failed to preserve error under Rule 612. Admittedly, this is a thin distinction, but one that is proper nonetheless.
However, due to the fact that we are affirming the Court of Appeal’s holding that appellant failed to preserve error, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds in the State’s motion for rehearing. Therefore, the majority’s criticisms of the December 16, 1998, opinion are unwarranted.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the judgment of the Court.
. The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence are now merged with the civil rules and are simply referred to as the Texas Rules of Evidence.