concurring.
I am reluctant to write concerning our refusal of the State’s petition for discretionary review. However, as my brethren have felt compelled to confront what the State has termed as a contradiction in our precedents by making some “hopefully clarifying remarks,” I must do so.
Initially, the manner in which we comment today bears remark. I do not believe brief explanations addressing the State’s perceived contradiction in our precedents are merited in a refusal of their petition. Rather, if the confusion over our precedents is merited then we should grant review at some point, not comment and refuse review. However, our Court should be cautious in granting review in all instances, and the cases in which we grant review should be carefully screened to determine the best scenario for advancing the jurisprudence of our State. Often this means allowing our courts of appeals to develop differing jurisprudence, so as to help in the determinations of what is the most efficient and just manner in exercising our appellate roles.
I agree in part with the majority today in its decision to deny the State’s petition. I believe Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), was correctly decided, and that its application in practice is narrow. Young only concerns review by appellate courts where they are evaluating the evidence presented by the State and
determining the merits of whether it refutes or corroborates the State’s arguments. Neither the majority or the dissent in the Fifth Court of Appeals believe there is a conflict in our decisions in Wright v. State, 832 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) and Young, supra. Additionally, I am inclined to permit our courts of appeals to operate under our precedents and will consider the merits of the State’s arguments in more appropriate circumstances in the future.