Following a nonjury trial in this assumpsit action, the lower court rendered a decision awarding appellees damages of $18,321.00. Appellants subsequently filed exceptions, which the lower court denied in the order from which the present appeal is taken.1 We are unable to reach the merits, however, because the order denying appellants’ exceptions has not been reduced to judgment and docketed. It is settled that “[a]n order denying exceptions following a nonjury trial is interlocutory and not appealable.” Heffner v. Bock, 287 Pa.Super. 345, 346, 430 A.2d 318, 319 (1981). See also Lashner v. Redevelopment Authority of the. City of Philadelphia, 286 Pa.Super. 549, 429 A.2d 659 (1981); Unterberger v. Life Assurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 286 Pa.Super. 469, 429 A.2d 34 (1981); Slaseman v. Myers, 285 Pa.Super. 167, 427 A.2d 165 (1981); Penstan Supply Co. v. Hay, 285 Pa.Super. 558, 424 A.2d 950 (1981). “Such an order does not *333become appealable until, ‘on praecipe of any party,’ Pa.R.A.P. 301(d), it is ‘reduced to judgment and docketed,’ Pa.R.A.P. 301(c). And see Pa.R.C.P. 1038(e). The requirement that judgment be docketed is jurisdictional.” Unterberger v. Life Assurance Co. of Pennsylvania, supra, 286 Pa.Super. at 470, 429 A.2d at 35. Because this requirement has not been met in the present case, the appeal is premature and must be quashed.2
Appeal quashed.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.. The order from which the present appeal has been taken is as follows:
AND NOW, to wit, this 29th day of February, 1980, upon consideration of the briefs and arguments presented by respective counsel in this matter, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the Exceptions filed by the [appellants] to the Award entered by this Court on November 8, 1979, be and the same are hereby denied and dismissed. The Award entered by this Court on November 8, 1979 in favor of the [appellees] and against the [appellants] Matthew J. DiDomenico and Aurelio Nardoni in the sum of Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-One Dollars ($18,321.00) and the Award entered in favor of defendant John Matthew, Inc., be and the same is hereby affirmed.
. Despite the well settled jurisdictional principle embodied in our cases, the dissent would “consider the lower court’s statement that it ‘affirmed’ as equivalent to a statement that it was ‘entering judgment.’ ” At 1254. In support of its interpretation, the dissent assumes that the present appeal would be proper had the lower court stated that it was “entering judgment.” Id. at 1254. That assumption is not warranted, for Pa.R.A.P. 301(c) expressly mandates that “[a] direction by the lower court that a specified judgment, sentence or other order shall be entered, unaccompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket, . .. does not constitute an appealable order.” (Emphasis added.) That being the case, we cannot discern how the present order can be deemed appealable. Moreover, while the dissent’s call for revision of the rules governing appeals is not without merit, the present statutes, rules, and cases defining and delimiting this Court’s jurisdiction are sufficiently clear and readily applicable. Consequently, we can perceive no basis for construing lower court orders “liberally” to compensate for the inadvertence of counsel. Cf. Gurnick v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 278 Pa.Super. 437, 440-41, 420 A.2d 620, 623-24 (1980) (HOFFMAN, J., dissenting) (no need to recognize a broad discretionary power of review of interlocutory orders).