Appellee school districts, parents, and students filed suit in the district court of Travis County seeking a declaration that the Texas school financing system, Tex. Educ.Code § 16.001, et seq., is in violation of the Texas Constitution.1 After a bench trial, the district court rendered judgment to that effect. This Court will reverse the judgment and here render judgment that appellees take nothing.
By its judgment the district court declared the funding scheme in violation of Tex. Const, art. I, § 3 (equal rights), § 19 (due course of law)2 and art. VII, § 1 (efficient school system). The district court concluded that education is a “fundamental right”; that wealth is a “suspect classification” in the school finance context; that the existing funding scheme is unconstitutionally “inefficient”; and that the Texas Constitution demands “fiscal neutrality” in public school funding, i.e., the level of expenditures per pupil in any district may not vary according to the property wealth of that district. Finally, the district court enjoined the relevant state officials from enforcing the challenged statutes but *861“stayed” the injunction until September 1, 1989.
The district court filed many findings of fact, a distillation of which follows. There are 1,061 school districts in Texas with about three million students in attendance. Under the existing school finance system, the state and the school districts share the cost of school operations but not the cost of facilities, which is borne entirely by the districts. Of total education costs, the State provides approximately forty-two percent, the school districts approximately fifty percent (derived from local property taxes), with the remainder coming from various sources, including federal funds. Because taxable property wealth varies from district to district, school districts’ abilities to generate revenues vary and, as one would expect, there are disparities in the level of expenditures per student between the wealthy and the less wealthy school districts. Wealthier school districts are able to provide their students better physical facilities, more extensive curriculum, larger libraries and better trained teachers than are the less wealthy districts.
The local school district tax rates also vary widely from district to district. The less wealthy districts frequently must set a higher than average tax rate to achieve the necessary revenue to meet minimum educational standards.
The State, through its Foundation School Program, offsets to a degree the inability of the less wealthy school districts to generate revenues. The purpose of the program is to insure that each district has the necessary funds to provide each of its students at least a basic education. Under the program, the amount of state aid received by any given district is “equalized” according to a complex formula, so that low property wealth districts generally receive substantially more state aid than do the high property wealth districts.
By several points of error, appellants challenge the district court’s overall conclusion that the State’s school funding scheme is in violation of Tex. Const, art. I, § 3. Article I, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights....
More specifically, appellants attack the district court’s application of the “strict scrutiny” standard in evaluating the school finance system because, appellants assert, education is not a “fundamental right” and wealth is not a “suspect classification.”
In an equal protection or equal rights analysis, the appellate court, of necessity, must begin by recognizing the applicable standard of judicial review.3 If the questioned statute infringes upon a “fundamental right” or creates an inherently “suspect classification,” the statute will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny requires the state to establish a compelling interest in its enactment. To discharge such a burden the state must demonstrate that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and compelling, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.1985); Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).4 *862On the other hand, if the statute does not collide with a fundamental right or create a suspect classification, the statute is accorded a presumption of constitutionality. The presumption may not be disturbed unless the enactment rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state objective. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex.1985).
In support of the district court’s conclusion that education is a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis, appellees advance the premises that (1) education is vitally important and (2) education is specifically referred to in the Constitution of Texas, particularly Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1. No one, of course, disputes appellees’ premise that education is important and that public education has long commanded a central role in the affairs of this State. Importance of a state service and its role in state affairs, however, is not controlling in ascertaining whether fundamental constitutional rights are involved. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1295, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
Appellees’ second premise is grounded upon a statement in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, to the effect that for purposes of federal equal protection analysis one should determine “whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” Because public education is mentioned in the Texas Constitution, appel-lees insist that the right to an education is a fundamental right. More specifically, ap-pellees rely upon Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1 which provides:
§ 1. Support and maintenance of system of public free schools.
Sec. 1. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.
Appellees’ argument, embraced by the district court, ignores the difference between the Constitution of the United States and that of Texas. Unlike the United States Constitution, which is a document delegating limited authority and power, the Texas Constitution addresses a great number of subjects, the large majority of which are not fundamental rights. Indeed, the Texas Constitution contains many provisions that are usually the subject for legislation. For example, the Constitution provides for the establishment of county poor houses and farms, art. XVI, § 8; defines usury, art. XVI, § 11; provides for local option elections, art. XVI, § 20; provides for mechanic liens, art. XVI, § 37, and for water storage facilities, art. Ill, § 49-d. Yet, no one would seriously propose that one has a fundamental right, for example, to a water storage facility or a mechanics lien although the provision for each finds its place in the Texas Constitution. This Court, of course, does not suggest that these provisions are on an equal footing with those provisions which concern education, but the placement in the Constitution of such legislative-type provisions points up the weakness in appellees’ argument, i.e., that because a subject is contained in the Texas Constitution it must be a fundamental right.
Appellees point out, however, that the Texas Constitution not only refers to education, but also states that education is “essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people.” Because the Texas Constitution states that education is “essential” to the basic liberties, appellees argue education must be a fundamental right. Without a system of education, ap-pellees reason, the people would not be able to meaningfully exercise liberties such as freedom of speech and the right to vote.5 *863Appellees’ analysis has been termed the “nexus” theory in legal writings.
The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that education is not a fundamental right even though its provision by the state may be necessary for its citizens to exercise meaningfully their basic liberties. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra. The Court reasoned that the “nexus” analysis lacked logical limitation; for example, that there is no fundamental right to food and shelter although the existence of each is essential for the exercise of recognized fundamental rights. In this connection, the court stated:
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. If so, appellees’ thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dandridge v. Williams ... [397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) ] and Lindsey v. Normet [405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972)].
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37, 93 S.Ct. at 1299.
Education, without doubt, occupies an important place in the maintenance of the State’s basic institutions and is certainly a primary vehicle for transmitting the values upon which our society rests. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2396, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). The issue here to be resolved, however, is whether education is included in the limited category of fundamental rights that reach constitutional dimensions. Initially, one might conclude that the two issues are the Same; that because education is important, it should be a fundamental right. In ordinary usage, that conclusion is probably correct. In law, however, the term “fundamental right” has a special, narrow, technical meaning. This Court, of course, must employ the term’s legal meaning.
In discussing the narrow, technical meaning, the Supreme Court of Texas has plainly stated that “fundamental rights have their genesis in the express and implied protections of personal liberty recognized in federal and state constitutions” such as the right to free speech or free exercise of religion. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 559 (Emphasis added). The term “fundamental right” refers to a limitation upon the exercise of governmental power; it does not imply an affirmative obligation upon government to insure that all persons have the financial resources available to exercise their liberty or fundamental rights. The issue is one of personal liberty, a broad term, but one that necessarily contemplates that some things must fall outside the scope of “liberty” and hence outside the scope of “fundamental rights.” See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In the present appeal, there is no suggestion of unwarranted governmental interference with any person’s “liberty,” of whatever kind, such as the freedom to travel, to choose an occupation, to make family decisions (whether to marry or whether to have children), to worship God as one sees fit, “and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. at 2706 (Emphasis added).
This court concludes that education, although vital, does not rise to the same level as the right to engage in freedom of speech or to exercise religion free of governmental interference, both rights which have long been recognized as fundamental and entitled to protection under both the federal and state constitutions. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 560. In the opinion of this Court, the dis*864trict court erroneously elevated the important state interest of financing educational opportunity into a protected right on the same level with ancient liberties long recognized by the courts as fundamental, such recognized rights which do not depend upon public financial support.
Moreover, this Court in 1977 adopted the federal constitutional analysis as the proper approach to determine the validity of “constitutional right to education” claims under the Texas Constitution. Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, supra. Although the precise holding in that case was overruled in Plyler, supra, it was overruled on other grounds, i.e., a claim under the federal constitution. As such, Hernandez still requires that the federal analysis be employed to measure state claims. In order to reach its conclusion, the district court disregarded this precedent.
For all of these reasons, the district court erred in concluding that education is a “fundamental” right.
The district court erred further in determining that wealth is a suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis. The plaintiffs in Rodriguez claimed that unequal funding for school districts violated the equal protection rights of students in the less well-funded districts. In rejecting that proposition, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
... [Ajppellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majori-tarian political process.
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1293.
Our analysis under the Texas Constitution reaches no different result.
Because the Texas public school finance system neither collides with a fundamental right nor creates a suspect classification, such system is accorded a presumption of constitutionality. Such presumption may not be disturbed unless the public school finance system bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose. Whitworth v. Bynum, supra; Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, supra; and Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., supra. Utilizing local property taxation revenues to partly finance free public schools is rationally related to effectuating local control of education. The use of local taxes allows a school district the freedom to devote more funds toward educating its children than are otherwise available in the state-guaranteed minimum amount. It also enables the local citizen greater influence and participation in the decision-making process as to how these local dollars are spent. Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931).
Although this Court recognizes that, because of disparities in wealth, the practical effect of the existing finance system can lead to low property-value districts having less fiscal control than wealthier districts, this undesirable result, by itself, cannot invalidate the entire system. The fact that obvious disparities in wealth may promote more local control in some districts than in others does not entirely invalidate the legitimate goal of local participation. A legislative scheme may not be condemned simply because it does not effectuate the state’s goals with perfection. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50-54, 93 S.Ct. at 1305-1307.
Appellants also urge that the present system of school finance is authorized by Tex. Const, art. VII, § 3. This Court agrees. Texas Const, art. VII, § 3, as amended in 1883 and subsequently, provides in relevant part as follows:
*865One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes and poll tax of one dollar on every inhabitant of the State, between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, shall be set apart annually for the benefit of the public free schools; ... and it shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside a sufficient amount of the said tax to provide free text books for the use of children attending the public free schools of this State; provided, however, that should the limit of taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met by appropriation from the general funds of the State and the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school district [sic] by general laws; and all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all said districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts heretofore formed or hereafter formed, for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall vote such tax not to exceed in any one year one ($1.00) dollar on the one hundred dollars valuation of the property subject to taxation in such district, but the limitation upon the amount of school district tax herein authorized shall not apply to incorporated cities or towns constituting separate and independent school districts, nor to independent or common school districts created by general or special law.
(Emphasis added). See also Tex. Const. art. XI, § 10 (repealed 1969); Shepherd v. San Jacinto Jr. Coll. Dist., 363 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.1963); 2 G. Braden (ed.), The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis, 511-520 (1977).
The district court concluded that the provisions of art. VII, § 3 are permissive in nature and merely allow the legislature to create school districts with the power to tax as but one means of providing public education. The district court opined, finally, that nothing in the language of art. VII, § 3 or its history requires a finding that the present system of school finance is constitutional.
The proper guiding principle in the construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted it. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912). A state constitution is not a grant of power but instead it operates solely as a limitation of power. Watts v. Mann, 187 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex.Civ.App.1945, writ ref’d). All power which is not limited by the constitution inheres in the people and a legislative act is valid when the constitution contains no prohibition against it. Id. A general provision in the constitution must yield to a specific provision, San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co. v. State, 128 Tex. 33, 95 S.W.2d 680, 686 (1936), or to another provision adopted later in time. State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S.W. 114, 115 (1901). The wisdom of a constitutional provision cannot be questioned by the courts. Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 167 S.W.2d 147, 154 (1942). If the meaning of the language of the constitutional provision is plain, it must be given effect without regard to the consequences. Id. A statute is presumed constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless some provision of the constitution can be cited plainly showing its invalidity. Tex. Nat. Guard Armory Bd. v. McGraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d 627, 634 (1939). Our duty, then, is to examine the words of the constitution and intent of the voters to determine whether a reason exists to defeat the statute’s presumption of validity. Cox, supra; McGraw, supra.
One need not be a student of history to know of the events leading to the Constitutional Convention of 1875. From 1865 to *8661873, the people of this state were governed by a group of Union supporters and outsiders, a rule imposed and maintained by military might. Ramsdell, Reconstruction in Texas (1910). The Reconstruction Constitution of 1869 set up a strong centralized education system providing for free compulsory education with generous tax support. Eby, The Development of Education in Texas 158 (1925). Pursuant to that Constitution, “[t]he law of 1871 set up the most imperial system of education known to any American state. It was organized along military lines and assumed absolute authority over the training of the children.” Id. at 159. Under the law of 1871 the state board of education was empowered to act in place of the legislature in school affairs. Id. One feature repugnant to most Texans was a district tax of one percent for building and maintaining school houses in the district, Id. at 163; the tax was levied by five citizens appointed to the district board of directors. Id. at 160-161.
Opposition to the new school system was immediate, vigorous, and widespread. For example, a taxpayers’ convention convened in Austin resulted in a proclamation advising the citizens not to pay the tax. Id. at 163. The people had no role, “but to pay the taxes for the support of the system and obediently to send their children to school ... A system more foreign to the sentiments of the people of Texas could not have been devised.” Id. at 161. Texans, by and large, ignored the new school laws.
After a majority of the people were enfranchised and regained control of state government, a convention was assembled in 1875 to draft a new constitution. No subject at the convention created more agitation than that of education. Id. at 169. In reaction to the education provisions of the Reconstruction Constitution and laws, there was considerable opposition in the convention to public education in any form. After much debate, the convention adopted the article on education which “fell far short of meeting the real needs of the times. In its intense hatred of the radical school system the convention blindly wrecked the entire [radical school] organization, destroying the features which were good together with those which were bad.” Id. at 170.
In response to the radical regime’s extravagance in taxing and spending, the drafters of the Constitution of 1876 embedded that document with inhibitions against the exercise of the taxing power and the expenditures of public money. “The farmers of Texas constituted a large proportion of that convention, and, writhing under the exactions and extortions of the state government forced upon them, the pendulum swung from the extreme of riotous and irresponsive expenditure of public money to the extreme of close economy, if not penuriousness.” Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367 (Tex.Civ.App.1916, writ ref’d at 108 Tex. 14, 191 S.W. 1138).
In the exercise of “close economy” and in response to Reconstruction excesses, the drafters of the 1876 Constitution did not provide for local taxation for schools. By 1880, however, there was a change in public sentiment in support of public education. Eby, supra, at 193. Such support was reflected in 1883 by the adoption of the amendment to art. VII, § 3. By the adoption of the amendment the voters evidenced their intent that the initiative for the formation and maintenance of school districts be vested in those most directly affected: the local citizenry. The legislature was empowered to establish the method for the creation of school districts so that they might be organized as the need for new districts arose. Within limitations, the property-owning voters within the district could impose upon themselves an ad valo-rem tax to help maintain the schools in the district. The limitation on the taxing power was not imposed, however, upon the incorporated cities and towns constituting separate and independent school districts, thereby permitting those districts the option to raise greater revenue for the support of their schools.6
*867In summary, the people intended to set up a school system retaining a significant degree of local control. The scheme of local financing that evolved is not wholly irrelevant to the goal of local control.
The district court also concluded that the present school system was “inefficient” in violation of Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1.
That provision does, of course, require that the school system be “efficient,” but the provision provides no guidance as to how this or any other court may arrive at a determination of what is efficient or inefficient. Given the enormous complexity of a school system educating three million children, this Court concludes that which is, or is not, “efficient” is essentially a political question not suitable for judicial review.
A rather “patched-up and overly cobbled” 7 system of administration and finance for public education has evolved in this state over the past one hundred years. The system does not provide an ideal education for all students nor a completely fair distribution of tax benefits and burdens among all of the school patrons. Nevertheless, under our system of government, efforts to achieve those ideals come from the people through constitutional amendments and legislative enactments and not through judgments of courts.
The opinion and judgment of this Court should not be viewed as an affirmation that the present school financing system is desirable or that it should continue without change; rather, our conclusion is solely that the system is not in violation of the Constitution of Texas.
The judgment is reversed and judgment is here rendered that appellees take nothing.
. Appellants are the Commissioner of Education, the State Board of Education, other State officials and a number of school districts.
. There is no mention of the due course of law provision in the pleadings or conclusions of law, and such claim was not tried by consent. Accordingly, the issue of whether the existing school funding scheme violates the due course of law provision is not a basis for the district court’s judgment and is also not before this Court.
. Appellees point out, correctly, that subject to meeting to federal standards as well, the courts of this State are at liberty to fashion their own tests to determine whether a Texas statute is valid under the Texas constitution. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.1985). Ap-pellees then urge this Court to disregard federal precedent in resolving this appeal. Appellees’ position ignores the fact that this cause was pleaded, tried, and judgment rendered pursuant to the equal protection analysis evolved by the opinions of the federal courts: a statute is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny if it infringes upon a fundamental right or if it creates a suspect classification. Moreover, this Court notes that when advantageous to their position, appellees do not hesitate to seize upon and urge federal equal protection precedent.
More important, in several opinions our courts have employed the federal equal protection analysis in considering the "equal rights” provision of the Texas Constitution. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.1985); Hernandez v. Houston Independent School District, 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, writ refd n.r.e.). Because the Texas courts have utilized the federal analysis, federal precedent is highly persuasive.
. The precise holding in Hernandez, that the State need not provide a tuition-free education to illegal alien children, was overruled by Plyler *862v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
. We do not understand that the district court concluded that the Texas educational system fails to provide each child with a basic education sufficient to meaningfully exercise his basic liberties. Instead, the district court found that in many school districts, because of inferior resources, the educational system fails to provide many children with an "adequate” education. The district court defined an "adequate *863education opportunity” as the "education program available to ... the 600,000 students in the state’s wealthiest school districts.” The district court apparently concluded that the Texas Constitution guarantees this type of educational opportunity to each child.
. From early times, the towns in Texas were granted special privileges by the legislature for the conduct and management of their schools. The towns were permitted to vote taxes for the construction and maintenance of buildings. They formed districts independently of the state *867rules, while at the same time they received the state per capita allotment for their children. These privileges were reaffirmed by the Constitution of 1876 and by subsequent laws. Incorporated towns had the privilege of voting on the question of assuming control of their own schools as independent districts and the question of how large a tax the people desired to pay for this purpose. They could also choose the form of government, whether the schools should be managed by the city council or by a board of trustees appointed for that purpose. With great rapidity the towns availed themselves of these privileges, especially after 1880. Eby, supra, at 178.
. This Court has borrowed the quoted phrase from Justice Norvell’s opinion in Shepherd v. San Jacinto Jr. Coll. Dist., 363 S.W.2d at 744.