dissenting. I dissent. Defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of N. J. 8. A. 24:21-20 which prohibits the knowing possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Defendant did not plead guilty to, nor was he convicted of, the separate offense of possession “with intent to . . . distribute . . . .” N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19. Notwithstanding, the trial judge imposed, a six-month custodial sentence (as well as 12 months probation and a fine) because he believed that the circumstances surrounding defendant’s possession suggested “commercial” overtones — that is, possession coupled with an “intent to distribute.” In so doing, he in effect eviscerated defendant’s due process right to be free from punishment for the commission of a specific offense unless the State proves each and' every element' of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Moreover, consideration of this factor directly contravened defendant’s reasonable expectations created by the terms of his agreement to plead guilty to the possession count. Consequently, he should be resentenced without consideration of commercialism or, alternatively, be permitted to withdraw his plea and stand trial.
I
N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19 makes unlawful the possession of a controlled dangerous substance “with intent to . . . distribute . . . .” A separate statute, N. J. 8. A. 24:21-20, criminalizes the mere “possession” of such a substance. The enactment of each of .these distinct provisions is a clear legislative declaration that those whose illegal possession is *187coupled with commercial aspects pose a greater threat to societal well-being, and hence are deserving of more severe punishment, than those who merely possess a controlled dangerous substance. Hence, an individual who pleads guilty to or is convicted of a violation of N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19 should ordinarily receive a harsher sentence than that meted out to a similarly situated individual who pleads guilty to or is convicted of a violation of N. J. 8. A. 24:21-20. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 57 N. J. 75 (1970); State v. Brennan, 115 N. J. Super. 400 (App. Div. 1971). In order for this more severe potential sentence to be appropriate, however, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that possession was in fact coupled with an “intent to . . . distribute . . . .”
The majority today relieves the State of its burden of proof with respect to this additional element. That is, the majority rules that notwithstanding the State’s failure or inability to secure a conviction under N. J. S. A. 24:21-19, sentence can be imposed as if such a conviction was in fact obtained, as long as the prosecutor can convince the sentencing judge that the circumstances surrounding a defendant’s possession of marijuana suggest “commercial overtones.”
Such a holding nullifies a defendant’s right under the due process clause to be free from sanctions imposed by a criminal statute unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed each and every element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Consequently, this case should be remanded in order that sentence be imposed without regard to any commercial overtones.
The majority conveniently ignores the due process implications of the sentence imposed below by focusing its discussion upon' a matter which is not here at issue — i. e., whether, in general, a sentencing judge may take into account the quantity of marijuana possessed by a defendant. The precise issue presented in this ease is, however, a much *188narrower question — whether the quantity factor can be considered in order io determine the existence of "commercial overtones.”
Clearly, a judge imposing sentence for a violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-20 may consider the quantity of marijuana that a defendant possessed. As caselaw demonstrates, the main goals underlying a trial judge’s choice of sentence are: (1) rehabilitation; (2) deterrence; and (3) protection of society from future criminal conduct on the part of a particular defendant. See, e. g., State v. Leggeadrini, 75 N. J. 150, 157-158 (1977); State v. Jones, 66 N. J. 563, 568 (1975). In the case of youthful offenders found to have violated N. J. S. A. 24:21-20, we have emphasized that among these goals rehabilitation is the most important. See State v. Ward, 57 N. J. 75, 82-83 ,(1970). See also State v. Brennan, supra, 115 N. J. Super, at 406-407. As long as quantity is considered only as it relates to the above criteria, this factor can properly be considered in combination with all other aggravating and mitigating circumstances bearing upon the seriousness of the crime and the character of the defendant.
Thus, the amount of marijuana possessed by a defendant may be relevant to his propensity to violate drug laws in the future and hence the need to impose a particular sentence in order to prevent recidivism. See, e. g., Ward, supra, 57 N. J. at 82-83. Meting out a heavier sentence when large quantities are involved may also deter others from wholesale use of a controlled dangerous substance. Finally, possession of large quantities may indicate that the defendant transcended statutory bounds to a greater extent, and hence is more deserving of punishment, than one who possesses merely a smaller amount.
Therefore, a trial judge may ordinarily take into account the quantity factor in imposing sentence for violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-20. What he may not do> however, is consider this factor in order to assess whether possession was coupled with a commercial motive. For to do so would in *189effect be to adjudge a defendant guilty of a statutory offense for which he has not been convicted.
II
Even assuming the correctness of the majority’s conclusion that ordinarily a judge may consider the “commercial overtones” present when imposing sentence for violation of N. J. 8. A. 24:21-20, in the present case this factor clearly should not have been taken into account. Defendant was originally indicted on charges of both possession (N. J. 8. A. 24:21-20) and possession with intent to distribute (N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19). Before the jury rendered a verdict, defendant and the State agreed that defendant would plead guilty to the possession count and that the intent to distribute charge would be dismissed. The trial judge, in accepting the plea bargain, did, as the majority notes, tell defendant that a custodial sentence might be imposed. See ante at 184. He did not, however, in any way indicate that the sentence would be based upon the presence or absence of “commercial overtones.”1
Our courts have now accepted plea bargaining as a legitimate and respectable adjunct to the administration of the criminal laws. See, e. g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978); State v. Thomas, 61 N. J. 314, 321 (1972). We have emphasized, however, that if plea bargaining is to fulfill its intended purposes, it must be conducted fairly on both sides and “the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either [party].” State v. Thomas, supra, 61 N. J. at 321; see, e. g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. *190Ed. 2d 427 (1971). A defendant who pleads guilty to a particular offense relinquishes three fundamental rights: (1) the right to be tried by a jury of his peers; (2) the right to confront witnesses; and (3) the right not to incriminate himself. By agreeing to a particular plea bargain, a defendant is therefore entitled to have his reasonable expectations honored, lest the procedure become a “trap” for the unwary. Santobello, supra; State v. Thomas, supra, 61 N. J. at 322.
A judge is not bound to honor a plea bargain negotiated by the prosecutor. If he feels that acceptance of its terms will not serve the ends of justice, he remains free to reject the bargain and allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. See, e. g., State v. Thomas, supra, 61 N. J. at 322; State v. Brockington, 140 N. J. Super. 422 (App. Div. 1976). He may not, however, accept the plea and then impose sentence in violation of its terms.
In the present case, defendant reasonably believed that by pleading guilty to the possession count, sentence would be imposed without regard to any commercial overtones that may have been present. This belief was justifiably derived from the fact that the charge of possession with intent to sell was dismissed as part of the plea. See Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1971). If the trial judge felt that the interests of justice mandated that “commercialism” be taken into account, he should have refused to accept the plea, and allowed the jury to return a verdict. He should not, as he did in this case, have accepted the plea and then proeeeeded to impose sentence directly counter to defendant’s reasonable expectations. At the least, the judge should have permitted defendant to withdraw the plea after it became evident that the plea was tendered under a misapprehension on defendant’s part. See, e. g., Brown, supra. The course which the trial court in fact took — i. e., treating the defendant as if he were guilty of possession “with intent to . . . distribute” — reduced to a nullity any possible benefit which the plea bargain presented. Thus, defendant contracted away his constitutional rights in return for an illusory promise.
*191Accordingly, this case shoud be remanded for resentencing at which the trial judge may not consider the commercial overtones of the defendant’s offense. Alternatively, defendant should he allowed to withdraw his plea and stand trial.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clifford, Scheeibee and Handles — 6.
For affirmance — Justice Pashman- — -1.
Although defendant was thus informed as to the possibility of a custodial sentence, he might well have expected that (1) his chances of probation would be much better if the commercialism charge were dropped and (2) any custodial sentence he might receive would be shorter than if commercialism were present. Thus, despite the judge’s warning, there might well have existed justifiable expectations on defendant’s part which were frustrated by the ultimate sentence.