dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could have found the Hospital acted in a grossly negligent manner. Because this case is not entirely free from doubt and should have been presented to the jury, I believe Appellant has presented sufficient facts to support a finding of gross negligence on the part of the Hospital. Accordingly, I dissent.
Summary judgment may be granted only in those cases where the right is clear and free from doubt. In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of *285proving the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. Further, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Marks v. Tasman, 527 Pa. 132, 134-135, 589 A.2d 205, 206 (1991) (citations omitted).
Instantly, the majority adopts the definition of grossly negligent as articulated in Bloom v. DuBois Regional Medical Center, 409 Pa.Super. 83, 597 A.2d 671 (1991) and finds the question of whether the Hospital acted in a grossly negligent manner was properly removed from the jury’s consideration. In Bloom, the Superior Court defines gross negligence as conduct found to be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.1 Bloom leaves open the controlling question of whether the judge or jury should make the determination as to what constitutes “flagrant.” Here, the majority suggests the question was clearly for the judge as a matter of law. I disagree.
The Bloom court stated whether an act or failure to act constitutes negligence, of any degree, when viewing all the evidence is a determination for the jury and may be decided as a matter of law only when the case is entirely free from doubt, with no possibility that a reasonable jury could find negligence. Bloom at 99, 597 A.2d at 679-680 (citations omitted). The majority interprets that language and finds that the determination of whether an act constitutes gross negligence is for a jury. However, when the case is entirely free and clear from doubt, it may be removed from the jury and decided as a matter of law. However, this case is not entirely free from doubt and the trial judge’s finding of no gross negligence as a matter of law was an abuse of discretion and in conflict with the majority’s interpretation of Bloom.
In this matter, Appellant has presented sufficient facts to present this case to the jury. Specifically, Appellant asserted that the Hospital ignored warnings of Mrs. Albright’s deterio*286rating mental condition after being informed of her manic state by Mr. Albright, and failed to commit her as an inpatient when she declined to follow up her missed December appointment. Further, Mr. Albright informed the hospital that Mrs. Albright was not taking her medication and missed her last appointment. He told the Hospital that she had a breakdown and was becoming manic, walking around at night. He also indicated Mrs. Albright was chain smoking and that there were some cigarette burns on the couch. In response, the Hospital did not believe there was sufficient time to attempt an involuntary commitment as Mrs. Albright was in the 85th day of a 90-day outpatient treatment. Further, the Hospital believed that an emergency commitment was unsupportable.
When viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party, the question of whether the Hospital’s conduct was flagrant or grossly negligent should have been left to the province of the jury, not the judge. The Superior Court below suggests that this ease is at worst simply an exercise of poor judgement by the Hospital staff. However, I believe the jury should have been afforded the opportunity to make that ultimate decision.
. The definition of flagrant is extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious; shocking. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Second Printing 1969).