dissenting:
Again I dissent in this case involving Anthony Ciotti. I dissent because there is no evidence to indicate that the Commonwealth’s chief witnesses, Samuel and Andrea Rossi, might have been “accomplices” of appellant, and also because I feel that the defense waived any right to have an accomplice charge read to the jury.1
*556The facts of this case are set forth in the majority’s opinion; however, some of the facts merit elaboration. Mr. Rossi testified that he did not realize how much money had been given to him by appellant “for the kids” the night of November 15, 1977, until he got undressed for bed after appellant left the Rossi residence. Although Mr. Rossi did not attempt to give the money back to appellant, he did turn it over to the police the following day. Although Mr. Rossi did not immediately contact the police the night of November 15, he did make two phone calls from work on November 16 to an attorney acquaintance, and stopped at the attorney’s house that evening after the attorney failed to return his phone calls. Mr. Rossi testified: “I was very scared. I didn’t know what to do. I had to ask somebody for advice. I had to talk to somebody, and I tried to call him [the attorney].” Mrs. Rossi similarly testified that she became afraid and didn’t know what to do when she realized that there was stolen property in her garage. Within twenty-four hours of discovering that their garage contained stolen property, and immediately after conferring with counsel, the Rossis notified the police and turned over to them the two hundred dollars.
A person may be found guilty of receiving stolen property if he “intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing . that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) defines “accomplice” as follows:2 “A person is an *557accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.” The only part of the definition of “accomplice” which might arguably apply to our situation is (1) (ii). I see absolutely nothing in the record in this case which could lead to any reasonable inference that Mr. and Mrs. Rossi had the intent of “promoting” or “facilitating” the reception, the retention, or the disposition of stolen property by appellant. There is simply no evidence sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the Rossis were accomplices.
In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 479 Pa. 34, 37-38, 387 A.2d 820, 822 (1978), our Supreme Court set forth the law on accomplice testimony:
The rationale behind instructing a jury that it should view the testimony of an accomplice with suspicion when the accomplice testifies for the prosecution, lies in the recognition that such a witness, out of a reasonable expectation of leniency, has an interest in inculpating others. For an accomplice charge to be required, the facts need not require the inference that the witness was in fact an accomplice, they need only permit such an inference. If the evidence is sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the prosecution’s witness was an accomplice, the defendant is entitled to an instruction as to the weight to be given to that witness’s testimony. (Citations omitted).
In the case before us, the police were totally unaware of any connection between the Rossis and the stolen records until the Rossis voluntarily came forward. I do not see how an inference might be drawn that these people who involved themselves by reporting a crime to the police had the intent to “promote” or “facilitate” the retention or disposition of stolen property. The case before us is totally unlike the *558situation in Thomas, wherein the witnesses were members of the same gang that the appellant belonged to, and were engaged in continuing criminal activities with the understanding that the fruits of any crimes would be shared by the gang members. I do not believe that the trial judge in the case before us erred in refusing to charge the jury on accomplice testimony.3 Considering the evidence which had been presented, such a charge could only have served to confuse the jury.
As noted previously, the rationale behind an accomplice charge is that an accomplice testifying for the prosecution has an interest beyond that of an ordinary witness, and this interest should be called to the jury’s attention so that the jury will hear the testimony with suspicion and .weigh it carefully for truthfulness. In the case before us, the following exchange took place at side-bar between the Commonwealth’s attorney, Mr. Palmisano, and appellant’s attorney, Mr. Scarpitti, after eight of appellant’s witnesses had testified and before appellant took the stand himself:
MR. SCARPITTI: Your Honor, Mr. Palmisano has graciously said that we can stipulate that Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Rossi have not been charged with anything arising out of this incident rather than having to call somebody to prove it. Would you announce that—
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SCARPITTI: —to the jury, your Honor, at this time?
THE COURT: All right.
MR. PALMISANO: There’s been no deal with them, you know. You understand. I think that—I think same token, there’s been no deal with them.
MR. SCARPITTI: I don’t know if there’s a deal or not, your Honor.
MR. PALMISANO: There is none.
*559THE COURT: Are you stipulating on that, too?
MR. SCARPITTI: I didn’t—I didn’t assume a deal. I could—
PALMISANO: They’ve never been charged and they’ve never—there was never any approach, never any conversation about being charged.
MR. SCARPITTI: I believe Mr. Palmisano. I don’t know what the police said to ’em, of course. That’s the problem. I never asked about a deal. I mean I know you never had any contact with them.
MR. PALMISANO: Never a deal. I never heard of anything in the case about it.
THE COURT: Kind of a funny thing to stipulate on.
MR. SCARPITTI: I don’t want to seem like I’m double-crossing you, and I would stipulate that Mr. Palmisano didn’t make a deal with them, but I don’t—I don’t know enough from the police officers to know—to be able to stipulate whether or not they did say anything to them in that respect.
MR. PALMISANO: I don’t know what relevancy it is that they have not been charged.
THE COURT: You could have asked them that when they were on the stand.
MR. SCARPITTI: I forgot, frankly, your Honor.
That’s why I wanted to stipulate it rather than having to call somebody to testify.
MR. PALMISANO: But I don’t want it to go in, you know, bare that they haven’t been charged because you could have somebody on the jury thinking there’s been a deal, which is in conjunction with his trying to discredit these people.
THE COURT: Call them back then.
MR. SCARPITTI: I’d be willing to stipulate, your Hon- or, that if Mr. and Mrs. Rossi had been asked, they would testify that they were not charged and that if they had been asked, they would testify that no deal was made.
MR. PALMISANO: Right.
THE COURT: All right.
*560It seems apparent from the above exchange that appellant’s attorney wanted the Commonwealth to stipulate that no charges had been brought against the Rossis, so that the defense could argue to the jury that a deal might have been made to obtain the Rossis’ testimony, thereby possibly discrediting the Rossis to some extent. When the Commonwealth’s attorney was not taken in by the ploy, but requested the additional stipulation that no deal had been arranged, the defense agreed to the stipulation “that if Mr. and/or Mrs. Rossi had been asked on either direct or cross examination, they would have answered that they had not been charged with any crime as a result of this incident; and furthermore, if asked, they would have answered that they had struck no deal with the police or with the district attorney.” The lower court was puzzled by the stipulation, doubtless because appellant’s defense had been that of alibi 4—that he had had no contact with the Rossis at the times in question—and because there had been no indication from the evidence presented that anyone might have contemplated bringing charges against the Rossis or that a “deal” of some sort might have been worked out to obtain their testimony. By offering to stipulate, the defense passed up the opportunity to place before the jury evidence (probably because the defense knew that there was none) that the Rossis might be testifying out of an expectation of leniency; yet the defense later requested an accomplice charge, which is based on the theory that an accomplice will testify for the prosecution out of an expectation of leniency. In addition to finding that the record does not permit an inference that the Rossis were accomplices, I would therefore also find that the defense waived any right to have the court give an accomplice charge when it declined the opportunity to question the witnesses concerning any deal that might have *561been made, and stipulated that the witnesses would have testified that there had been no deal made.
. The following points for charge relevant to accomplice testimony were presented in writing to the lower court, and were denied in chambers on record:
12. Andrea Rossi and Samuel Rossi should be considered accomplices in this case.
13. The testimony of an accomplice given at a Defendant’s trial must be carefully scrutinized and accepted with a high degree of caution because of the interest which the accomplice has in the case and because his testimony is from a corrupt source.
14. A conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or accomplices is looked on with disfavor by the law.
15. An accomplice is one who is guilty of the crime charged, in this case, the crime of receiving stolen property and it is well known that when apprehended, accomplices are likely to attempt to cast the blame on others.
. Since the Crimes Code was enacted after the decision of both Commonwealth v. Sisak, 436 Pa. 262, 259 A.2d 428 (1969) and Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 165 Pa.Superior Ct. 561, 69 A.2d 428 (1949) (cited by the majority for the "general rule” on whether a witness is an "accomplice”), it would seem to be less confusing and more appropriate to use only the definition of "accomplice” given in the Crimes Code.
. The lower court did charge the jury: "Ask yourself whether [the witnesses’] testimony is logical and reasonable; whether it’s plausible; whether there is any corroboration for their testimony. Ask yourself whether or not they have any interest in the outcome of this case. The Rossis certainly have an interest. The defendant has an interest.”
. Although the majority opinion indicates, n. 3, that part of appellant's defense was that the Rossis were accomplices of an undisclosed third party, the notes of testimony of the trial indicate that this simply was never mentioned (unless, perhaps, it was mentioned in the untranscribed arguments to the jury).