dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority that the appellant had no accrued right of action when the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975, T.C.A. 23-3401, et seq!, was enacted, I would hold that the appellant’s cause of action was not barred by the three-year maximum ceiling found at T.C.A. 23-3415(a). I would reverse the dismissal of this suit below and remand the cause for trial.
At the time the diagnosis of the mole was made, the law in this state, like that in the majority of jurisdictions, was that the statute of limitations for personal injury began to run or, in other words, accrued on the date that the negligent act causing the injury occurred. Hall v. DeSaussure, 41 Tenn.App. 572, 297 S.W.2d 81 (1956). Following the lead of the legislature in such fields as products liability, the Supreme Court in Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (1974), adopted the “discovery doctrine” in malpractice actions and held that in such cases:
. the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury, [at p. 517]
Reacting to what was termed the “medical malpractice insurance crisis,” the legislature moved quickly to limit the discovery rule by enacting the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975, T.C.A. 23-3401, et seq. This act and the limitation section found therein, T.C.A. 23-3415, superimpose upon the preexisting *822statute of limitations for personal injury, T.C.A. 28-304, and the discovery rule applicable thereto a three-year ceiling. With the exception of the two specifically mentioned situations — fraudulent concealment and foreign objects negligently left in the patient’s body — T.C.A. 23-3415(a) mandates “that in no event shall any such action be brought more than three (3) years after the date on which the negligent act or omission occurred . . . .” Therefore, it is clear that if the three-year maximum period is applicable to the suit sub judice, then the cause of action is barred.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Tennessee law in Hodge v. Service Machine Company, 438 F.2d 347 (1971), stated:
A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained upon it. Black’s Law Dictionary 37 (4th ed. 1951). A suit may not be brought upon a cause of action until it exists, and a cause of action does not exist until all its elements coalesce. In civil actions for damages, two elements must coalesce before a cause of action can exist: (a) a breach of some legally recognized duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (b) which causes the plaintiff some legally cognizable damage.
Prior to the rendering of Teeters, and the discovery doctrine adopted therein, a plaintiff had “some legally cognizable damage” when the injury occurred whether or not such injury was known or knowable to the plaintiff. (See Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100 (1928); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140 (1934); Jackson v. General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, 223 Tenn. 12, 441 S.W.2d 482 (1969) cert. denied 396 U.S. 942, 90 S.Ct. 376, 24 L.Ed.2d 243.)
In this suit the decedent had an accrued cause of action under the applicable statute, T.C.A. 28-304, on June 2, 1970, and a one-year period commencing on that date in which to file suit. Because of her minority, however, the running of this one-year period was tolled by the savings statute, T.C.A. 28-107, until she reached majority, which under the Legal Responsibilities Act of 1971 was her eighteenth birthday, January 10, 1974. The tolled one-year period began to run on that date. Prior to the running of this period, which would have ended on January 10, 1975, the Supreme Court rendered the Teeters decision, adopted the discovery rule for malpractice actions, and specifically overruled all prior inconsistent cases.
Teeters, in effect, redefined the meaning of “legally cognizable damage” adding discovery as an element thereto. Therefore, under the authority of Hodge and under the express terms of Teeters itself, a cause of action in medical malpractice situations accrues on discovery. With the enactment of T.C.A. 23-3401, et seq., and the three-year maximum ceiling found therein, the possibility of a cause of action being cut off before it ever accrued arose. This possibility has not been addressed by the courts. See Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn.1978) and specifically the petition to rehear found therein.
The issue in this suit differs from the one enumerated by Justice Henry in the petition to rehear in Harrison. The appellant here had an accrued cause of action when the Teeters decision was rendered. This Court must, therefore, address the issue as to what effect Teeters had on an accrued cause of action.
An accrued cause of action is a legal and substantive right and not merely a right to a certain legal remedy. Anderson v. Wetter, 69 A. 105, 103 Me. 257 (1907). In this sense it is a vested right and was not cut off by the subsequent rendering of Teeters. Although Teeters speaks in terms of accrual on discovery, its effect on a prior accrued cause of action was not one of divestment but of tolling until the right of action vests. This would accrue under T.C.A. 28-304 on discovery. At that point the one-year statute of limitations would begin to run.
When the medical malpractice act became effective, the appellant had an accrued cause of action but no vested right of action. Although some jurisdictions appear to view the two terms an synonymous, Ten*823nessee recognizes the distinction between them. See Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S.W.2d 824 (1954). A cause of action is the state of facts which gives rise to an enforceable right, whereas a right of action is the right to enforce a cause of action under a specific legal remedy. There can be more than one right of action for a single cause of action. Furthermore, there is no vested right to a particular right of action, even if that right of action is in force when the cause of action accrues. Collins v. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Co., 56 Tenn. 841, 9 Heisk. 841; Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn.1973).
Even though the appellant had no vested right of action under T.C.A. 28-304 when the medical malpractice act became effective, I would hold that the three-year ceiling did not cut off the appellant’s cause of action or the right of action which subsequently accrued on discovery on January 13, 1976.
In Parlatto v. Howe, 470 F.Supp. 996, U.S. District Court, Knoxville, filed April 20, 1979, and designated for publication, Judge Taylor held that T.C.A. 23-3415(a) did not eliminate the special rights of minors under T.C.A. 28-107. This Court adopted that holding in Braden v. Yoder, Knox County, filed May 25, 1979. T.C.A. 28-107 provides:
If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either (1) within the age of eighteen (18) years, or (2) of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability;
This legal disability provision does not “toll” the running of T.C.A. 28-304 but rather provides a grace period in which suit may be commenced once the disability is removed. Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
As was held in Parlatto and in Braden, the three-year maximum ceiling codified in the malpractice act does not create an absolute bar under all circumstances. The disability statute is a legislative exception to the running of certain statutory limitation periods designed to provide protection to disabled parties who are otherwise helpless to protect themselves. To cut off a minor’s cause of action under the three-year ceiling of the malpractice act would be to effectively deprive that minor of a cause of action in all situations where the negligent act or omission occurred more than three years before reaching majority. Such an application is contrary to the legislative purpose of the disability statute, and would produce results unreasonably harsh in nature.
The causes of action of the various plaintiffs protected under T.C.A. 28-107 is not therefore cut off three years from the date of the negligent act or omission where the cause accrued during disability. The disabled plaintiff must be given the grace period equal to the time limitation for the particular cause of action. The appellant’s cause of action in the instant suit was filed on January 7, 1977. The decedent’s eighteenth birthday was January 10,1974. The suit is not barred by the three-year maximum period. Furthermore, discovery occurred on January 13, 1976; therefore, the suit is timely under T.C.A. 28-304.