dissenting.
I fully agree with the majority that this voluminous record of 2,350 pages presents an uncommonly complex case, and I acknowledge at the outset that, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision call is extremely close. I disagree, however, with the result reached.
The conviction was for being an accomplice to murder with malice aforethought under our former Penal Code (See Articles 70, 72, 1256 and 1257, V.A.P.C., 1925). The punishment of 35 years’ imprisonment was assessed by the jury.
Appellant’s foremost contention on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness, Marcia McKittrick, and thus to sustain the conviction. Appellant relies upon Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., which requires the corroboration of an accomplice witness. McKittrick made out . a complete case against the appellant, and except for the requirement of Article 38.14, supra, the conviction would be easily affirmed.
Turning to the record before this court, it is found that, omitting the formal parts, the indictment alleged:
“Bobby Wayne Vandiver and Marcia McKittrick on or about the 24th day of September, A.D. 1972, in said County and State did with malice aforethought kill John Hill by shooting him with a gun.
“And the Grand Jurors aforesaid do further present in and to said court that Lilia Paulus on or about 24th day of' September, A.D., 1972, prior to the commission of the said offense by the said Bobby Wayne Vandiver and Marcia McKittrick as aforesaid, in the County of Harris and State of Texas, did unlawfully and wilfully advise, command, and encourage the said Bobby Wayne Vandiver and Marcia McKittrick to commit said offense, the said Lilia Paulus not being present at the commission of the said offense by the said Bobby Wayne Vandi-ver and Marcia McKittrick .... ”
Article 70, V.A.P.C. (1925), defined an accomplice to the crime as
“An accomplice is one who is not present at the commission of an offense, *838but who, before the act is done, advises, commands or encourages another to commit the offense; or
“Who agrees with the principal offender to aid him in committing the offense, though he may not have given such aid; or,
“Who promises any reward, favor or other inducement, or threatens any injury in order to procure the commission of the offense; or,
“Who prepares arms or aid of any kind, prior to the commission of an offense, for the purpose of assisting the principal in the execution of the same.”1
It is clear from the record before us the appellant was charged under the first mode of Article 70, supra (the first paragraph of the statute quoted above). The State thus had the responsibility of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was an accomplice to the crime of murder in the mode chárged.
The record reflects that at approximately 7:30 p. m. on September 24, 1972, Dr. John Hill was shot to death at his home in Houston. Hill and his wife, Connie, had just returned to Houston on National Air Lines from a trip to Seattle, San Francisco and to a medical convention at Las Vegas. As the Hills arrived by taxi at their home on Kirby Drive in the River Oaks section of the city, they were confronted at the door by a masked man with a gun who announced it was a robbery. The masked individual, deceased at the time of trial,2 and later identified as Bobby Wayne Vandiver,3 had been waiting at the Hill home in anticipation of the Hills’ arrival and had bound and gagged Hill’s mother and his 12-year-old son, Robert. Hill and Vandiver struggled, and Hill’s wife ran for help. Vandiver fled after shooting Hill four times with a .38 caliber pistol. The cause of death was shown to be the result of gunshot wounds.
At the time of his death Dr. Hill was under indictment for murder in the death of his first wife, Joan, daughter of Ash Robinson. The trial on said charge had resulted in a mistrial. A second trial was pending. It appears from the evidence that there was a great deal of animosity between Hill and Ash Robinson.
Marcia McKittrick was the State’s principal witness, whom thé court designated as an accomplice witness as a matter of law in *839its charge to the jury. She was an admitted prostitute from Dallas who was 25 years old at the time of the instant trial.4 She related she met Vandiver during her childhood and met him again when she was “working”5 in Houston and he became her “chip”6 or boyfriend, who was aware of her profession and who travelled with her from time to time while she practiced her profession. Vandiver informed her that from time to time he committed robberies. McKittriek testified she believed she met the appellant Paulus at the Houston airport in January 1972, and on that day or the next day she went to appellant’s home on Underwood Street in Houston and thereafter she stayed at appellant’s home whenever she was in Houston — approximately three months all together from the time she met appellant until the time of the alleged offense. She related appellant was aware of her “activities” and that from time to time she worked as a member of the world’s oldest profession at the Wm. Penn Hotel.
During her stay at appellant’s home, she related appellant asked her if she knew of anyone interested “in filling a contract,” meaning a killing without mentioning any intended victim. McKittriek agreed to make inquiries. Thereafter she met Ash Robinson at appellant’s home and appellant later told her that Robinson was the one who wanted a contract on Dr. John Hill of whom she had not heard. She saw Robinson at appellant’s house several times and concluded he seemed obsessed with his grandson and the question of his custody.
McKittriek revealed she mentioned the “contract” to Vandiver in the spring or early summer of 1972, while they were in Dallas, and two weeks or so later, she introduced Vandiver to the appellant at appellant’s home in Houston. She related appellant asked Vandiver if he was interested in the “contract” for $5,000.00, and stated, without revealing the source, that she would receive her money from the same source as Vandiver. Vandiver agreed and they discussed details. Later, McKittriek and Vandiver decided to “forget it” and returned to Dallas. In the late summer, McKittriek related, the appellant called Vandiver at his sister’s house in Dallas and told him the contract was on again and “... what had gone wrong was right again.” McKittriek and Vandiver returned to Houston, and several weeks before September 24,1972, the appellant took them on at least three occasions to the Hill home on Kirby Drive, discussing Hill’s routine and mentioning the people who were normally there. McKittriek related that once Ash Robinson came to appellant’s home while Vandiver was there, but Vandiver was asleep. She stated on occasion she was with the appellant when appellant met Robinson at the Ben Taub Hospital in Houston, but she stayed in appellant’s car and that appellant would sit in Robinson’s car or they would walk. She related she couldn’t hear any conversation, but on several occasions it appeared Robinson handed money to the appellant.
McKittriek related that prior to September 24, 1972, appellant told Vandiver the money was to come from Ash Robinson because Robinson was convinced that Hill would never be convicted of his daughter’s death and that this was the only way he could get justice. Appellant gave McKit-trick and Vandiver a coffin shaped picture of Hill. In an effort to locate Hill, McKit-trick made phone calls from appellant’s home to Seattle and to Las Vegas. She stated the appellant was aware of these calls. Unable to locate Hill, McKittriek and Vandiver drove to Las Vegas in an effort to *840find Hill a few days before September 24th. Unable to locate Hill, they returned to Houston where the appellant told them that Hill was to return the next day but that Ash Robinson didn’t know which flight. Appellant informed McKittrick that Ash Robinson had given her $7,000.00. On the morning of September 24, 1972, McKittrick saw Robinson at appellant’s home and he stated that Hill would have $15,000.00 on his person. McKittrick testified the appellant had the arrival times for the National Airlines flights from Las Vegas on that day, but appellant didn’t know which flight Hill would be on, so McKittrick called the ticket agent for National Airlines and learned Hill was due to arrive in Houston at 6:38 p. m. She identified the front of State’s Exhibit # 21 containing the time of the incoming flights from Las Vegas to be in appellant’s handwriting.
McKittrick related she and Vandiver then calculated the time it would take a taxi to come from the airport and about 7 p. m. they drove to the Hill home. After Vandi-ver knocked on the door and entered the house, McKittrick drove the car to the House of Pies on Kirby Drive and waited for Vandiver to call on the pay phone as previously agreed. She waited an hour until Vandiver called and said there had been a “rumble.” She picked him up at a Stop and Go convenience store and they returned to appellant’s home. There appellant gave Vandiver $5,000.00 and he returned $1,500.00 — $1,000.00 for steering him to the job and $500.00 for the advance she had given to them for the trip to Las Vegas.
McKittrick related she and Vandiver then left for Dallas where they learned from television news reports the pistol used had been recovered from some bushes near the Hill home. McKittrick admitted she had acquired the .38 caliber pistol involved from Dr. William Mitchell of Longview, who was one of her “tricks” or customers and that she had given it to Vandiver sometime before the alleged offense.
Dr. Mitchell testified and acknowledged that he had given the .38 caliber pistol to McKittrick.
The State offered evidence relating to appellant’s arrest on April 25, 1973, over seven months after the alleged offense, at a house at 3024 Pine Gulley Street in Houston where she was living at the time with one Corley Myers. In her purse was a piece of paper on which the number “523-3746” was written. It was shown to correspond to the once unlisted telephone number of Ash Robinson. The telephone number was not in appellant’s handwriting.
In a search of appellant’s home at 3654 Underwood on the same date, police officers found a blank personalized check # 117 on a joint account of the appellant and her husband, who was then deceased. This check was found in a night stand in the back bedroom. On the cheek was written, “You had better tell Ash they are trying to sepono (sic) Ma.” It was shown “Ma” was commonly used in reference to Robinson’s wife. The writing was not in appellant’s handwriting.
In the search of appellant’s house on Underwood the police found several slips of paper in a chest near a telephone in the den. The first slip (State’s Exhibit No. 21) contained the following handwritten notations:
the second note (State’s Exhibit No. 22A) was as follows:
*841The apparent times listed on the front of State’s Exhibit No. 21 were shown to coincide with the arrival times of National Airlines flights into Houston from Las Vegas during 1972 and 1973, etc. The notations on the bottom part of the front of said exhibit were shown to relate to the Wm. Penn Hotel and a telephone number. The State offered appellant’s daughter, Mary Wood, who testified the handwriting on the front of State’s Exhibit No. 21 was that of her mother’s.7 Two handwriting experts called by the defense, including one from the Houston Police Department, were unable to testify that the handwriting on the front of such exhibit was that of appellant’s.
The notations on the back of the exhibit were shown to coincide with the round trip times of National Airlines flights between Houston and Las Vegas and were not in appellant’s handwriting. The upside down figures were shown to be in McKittrick’s handwriting and were apparently made as a result of a gin rummy game.
State’s Exhibit No. 22A was shown to be a telephone message for McKittrick who “worked” under the name “Dusty.” The message was not in appellant’s handwriting. It was apparently from Dr. Mitchell.
It was shown by a security supervisor of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company that telephone calls from appellant’s home phone were made on September 16, 1972 to Western Airlines and Air West, Inc., in Seattle and to the Stardust Hotel in Las Vegas. The record also shows a telephone call on September 11, 1972 to Kenneth Hotchkins’ home in North Mesquite, shown to be the residence of Vandiver’s sister according to McKittrick. Apparently because of some mix-up in telephone company records the supervisor-witness was unable to pinpoint the exact date the unlisted phone (523-3746) for Ash Robinson was installed. He could only say it was in operation from sometime late in September until November 3, 1972, when the original listed phone number was reinstated. Whether the unlisted phone was installed prior to Hill’s death is thus not revealed.8
The appellant testified denying that she participated in the alleged offense. She denied knowing Vandiver or acting as a liaison for Robinson. She related she knew Robinson only “on sight and through horse show circles,” but never had a private or intimate conversation with him. “I know of him and I have seen things in the news about him, but personally he is not an acquaintance of mine.” She stated she met McKittrick in the spring of 1972 when she was introduced to her by Bill McDonald, a friend of her late husband. She acknowledged that McKittrick stayed at her house on Underwood Street from time to time and had a key to the house. Sometimes McKittrick would stay in the middle bedroom and sometimes in the back bedroom. Appellant related she did not know whether McKittrick was a prostitute, but suspected it later and told McKittrick not to bring her men friends to her (appellant’s) home.
Appellant testified that Dianne Setteg-est, a close friend of Joan Hill before her death and of Ash Robinson, stayed at her home when she was in Houston in 1971 to testify at the murder trial of Dr. Hill and that she (appellant) attended a portion of the trial when Settegest testified. Setteg-est planned, she said, to stay with her again when she returned to testify at Dr. Hill’s second trial. She related the number “523-3746” on a slip of paper in her purse was not in her handwriting and could have been given to her by Settegest.
Appellant related she met Corley Myers in the summer of 1972, became engaged to *842him, and in the late summer of 1972 moved in with him in his house on Pine Gulley in Houston. She did not completely abandon her house on Underwood as she returned to pick up the mail and stayed a few days from time to time, but she stayed most of her time at Myers’ house. It was there that she was arrested seven months after the death of Dr. Hill.
The State, in rebuttal, called Joan Jawor-ski Worrell, who testified she had seen the appellant in a conversation with Ash Robinson at Chatsworth Farms, a horse farm, once in 1965 and twice thereafter, the last time being in early 1969 before Joan Robinson Hill’s death. Worrell also testified she had seen the appellant with Robinson in a restaurant in New Orleans in April, 1970, when she (Worrell) was staying at the Fair-mont Hotel there.9
Mary Wood, appellant’s daughter, testified for the State. She stated that in 1963 or 1964 she met Joan Robinson Hill through Dianne Settegest and that at the Hills’ home on MacArthur Street she and her mother were introduced to Ash Robinson. Later they visited a number of times in the Hill home in River Oaks and on occasion Ash Robinson would be there and she and her mother conversed with him. She related that on occasion she and her mother would sit in the Robinson box at horse shows with Robinson and his wife. During December, 1970, while on a visit to her parents’ home, Wood heard her mother say that Dianne Settegest had called and said Ash Robinson was looking for someone to kill John Hill.10 She testified that her mother’s reputation for truth and veracity was bad.
The defense called Dianne Settegest of Dallas, who was born and raised in Houston. She related she rode show horses as did Joan Robinson Hill and that she met Joan and her father at a horse show in Baton Rouge in 1952; that she met the appellant, Lilia Paulus, at the Almeda Stables in Houston in 1957 or 1958; that Chats-worth Farm Stables operated by Joan Robinson Hill were opened in 1963 and she spent many week-ends there and was manager of the farm from September 1968 to February 1969. She stated she never saw appellant and Ash Robinson there together. The only time appellant was there was when she invited the appellant to come to the farm for a drink during the Christmas season of 1968. She knew of no acquaintanceship between Ash Robinson and the appellant. She doubted if Ash Robinson knew who Lilia Paulus was though Lilia might recognize Ash. She attended many horse shows and never saw the appellant sitting in the Robinson box and never saw the appellant at the home of the Hills.
She testified that immediately preceding Joan Robinson Hill’s death she was staying at the Hill home; that when she returned from Dallas to testify before the grand jury in connection with Joan’s death she stayed at Ash Robinson’s home; that when she came back to testify at Hill’s trial she stayed at appellant’s home on Underwood Street.
She denied that she ever told the appellant Ash Robinson wanted John Hill killed. She acknowledged that she had three phone numbers for Ash Robinson. She had two numbers “... [A]nd then, at some point, I was given another.” To the best of her knowledge it was given to her after Hill’s death, ft was a possibility that she gave this number to the appellant as she (Setteg-est) was going to see Robinson, but she had no specific recollection.
Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corrob*843orated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”
This provision has been a part of every Code of Criminal Procedure ever adopted in this state, Rogers v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 331, 54 S.W.2d 1010 (1932), and the language of the statute has remained the same.
An accomplice witness11 has been described as a discredited witness. Cast v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 3, 296 S.W.2d 269 (1956); Odom v. State, 438 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); 23 C.J.S., Crim.Law, § 808, p. 72. It has been frequently said that the testimony of an accomplice witness is untrustworthy and that it should be received and viewed and acted on with caution. 23 C.J.S., Crim.Law, § 808, p. 72. In Comm. v. Turner, 80 A.2d 708, 367 Pa. 403, it was said that the testimony of an accomplice witness is to be carefully scrutinized not only because of any interest he or she might have, but because her or his testimony is evidence from a corrupt source. It is well established by virtue of Article 38.14, supra, that the testimony alone of an accomplice witness cannot furnish the basis for a conviction. O’Neal v. State, 421 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Boone v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 259 S.W. 581 (1924), and a conviction so based must be reversed. Walker v. State, 94 Tex.Cr.R. 567, 252 S.W. 554 (1923). And this is true no matter how complete a case may have been made by the accomplice witness’ testimony, Meyer v. State, 104 Tex.Cr.R. 6, 282 S.W. 233 (1926), and no matter how much credit the jury might have given to such testimony. Article 38.14, supra, note # 54.
In Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), this court wrote:
“The test as to the sufficiency of the corroboration is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then to examine the evidence of other witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpatory evidence, that is evidence of incriminating character which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. If there is such evidence, the corroboration is sufficient; otherwise it is not. Dalrymple v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 366 S.W.2d 576; Bradford v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 530, 342 S.W.2d 319.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Odom v. State, 438 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); James v. State, 538 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Etheredge v. State, 542 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Nelson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Loa v. State, 545 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
All the facts and circumstances in evidence may be looked to as furnishing the corroboration necessary. Washburn v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 125, 318 S.W.2d 627, 634 (1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 965, 79 S.Ct. 876, 3 L.Ed.2d 834. See Brown v. State, 561 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The corroborative evidence may be circumstantial or direct. 23 C.J.S., Crim.Law, § 812(3), f. 107 (note 51 with a host of Texas cases cited). See Brown v. State, supra. The combined cumulative weight of the incriminating evidence furnished by the nonaccomplice witnesses which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense supplies the test. Perkins v. State, 450 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Windham v. State, 479 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Colunga v. State, 481 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). It is not necessary that the corroboration directly link the accused to the crime or be sufficient in itself to establish guilt. Attwood v. State, 509 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Rainey v. State, 401 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Cr.App.1966); Washburn *844v. State, supra. Apparently insignificant circumstances sometimes afford most satisfactory evidence of guilt and corroboration of the accomplice witness’ testimony. Holmes v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 423, 157 S.W. 487 (1913).
In Reynolds v. State, supra, it was said:
“The corroborative testimony need not directly link the accused to the crime or be sufficient in itself to establish his guilt. Otherwise, the testimony of the accomplice would be valueless. The corroborative evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the accused with the crime, and it is the cumulative weight of such evidence which supplies the test.”
What was said in Reynolds was expressed in Minor v. State, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 299 S.W. 422 (1927), as follows:
“The law forbidding a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice does not demand that there be direct evidence pointing to the accused as the offender, but merely requires that there be ‘other evidence tending to connect the defendant with offense committed.’ * * * Circumstances proved by credible witnesses may be as potent as direct testimony in tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. The state is not called upon to point to some single or isolated fact which in itself, unrelated to other proven facts, will be sufficient corroboration. It is the combined and cumulative weight of the evidence furnished by non-accomplice witnesses which supply the test. If by this rule it appears on appeal that before the jury there was proof confirming the testimony of the accomplice to material facts tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offense, the law is satisfied.”
It must be remembered, however, that evidence which does no more than point the finger of suspicion towards an accused is insufficient to corroborate testimony of an accomplice witness. 24 Tex. Jur.2d, Evidence, § 694, p. 326, note 18, and cases there cited. In Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 145 S.W.2d 576, 579 (1940), this court wrote:
“For the purpose of corroborating testimony which is considered too unreliable to take human liberty, something stronger is required than mere suspicion.”
In Umsted v. State, 435 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), it was held that evidence which merely raised strong suspicions or the probability of guilt of the accused was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice witness.
It should also be noted that although an accomplice witness may state any number of facts that are corroborated by evidence of other witnesses, still if the facts thus corroborated do not tend to connect the accused with the crime, corroboration on that basis would not meet the requirements of Article 38.14, supra; Odneal v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 97, 34 S.W.2d 595 (1931); Noble v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 404, 273 S.W. 251 (1925); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); O’Donald v. State, 492 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Anders v. State, 501 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
“No precise rule can be laid down as to the amount of evidence that is requisite to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, so as to sustain a conviction of the accused.” 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 694, p. 325.
In applying the test of the sufficiency of the corroboration, each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances — on its own merits. Etheredge v. State, 542 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); O’Donald v. State, 492 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Barnett v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 270, 290 S.W.2d 234 (1956); McCarty v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 408, 163 S.W.2d 200, 202 (1942). See also 23 C.J.S., Crim.Law, § 812(6), p. 134; Forbes v. State, 513 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), cert.den. 420 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 830, 42 L.Ed.2d 840.
It appears that McKittrick, the accomplice witness as a matter of law, made out *845an almost complete case against the appellant. Without the requirements of Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., there could be no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Applying Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., as we are required to do, and the test of sufficiency of corroboration as discussed in Edwards v. State, supra, we must look to the non-accomplice witnesses’ testimony.
The evidence, independent of that of the accomplice witness, reveals the murder of Dr. John Hill by Bobby Wayne Vandiver.
Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., however, expressly provides that evidence merely showing the commission of an offense is not sufficient alone to corroborate an accomplice witness. 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 694, p. 326. See also Odom v. State, 438 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Windham v. State, 479 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Colunga v. State, 481 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Anders v. State, 501 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Nelson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). However, it is a factor to be considered along with other possible factors in determining where is sufficient independent evidence to corroborate the accomplice witness.
There was evidence that there was a great deal of animosity between Hill and Ash Robinson, his former father-in-law, over the death of Hill’s first wife, Joan Robinson Hill. Hill had been charged with murder in connection with her death. His trial on said charge had ended in a mistrial and the charge was still pending at the time of his death. The evidence implies Ash Robinson had a motive for having Hill killed.
Appellant admitted she knew of Ash Robinson, but denied he was an acquaintance of hers. One witness placed appellant in the company of Robinson on several occasions, the first occasion being in 1965. Appellant’s daughter, Mary Wood, testified she and her mother had visited in the Hill home in 1964 and 1965 and there they met Ash Robinson, and had on occasion sat in the Robinson’s box at horse shows with Robinson and his wife “Ma.” Wood also testified she heard the appellant say in December, 1970 that Diane Settegest had told her Ash Robinson was looking for someone to kill John Hill.
Appellant was shown to be a friend of Diane Settegest who had lived at the Hill home prior to Joan Hill’s death, stayed at the Robinson home on occasion, and who stayed at appellant’s home during Hill’s trial at which she was a witness. On the day of her arrest, there was found in the back bedroom of appellant’s home a blank personalized check of appellant’s (# 117). On the check had been written the message, “Tell Ash they are trying to subpono (sic) Ma.” It was shown that series of checks from the bank account of appellant from # 112 to # 120, with the exception of #’s 114 and 117, were cashed during the time of Hill’s trial for murder. The writing on said check was not in appellant’s handwriting.
In appellant’s purse on the day of her arrest was a slip of paper containing numbers which corresponded with the unlisted telephone number of Ash Robinson in service from sometime in September until November 3, 1972.
The evidence is sufficient to corroborate McKittrick that appellant knew Ash Robinson. This is a factor also to be considered.
It was undisputed that McKittrick lived at appellant’s house from time to time and had a key thereto during the period of time that McKittrick testified that appellant solicited her to find someone to “fill a contract” and during the time McKittrick stated appellant advised and encouraged her and Vandiver to carry out the contract.
It has been held that it may be shown in corroboration that the accomplice witness and the accused were intimate associates. Brunett v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 244, 26 S.W.2d 208 (1930). In 23 C.J.S., Crim. Law, § 812(4)(g), pp. 119-120, it was writ*846ten, however, that “... it has been held not sufficient corroboration merely to show generally the accused was an associate of the accomplice at a time antecedent to the commission of the crime, or that they were together shortly before or shortly after the commission of the crime.” See also Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Moore v. State, 521 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Lyman v. State, 540 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). See further Ayala v. State, 511 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The presence of the accused with the accomplice witness, however, may when coupled with other circumstances be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness. Nelson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Moore v. State, supra; Cherb v. State, supra.
Further, evidence which merely goes to show motive or opportunity of the accused to commit the crime is insufficient to corroborate the accomplice witness, although it may be considered in connection with other evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime. See 23 C.J.S., Crim.Law, § 812(4), p. 111; Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The records of the telephone company reflect that on September 11, 1972, a phone call from appellant’s home and from a number listed to Claude Paulus, appellant’s deceased husband, was made to the home of Vandiver’s sister in Mesquite. The evidence indicates appellant was living alone at the time. This corroborates McKittrick’s testimony that in the late summer while she and Vandiver were at her sister’s house appellant called Vandiver and told him the contract was “on again.”
While the Hills were on their trip to Seattle, San Francisco and Las Vegas, telephone company records show that on September 16, 1972, phone calls were made from appellant’s home to two airlines in Seattle and to a hotel in Las Vegas.
Further, and most damaging, is the evidence that a slip of paper was found in the search of appellant’s house, on the front of which was written the arrival times in Houston for National Airlines flights from Las Vegas which were in effect for September 24,1972, the date of the alleged murder. Such notations on the front of the slip were in appellant’s handwriting according to her daughter.12
As earlier noted, all the facts and circumstances in evidence may be looked to as furnishing the corroboration necessary. The corroborative evidence may be circumstantial or direct. Apparently insignificant circumstances sometimes afford the most satisfactory evidence of guilt and corroboration of the accomplice witness’ testimony. It is not necessary that the corroboration directly link the accused to the crime or be sufficient in itself to establish guilt. The combined cumulative weight of the incriminating evidence furnished by the non-accomplice witnesses which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense supplies the test. Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances and on its own merits.
The trial court charged the jury on the law of accomplice witnesses and instructed the jurors that McKittrick was an accomplice witness as a matter of law. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict as this court is required to do, and under the rules previously discussed, I would conclude that the evidence independent of the accomplice witness tends to connect the appellant with the crime charged and is sufficient to corroborate the accomplice witness’ testimony.
*847I would uphold the jury verdict and overrule appellant’s contention.
I dissent to the reversal.
Before the court en banc.
.It has been said an accomplice to the crime is one who has completed his offense before the crime is actually committed, and whose liability attaches after its commission, by virtue of his previous acts in bringing it about through the agency or in connection with third parties. Burow v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 133, 210 S.W. 805 (1917); Harper v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 501, 33 S.W.2d 455 (1930).
Care should be taken to distinguish between an accomplice to the crime or offense (Article 70, V.A.P.C., 1925) and the meaning of an accomplice witness as contemplated by Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P. (1965).
Under the 1925 Penal Code the parties to a crime at common law were codified into Texas law as principals, accomplices to the crime (accessories before the fact) and accessories (after the fact). However, when reference is made to an accomplice witness, it means a person who, either as a principal, accomplice or accessory, was connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission on his part, transpiring either before, at the time of, or after commission of offense, whether or not he was present and participated in the crime. Cama-than v. State, 478 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert.den. 409 U.S. 866, 93 S.Ct. 160, 34 L.Ed.2d 114.
While a principal to a crime, an accomplice to a crime, and an accessory were separate and distinct offenses under the former codes, Dinklage v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 10, 117 S.W.2d 111 (1938); Lopez v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 208, 339 S.W.2d 906 (1960), when these individuals testified for the State in the trial of another for the same crime they all were considered accomplice witnesses for the purposes of Article 38.-14, supra. Much confusion has arisen since many opinions refer to accomplice meaning in fact an “accomplice witness” and another time meaning “accomplice to the crime.”
. It was shown that Vandiver had been killed by a city of Longview policeman in 1974 while resisting arrest.
. Hill’s son identified a photograph of Vandiver as the man who broke and entered the Hill home before the arrival of the doctor and his wife.
.In her testimony she admitted she had been convicted for her participation in the murder of Dr. Hill [McKittrick v. State, 541 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1976)], had been convicted of felony theft in Dallas County, and had become a heroin addict since the time of the alleged offense.
. She indicated this meant as a prostitute.
. She described a “chip” as a “bed partner.”
. McKittrick also testified the handwriting was that of appellant’s but her testimony must be considered in light of Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P.
. The trial court refused to let Ash Robinson’s attorney testify that after Dr. Hill’s death he advised Robinson to secure an unlisted telephone number because of the many calls Robinson received on his listed number.
. The defense offered evidence that the records of the said Fairmont Hotel did not show that Worrell was a guest at such hotel in April, 1970, or during the months of January, February or March of that year.
. The defense offered evidence the witness Wood did not visit her mother’s home in December 1970.
. An accomplice witness is defined in footnote 1.
. McKittrick had testified that when she and Vandiver returned to Houston from Las Vegas in search of Hill appellant had obtained the time of the arrival of the National Airlines flights from Las Vegas, but did not know which flight the Hills would be on. McKittrick also testified the handwriting was appellant’s, but her testimony cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration.