dissenting.
For reasons which are fully set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 551, 307 A.2d 238 (1973), I dissent from the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972), to police conduct which occurred prior to the Futch decision. See also Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301, 336 A.2d 296 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen.)
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.