dissenting:
The least important part of the criminal law is the determination of guilt; the most important part is the formulation of a just sentence. The accuracy of this appraisal is shown by the fact that most criminal cases are disposed of on pleas of guilty; even in those that are tried, the fact-finder (judge or jury) frequently has little trouble in deciding that the defendant is guilty. It is therefore “[a]mong the ironies of the law,” ABA Standards Relating to Appel*524late Review of Sentences (Approved Draft, 1971), that typically the courts devote a great deal of attention to the determination of guilt, and almost none to the formulation of a just sentence.
The majority opinion, I regret to observe, illustrates this typical approach. Great care, manifested by the citation of many cases, is devoted to deciding whether appellant was properly found guilty. The majority then turns, on page 522 of its opinion, to appellant’s argument that his sentence is manifestly excessive. This argument is disposed of summarily in two brief paragraphs that are not only not responsive but represent a misstatement of the law.
The first paragraph of the majority opinion’s discussion of the sentence is as follows:
Appellant first argues that the sentence is manifestly excessive. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for no less than six years and eight months nor more than fifteen years. Although the maximum sentence which could have been imposed was fifteen years, sentencing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 235 Pa.Super. 185, 340 A.2d 515 (1975). The sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum. Therefore, this contention is without merit. Majority Opinion 247 Pa.Super, at 522, 372 A.2d at 1212.
Appellant has never contended that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. If it had, the sentence would not have been illegal as “manifestly excessive” but illegal per se. No court has jurisdiction to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the crime committed.
The question that appellant has raised is whether the cumulative sentence imposed on him as a result of the charges arising out of the episode of April 28, 1966, was manifestly excessive in that it inflicted too severe a punishment. It is long-settled that when a defendant thus challenges his sentence, we must respond by reviewing the sentence. This obligation is imposed on us both by statute, Act of June 24, 1895, § 8, P.L. 212, as amended by Act of June 3,1971, P.L. 122, No. 6,' § 1 (§ 509(a)(33)), 17 P.S. § 192 *525(1976 Supp.) and by the cases. Commonwealth v. Person, 450 Pa. 1, 297 A.2d 460 (1972); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 235 Pa.Super. 185, 340 A.2d 515 (1975); Commonwealth v. Warner, 227 Pa.Super. 291, 324 A.2d 361 (1974); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa.Super. 203, 313 A.2d 342 (1972); Commonwealth v. Pouls, 198 Pa.Super. 595, 182 A.2d 261 (1962); Commonwealth v. Downer, 161 Pa.Super. 339, 53 A.2d 897 (1947). In discharging our obligation of review our responsibility is to determine whether the sentencing judge in formulating the sentence exercised his discretion in a lawful manner. In Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976), the Supreme Court has defined the content of this standard:
The sentence must be imposed for the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1321(b) (Supp.1975). At least two factors are crucial to such determination — the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1403(a)(2) provides that all pre-sentence reports shall include such information. We hold that regardless whether a pre-sentence report is ordered, the sentencing court must at least consider these two factors in its sentencing determination. Failure to give such individualized consideration requires that these sentences be vacated.
Id. 466 Pa. at 133, 351 A.2d at 658.
See also, Commonwealth v. Carmichael, 468 Pa. 501, 364 A.2d 304 (1976).
Here the majority has abdicated its responsibility. It has made no effort at all to determine whether the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in a lawful manner.
The second paragraph of the majority opinion’s discussion of the sentence is as follows:
Appellant next contends that the lower court erred in failing to provide reasons for the sentence imposed, as *526recommended by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (Approved Draft, 1971). However, Pennsylvania has not adopted this recommendation as a matter of law. Furthermore, appellant did not request reasons at the time he was sentenced. See Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 233 Pa.Super. 396, 336 A.2d 632 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 1477, 47 L.Ed.2d 744 (1976).
Majority Opinion 247 Pa.Super. at 522, 372 A.2d at 1212.
This statement is quite erroneous. Contrary to the statement, Pennsylvania law does conform to the ABA Standards. The Sentencing Code specifies in meticulous detail the criteria that the sentencing judge must consider in formulating the sentence, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1301 et seq., as amended by Act of Dec. 30, 1974, P.L. 1052, No. 345, § 1,18 Pa.C.S. § 1301 et seq. (1976 Supp.); the appellate rules require that if the sentence is challenged on appeal, the sentencing judge must file a statement of his reasons for the sentence; * and it is settled by statute and *527case law, as has just been discussed, that this court must then review that statement of reasons to determine whether it represents a lawful exercise of discretion.
Here, appellant fully complied with Rule 46 of the Superi- or Court Rules. He served notice on the sentencing judge of this appeal and specifically noted his argument that the sentence was manifestly excessive, and the sentencing judge’s failure to give reasons for the sentence. The sentencing judge in his opinion noted these issues but specifically declined to give his reasons for the sentence. Memorandum for Appellate Court at 4. This was plain error.
I would remand for an opinion in conformance with Rule 46, for without such an opinion we are powerless to discharge our obligation to review appellant’s argument that the sentence was excessive.
Rule 46 of the Rules of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania provides:
Immediately upon taking his appeal, appellant shall serve notice thereof on the opposite party or his counsel; and on the judge who entered the order, judgment or decree below; and also, if the official transcript of the evidence needed on the appeal has not been filed, on the stenographer who took it. If the appeal relates to any order, judgment or decree for which the reasons do not already appear of record, the judge below shall forthwith file of record a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the form of an opinion which shall be attached to the record and printed. Upon receipt of such notice, the official stenographer shall forthwith proceed to have his notes transcribed, approved and filed.
While the Superior Court Rules were abrogated by the Supreme Court effective July 1, 1976, the instant appeal was filed prior to that date.
The relevant portion of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which replace the Superior Court Rules, is Rule 1925(a). That rule provides:
(a) General rule. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the judge who entered the order appealed from, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief statement, in the form of an opinion, of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other matters complained of, or *527shall specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure removes any doubt that this requirement applies to sentencing. That rule defines “order” to “include [ ] judgment, decision, decree, sentence and adjudication” (emphasis added).