(dissenting in part).
The majority opinion is an excellent summary of the running battle within the Court for six decades over the application of the various salary limitation provisions of the State Constitution. The recurrence of the trouble over so many years, so often reflected in opinions by a divided Court, indicates rather clearly that any decision reached on *608the question at a given time is a short-lived affair and settles nothing for very long. Each attempt by the Court, as here, however well intended, to accommodate to a difficult situation caused by an outmoded provision of the Constitution again defers the need for public understanding of the problem.
“No public officer or employe except the Governor shall receive as compensation per annum for official services,” various amounts specified, says the Constitution. The word “employe” was inserted in 1948 by express intention of the Legislature, and it is in the Constitution now by vote of the people. It is significant that the insertion of the word “employe” into the Constitution followed, and was caused by, the 1947 decision of a divided Court in Pardue v. Miller, 306 Ky. 110, 206 S.W.2d 75, 79, freeing university professors and other State employes from the salary limitations of the Constitution which, at that time, did not include the word “employe” in the provision. The obvious purpose of this provision of the Constitution (Sec. 246) is to protect the public treasury from immoderate salary increases (Talbott v. Public Service Commission, 1942, 291 Ky. 109, 163 S.W.2d 33), a purpose which potentially could be almost completely thwarted as a consequence of the conclusion of the majority. While I am confident the General Assembly would act moderately in granting salary increases in these days of fluctuating values even if it were free of all constitutional salary limitations, nevertheless, so long as the provision remains in the Constitution its purpose should be observed.
I would be delighted to relieve university and college professors, statutory officers and employes from the oppressively restrictive salary provisions of the Constitution if I could concur in the present interpretation by the majority. I cannot concur, because I cannot ignore the presence of the word “employe” in the provision and the reason for its being there.