Werner v. Commonwealth

Dissenting Opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice Bell:

1 dissent from the Court’s holding that the Order of the Court of Common Pleas in Burns and the Order of the Court of Quarter Sessions in Werner — each of which dismissed exceptions taken to reports filed by a Board of Viewers in condemnation proceedings — were interlocutory and unappealable. While the present law prescribing a distinction between (a) exceptions and (b) appeals in condemnation proceedings seems

*361to me to be ridiculous,* the applicable statute in the Burns case specifically provides, and two very recent cases of this Court hold, that the Order in each of these cases was a final Order and appealable. Cavalier Appeal, 408 Pa. 295, 183 A. 2d 547; Angle v. Commonwealth, 396 Pa. 514, 153 A. 2d 912.

Commonwealth v. Burns

The Burns claim arises under the Act of July 15, 1919, P. L. 976, as amended, 71 P.S. §1571 et seq., which governs condemnations instituted by the Department of Property and Supplies. That statute provides in Section 2 for the appointment of viewers by the Court of Common Pleas, and in Section 5 for the filing of exceptions to the report of the viewers and/or an appeal therefrom to the Court of Common Pleas.

Section 6 of the Act provides: “The Commonwealth or any other party interested may have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the court of common pleas, either %ipon exceptions or upon the verdict in the issue framed on such appeal.”

The meaning of this statutory provision specifically granting the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the Court of Common Pleas upon exceptions, is clear as crystal and cannot possibly be ignored or changed by this Court.

Moreover (as we shall hereinafter see) the recent cases of this Court likewise, and without any doubt, allow an appeal to this Court from the dismissal of exceptions to the report of the Board of Viewers which were filed in the lower Court.

Cavalier Appeal, 408 Pa., supra, and Angle v. Commonwealth, 396 Pa., supra, clearly and unquestionably *362hold (1) that exceptions may be filed to the report of the Board of Viewers, and (a) that these exceptions relate solely to and raise only questions of procedure and of law, and (b) that questions of fact and the amount of damages may be raised only by and on appeal.*

Werner v. Commonwealth

The Werner claim arose as did the claim in Cavalier and in Angle out of condemnation proceedings brought under the Act of June 1, 1945, P. L. 1242, §101 et seq., known as the State Highway Law.

In Cavalier Appeal, 408 Pa., supra—which involved an appeal to this Court from a judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions which had dismissed exceptions taken to the report of a Board of View — this Court (speaking through Justice Cohen) unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court below.

In Angle v. Commonwealth, 396 Pa., supra, the Commonwealth appealed from an Order of the Court of Quarter Sessions which had dismissed the Commonwealth’s exceptions to findings of a Board of Viewers in condemnation proceedings. The Order of the lower Court was affirmed.

It is as obvious as anything can be that this Order or Judgment of the lower Court in Cavalier and in Angle which had dismissed exceptions which were filed to the report of the Board of Viewers was a final appealable Order.

Differences Between Exceptions and an Appeal

There is a well recognized distinction between exceptions to a viewers’ report and an appeal from a *363viewers’ report; neither embraces the other; they are separate and distinct and raise different questions.

In Lower Chichester Township v. Roberts, 308 Pa. 195, 162 A. 460, the Court said (pages 197, 200) : “Our conclusion is that the common pleas was right in holding that the matters complained of could be raised only on exceptions, and that it was not competent to have them passed upon at the jury trial on appeal from the viewers.

“. . . Matters which may be excepted to and which the court hearing the exceptions may conclude raise questions of fact proper for a jury’s consideration, would not be determined on exceptions, but would be relegated by the court to the triers of fact, but, if the property owner, or the municipality, wishes to raise any question as to the viewers’ report, other than the broad one of the assessment, if any, which should be made, it must be done by exceptions filed to the report and not by appeal.* This, as we view it, is the intent of the act.

“The judgment of the . . . [court of] common pleas is affirmed.”

In Lakewood Memorial Gardens Appeal, 381 Pa. 46, 112 A. 2d 135, exceptions were filed to a decision and Order of the Board of Viewers. These exceptions were dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the Order of the Board of Viewers. This Court affirmed the Order of the Common Pleas and said (page 51) : “. . . Exceptions to viewers’ reports, unlike appeals therefrom, are properly limited to procedural matters or questions of law basic to the inquiry: See Chester Municipal Authority v. Delp, 371 Pa. 600, 604, 92 A. 2d 169; and Lower Chichester Twp. v. Roberts, 308 Pa. 195, 162 A. 460....

“The order appealed from is affirmed. . . .”

*364The majority rely upon Pennsylvania Steel Company’s Appeal, 161 Pa. 571, 29 Atl. 294, and Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A. 2d 854, to which could be added Sinking Spring Water Co. v. Gring, 257 Pa. 340, 101 Atl. 732. The Sullivan case, which was an action of assumpsit, is entirely irrelevant and inapplicable; while the early cases of Pennsylvania Steel Company and of Sinking Spring Water Co. are likewise clearly inapplicable, because the statute under which each was decided was entirely different in language from the statute here involved.

For these reasons, I am compelled to dissent.

Mr. Justice Musmanno joins in this dissenting Opinion.

While no final interpretation is now made of the recent Eminent Domain Act of June 22, 1964, P. L. 84, it would appear that this ridiculous distinction has been changed.

It is too often overlooked that nearly every condemnation or eminent domain case is brought under a statute which in many respects differs from every other statute.

Italics throughout, ours.