concurring.
The appellant here was charged with a felony murder. The “modus operandi”, of which “was for appellant’s companion to choke the victim with a Chinese choker chain while appellant would reach into the pockets of the victim to remove any articles of value”.
Upon such evidence, a charge of voluntary manslaughter in any form is an affront to common sense and the truth determining process. Either the defendant is guilty of murder or he is not. To allow a jury to toy with any other definition upon such allegations is a disservice to both the defendant and the Commonwealth. A conviction of less than the crime charged based on the “passion” and “provocation” of voluntary manslaughter ought to be a compromise unacceptable to any of the parties. I would compel a charge of voluntary manslaughter only when the alleged facts argue its possibility. See, Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328 (1983).
*162By its definition, voluntary manslaughter is essentially an admission of the act of killing, justified by passion and provocation. It ought not be a substitute for an unproven charge of murder or “mercy”.
Therefore, I join in the opinion of the majority that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b).