(Supplemental Dissent)
The purpose of this supplemental opinion is to pin point and emphasize some of the important aspects of the case before us.
*213Even though a person may be a judge, his intellect is not impervious to knowledge of matters commonly known by all the people of a community. I am, therefore, not without awareness of the controversy which prevailed in the City of Augusta a few years ago just previous to the enactment of the ordinance now under consideration. This controversy involved the issue of the conveyance of parochial school children, and in order that the citizens of Augusta might have an opportunity to express their opinion upon the issue there was submitted to them the following question :
“Shall the City of Augusta appropriate funds for transportation of parochial school students?”
It is a matter of public record that on December 10, 1956, upon the question submitted, the people declared its affirmative plebiscite by a vote of 3915 to 2470.
Pursuant to the plebiscite of the people, the City Council of the City of Augusta, solicitous for the safety and welfare of all elementary school children, very wisely enacted an ordinance authorizing appropriations for the conveyance of such children to the private schools of the choice of their parents. This action, on the part of the Augusta City Council, is authorized under the police power of the City of Augusta, both under the provisions of the Augusta City Charter and Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957.
Then followed the institution of the instant action by thirteen protagonists of the opponents. In order that the names of these thirteen persons may go into the records permanently, and not be lost in the anonymity of a title such as Alden W. Squires, et al. v. The Inhabitants of the City of Augusta, et ah, let it be recorded that their names and occupations are as follows: Alden W. Squires, Physician, Veterans Administration, Togus, Maine; Rev. Harvey F. Ammerman, Pastor South Parish Congregational Church, Augusta, Maine; F. Herbert Bailey, Bridge Engi*214neer, State Highway Department; Franklin C. Brawn, Civil Engineer, State Highway Department; Kervin C. Ellis, employed at the Veterans Administration, Togus, Maine; Donald E. Hayward, Dentist, Veterans Administration, Togus, Maine; Trygve Heistad, General Agent Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company; Leslie G. Hilton, Bank Examiner; Robert E. Kinsey, General Manager, Gardiner Paper Mills; Albert E. Smith, Director of Sales Promotion, Central Maine Power Company, Augusta, Maine; William W. Sprague, Real Estate and Insurance; Stanley E. Sproul, Lumber Dealer; and Dorothy Tozier, Social Worker, Augusta State Hospital.
I write this opinion with genuine sorrow for the thousands of young innocent boys and girls, who, as a result of the majority opinion will be denied the safety of transportation to the schools which they attend. From any impending result I absolve myself of responsibility.
The instant bill in equity, was instituted largely upon the theory that the ordinance and vote of the City Council of the City of Augusta appropriating money for conveyance of parochial school children was repugnant to the Constitutions of the State of Maine and of the United States of America, in that they constituted a preference of one sect or denomination and purported to be a law respecting an establishment of religion. The Superior Court Justice who heard the bill at the outset, basing his decision on the presumption of constitutionality, dismissed the bill and from this decision the plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, that expenditures of public funds for the conveyance of private school pupils is not a violation of the Federal Constitution, nor do such expenditures constitute a preference of one religious sect or denomination. Such an edict constitutes the ultimate law of the land.
*215As to the assertion that the action of the City Council of the City of Augusta purports to be a law respecting an establishment of religion, such an allegation can be construed only as a plain absurdity.
Our associates who constitute the majority have seen fit to disregard the constitutional issues and have written their opinion upon the theory that the only issue is that of authority of the Augusta City Council under its police power.
If counsel for the appellants are aware of the provisions of the Constitution of Maine which relate to education, the statutes enacted pursuant thereto and the appropriations made by Maine Legislatures throughout the past 139 years in favor of academies and colleges, many of which were founded by religious sects, they have conveyed no such knowledge to the court.
Article VIII of the Constitution of Maine reads in part as follows:
“A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people; to promote this important object, the legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty to require the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools; and it shall further be their duty to encourage and suitably endow, from time to time, as the circumstances of the people may authorize, all academies, colleges and seminaries of learning within the state.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This constitutional provision, as well as several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, dispel the metaphorical fantasy of words such as “the wall between church and state,” and “the separation of church and state.”
*216No good American citizen desires to see the State united with any Church. However, we are a nation founded on a belief in God and with an abiding faith in a Divine Power, and certainly not hostile to religion.
Pursuant to constitutional authority, as cited above, the Legislature of Maine enacted what has been Section 100, Chapter 91, R. S., 1954 under which towns were authorized to repair and construct buildings for academies and seminaries. Section 100, Chapter 91, has now been repealed and superseded by Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957. However, during the many years during which this statute was on our books, towns in Maine appropriated and spent money for direct aid to academies many of which had a religious foundation.
Article VIII of the Maine Constitution imposes a duty on the Legislature to “suitably endow” academies. To endow an academy means to make a gift to that academy and that is exactly what Maine Legislatures have done. Throughout the years money has been appropriated for the direct benefit of academies and colleges. In the volume containing the 1921 Public Laws and Resolves, will be found Chapter 160, which includes a long list of academies which were voted direct financial help, including some Roman Catholic institutions of learning, as well as many others with a religious foundation.
Attention is also called to Section 105, Chapter 41, R. S., 1954, which authorizes superintending school committees to contract with the trustees of academies for the schooling of pupils within their town, when no free high school is maintained. This provision has been carried over into Chapter 364, Public Laws of. 1957, known as the Sinclair Act, the constitutionality of which Act was given the stamp *217of approval by this court on January 14, 1958. See Opinion of the Justices, 153 Me. 469. It is a matter of record that 21 different academies throughout the State of Maine have entered into contracts authorized by the foregoing section of the statutes and many of these academies have a religious foundation and background. Thus, direct financial help is given to institutions which are no less religious in character than are the parochial schools of Augusta.
As late as 1957, the 98th Maine Legislature appropriated $25,000.00 for Higgins Classical Institute to aid in building of a boys’ dormitory to replace one which had been destroyed by fire.
Moreover, the same Legislature authorized Aroostook County to expend $10,000.00 for each year of the ensuing biennium for Ricker College.
Higgins Classical Institute was organized under the provisions of Chapter 91 of the 1891 Public Laws and one of its purposes is to promote Christian education.
Ricker College is a successor to Houlton Academy, which was organized by legislative authority in 1839 and among its corporate purposes is the promotion of piety and religion.
The record of these two institutions is outstanding in the field of education. There is no evidence of any opposition to these expenditures for such worthwhile purposes. However, the appropriations do constitute direct aid to institutions of learning which have a religious foundation. These facts are included in this opinion for the enlightenment of those who are without knowledge that such expenditures of public funds for direct aid to institutions of learning founded by religious sects are authorized and countenanced by the constitutional and statutory provisions of our State.
*218Perhaps the foregoing information may serve as a basis for contemplation on the part of those who fear that the conveyance of parochial school children at public expense violates the nebulous doctrine of separation of church and state.
In the light of constitutional and statutory authority in reference to such appropriations, how can it be argued that expenditures for the conveyance of little children to parochial schools is an unlawful diversion of public funds? No particular church or sect receives money, nor other gain therefrom. The children themselves are the only recipients of the accruing benefits. In any event the Supreme Court of the United States has furnished the answer and has said that such expenditures are lawful and constitutional.
The majority opinion recites that a municipality is without power to expend public funds for the conveyance of elementary school pupils from any other source except from public school appropriations. This conclusion is reached because they say the matter of conveyance of school children has been made a component part of the educational program by being included in a chapter of the statutes relating to education. Such reasoning is based upon an unsound premise and is unconvincing. It is impossible to operate schools without school buildings, teachers, text books and the necessary equipment, but schools can be operated, and have been operated without conveyance of the pupils.
Section 14, Chapter 41, R. S., 1954, is the section which directs superintendents of schools to procure the conveyance of elementary school pupils. This section says:
“In all cases conveyance so provided shall conserve the comfort, safety, and welfare of the children conveyed.”
*219Here is found the reason for conveyance, viz., the comfort, safety and welfare of the children, and this is exactly what the Augusta City Council endeavored to do in providing for conveyance of non-public school pupils.
It is a well-known fact, that many municipalities, including the City of Augusta furnish police officers at all schools, including parochial schools, to protect the children from traffic hazards while the pupils are crossing public highways on their way to and from school. What is the difference between spending money from a special appropriation to convey a child to a parochial school, except perhaps in the amount of the expenditure, and spending money appropriated for the police department, to protect parochial school children in the vicinity of the schools which they attend ?
One may also ask if the conveyance of elementary school pupils to public schools is not for the protection of such pupils, as specified in the statute, what other purpose can it have?
Supposing there was not included in the chapter of our Revised Statutes specifically relating to education, a provision providing for the conveyance of elementary school pupils, I wonder if the appellants would argue, with any degree of vigor, that a municipality, for the purpose of conserving the safety and welfare of public school children, did not have the power to provide for their conveyance by a special appropriation not connected with a school appropriation?
The Augusta City Council provided in the ordinance before us for consideration, for the conveyance of all elementary school pupils who attend non-public schools, pursuant to and in conformity with the compulsory school attendance laws of the State of Maine; and in spelling out the *220reason for the ordinance, the very words of Section 14, Chapter 41 were used viz., “to conserve the comfort, safety and welfare” of the children so transported.
The charter of the City of Augusta, in my opinion, authorizes this enactment. The charter gives the City of Augusta, the power “to ordain and publish such acts, laws and regulations not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this State as shall be needful to the good order of said body politic.”
This court has said in Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 509:
“The ordinary form of a city charter granting authority to enact ordinances not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the State is a delegation of authority to exercise the police power.”
The majority opinion cites this quotation with approval. What, one may ask, is there in the instant ordinance which is repugnant or inconsistent with the constitution and laws of our State? We have already seen that the Supreme Court of the United States has said that the expenditure contemplated by this ordinance presents no constitutional inconsistency. That being true, what statutes are there on our books which make the enactment of such an ordinance invalid ? The answer is obvious. There are none.
It is pointed out in the main dissenting opinion that there is a tendency on the part of modern day courts to accord to municipal authorities wider discretion in the reasonable and nondiscriminatory exercise of the police power, in good faith, and in the public interest.
What is police power? According to Cooley, Const. 227 it is:
“The authority to establish, for the intercourse of the several members of the body politic with each *221other, those rules of good conduct and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a corresponding enjoyment by others, is usually spoken of as the authority or power of police. This is a most comprehensive branch of sovereignty, extending as it does to every person, every public and private right, everything in the nature of property, every relation in the state, in society and in private life.”
See also Section 942, Volume III, McQuillin on Municipal Corporations:
“It is a general rule, therefore, constantly applied that appropriate means to the exercise of the police power rest largely within the discretion of municipal authorities, and courts will not interpose unless the means employed amount to an unreasonable and oppressive interference with individual and property rights. Where the relation of the regulation to the police power is fairly debatable, ordinarily the court will not interfere.” Section 947, Volume III, McQuillin on Municipal Corporations.
In 1957 the Legislature revised the general laws relating to municipalities. This is Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957.
Section 3, of this new statute provides that a municipality may enact police power ordinances for the purpose of:
L
A. Promoting the general welfare; ........ providing for the public safety.
In reference to this subsection the then incumbent Attorney General in his report to the Legislature prior to the enactment of the law said:
“This subsection is a general statement of police power. ‘Promoting the general welfare,’ tvhich in- *222 dudes ‘prudential affairs’ is a general statement following the language of the Federal Constitution. Along with ‘providing for the public safety,’ it expresses a broad general power.”
It is my opinion that the Augusta City Council, if it did not already have the power under its charter, was given direct authority to enact the ordinance now before us for consideration, and to appropriate money to give effect thereto.
In Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 under the heading “Municipal Finance,” by Section 12, subsection VII, a municipality is given authority to raise and appropriate money for “providing for any operations authorized by law which, by their nature, require the expenditure of money.”
This section gives the Augusta City Council definite and positive legal warrant to appropriate and expend funds for the administration of the ordinance which was enacted pursuant to its police power specifically delegated and authorized by the City Charter and by section 3, I, A of Chapter 405, supra.
The majority opinion says that Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 is not a revision, but a mere consolidation. It requires only a cursory study of the 1957 statute to discover that this enactment is not a simple consolidation, but an important revision of the laws relating to the powers of municipalities. Section 100, Chapter 91, R. S., 1954, was the statute which specified the purposes for which municipalities could raise and appropriate money and the last clause of this section read: “And for other necessary town charges.”
The majority opinion properly says that public funds cannot be spent except for purposes authorized by law; and then using the last clause of Section 100, Chapter 91, says that the words “other necessary town charges” do not *223constitute a new and distinct grant of indefinite and unlimited power to raise money for any purpose whatsoever at the will and pleasure of a majority. Apparently the fact that Section 100, Chapter 91, R. S., 1954 was repealed by Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 was overlooked.
I agree thoroughly with the statement of the law to the effect that money derived from taxation, in order to be legally expended, must be made available by lawful appropriations and that public funds cannot be spent except for purposes authorized by law.
However, I am convinced that the provisions of Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957 cited above definitely and specifically authorize the City of Augusta to appropriate and expend money from a special fund for the conveyance of private school pupils.
The appropriation made by the Augusta City Council and under attack by the appellants herein, was a lawful appropriation. It is not necessary that the legislature specifically denote by statute all of the multiple purposes for which a municipality may raise or expend public funds. Under the broad general police power accorded by its charter, now confirmed by Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957, the Augusta City Council acted within its delegated authority. The very fact that the Legislature repealed the clause, “and for other necessary town charges,” which clause has been limited in the scope of its application, by various decisions of this court, is strong evidence that it was the intent of the Legislature to remove from the prior existing statute, any restriction contained therein.
In the interpretation of statutes there are, of course, certain applicable rules, and the fundamental rule of construction is legislative intent. However, the interpretation of such intent is but the composite opinion of the individual *224thinking of those who constitute the court. In other words a statute means what a majority of the court says it means, and it is not difficult to find in the statute before us for consideration, legislative authority for the exercise of police power for the protection and safety of young children who happen to attend a private school, and who like all other children in America are entitled to the equal rights ordained in the Preambles of the Constitution of the United States of America and of the State of Maine.
In the instant case the words of the empowering statute are simple and plain. Interpretation thereof presents no unusual difficulties. Divorced from the specious argument that a municipality cannot provide by special appropriation for the conveyance of elementary school children who attend a private school, because such authority is not included in the body of statutes relating to education, the legislative intent is manifest and clear.
To find legislative authority in support of the ordinance in question we do not have to read words into the statute. All the necessary words are present.
It is assumed that the majority concedes that properly authorized municipal expenditures for the conveyance of pupils to private schools, not operated for profit, are legal and not inconsistent with constitutional limitations or restrictions, and that such expenditures do not constitute direct aid to the religious sect which is operating such schools.
Under the rule laid down by this very court in Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 509, the Augusta City Council had charter authority, in the exercise of its police power, to enact the ordinance which is now under question. This authority has been confirmed and strengthened by the provisions of Chapter 405, Public Laws of 1957.
*225The ordinance, and the appropriation made pursuant thereto, are a valid exercise of delegated power.
The majority suggests the need of further legislation. Unfortunately this decision will bring to naught the efforts which seek to conserve the safety and welfare of elementary school pupils in Augusta, and will nullify the laudable efforts of many other communities of our State, which are now providing, without objection, for the conveyance of elementary school pupils who attend private non-profit schools. In the meantime, the consequences, initiated by the plaintiffs herein, will descend on little children. Such a course of action must be without my sanction.
Delay is unnecessary. Substantive and authoritative warrant of law to support the ordinance before us is already in existence.
The bill should be dismissed.