dissenting:
While I agree that Chapter 867 of the Acts of 1974 is not an appropriation bill within the contemplation of the Budget Amendment, I think the majority has fallen into grievous error in concluding that the Governor has no duty under the Constitution of Maryland, in future annual budgets submitted by him to the General Assembly, to include funds necessary to comply with and implement the provisions of the statute. To impose such a mandatory duty on the Governor is not to cause the destruction of the executive budget system, as the majority suggests. Indeed, not to impose such a duty upon the Governor has far more deadly consequences; most certainly it would herald the demise of the delicate and time-honored balance existing between the power and responsibility of the legislature to make the laws and the Governor’s duty to see that they are faithfully executed. There is nothing in the Budget Amendment, or in its history, which changes this fundamental allocation of power between the legislative and executive branches. The Governor had the power to veto the bill, which he did not exercise; once he signed it into law, he was bound to carry out its mandate. The result reached by the majority vests power in the Governor never envisaged by those who drafted the Budget Amendment. Under the majority’s interpretation, the Governor enjoys unbridled authority to ignore the legislative will, or even worse, to decide, in his sole discretion, which enactments will be funded and which will not. I therefore dissent from the view adopted by the majority that the funding of Chapter 867 is a matter constitutionally committed to the Governor’s discretion under the provisions of the Budget Amendment.
*154Chapter 867 of the Acts of 1974 became effective on July 1, 1974. It directed in no uncertain terms that the monthly rate to be paid by the State to foster parents for care of neglected or dependent children would be fixed at a specified monetary level after July 1, 1975. In the budget submitted by the Governor to the General Assembly in January of 1975 for fiscal year 1976, funds necessary to comply with the policy established by the legislature were not included.
The majority holds that if the General Assembly could fix by statute spending levels for particular programs which are higher than those proposed by the Governor) it would be able to increase the proposed appropriations in the Budget Bill in violation of the Budget Amendment and could result in deficit spending inconsistent with the constitutional requirement for a balanced budget. To permit this, according to the majority, is to allow the legislature to accomplish indirectly what the Constitution forbids because a legislatively initiated appropriation can only be made through enactment of a Supplementary Appropriation Bill which mandates imposition of a specific tax to raise the revenue necessary for the appropriation. The majority expresses the opinion that there is no mandatory duty upon the Governor to fund Chapter 867 in any event because he has authority under the Budget Amendment to “revise” estimated appropriations and may therefore reduce (or presumably eliminate) any item except estimated appropriations for the legislature, the judiciary, and for the public schools.
The Budget Amendment was not intended to circumscribe the plenary law-making power of the legislature to determine what the State’s fiscal policy shall be. Rather it was the grand design of the executive budget system to bring about a fundamental change in the method of appropriating money from the State Treasury in order to make it impossible to produce a budget deficit. To this end, the General Assembly was prohibited by the Amendment from appropriating money out of the State Treasury except through the Budget Bill or, by a Supplementary Appropriation Bill. Subsection (3) of the Budget Amendment requires the Governor to submit a budget to the *155General Assembly containing a complete plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues. That the items comprising the Governor’s “plan” were not to be of his own original making is plain from subsection (4), which provides that the budget shall contain “an estimate of all appropriations... as follows:
(a) for the General Assembly as certified to the Governor in the manner hereinafter provided;
(b) for the Executive Department;
(c) for the Judiciary Department, as provided by law, certified by the Comptroller;
(d) to pay and discharge the principal and interest of the debt of the State in conformity with Section 34 of Article 3 of the Constitution, and all laws enacted in pursuance thereof;
(e) for the salaries payable by the State and under the Constitution and laws of the State;
(f) for the establishment and maintenance throughout the State of a thorough and efficient system of public schools in conformity with Article 8 of the Constitution and with the laws of the State;
(g) for such, other purposes as are set forth in the Constitution or laws of the State.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsection 5 (a) requires that the total proposed appropriations contained in the Governor’s budget as submitted to the General Assembly not exceed the figure for total estimated revenues. The subsection requires that the budget as ultimately enacted by the legislature after all amendments have been made be balanced, i.e., that the figure for total estimated revenues be equal to or exceed the figure for total appropriations.
In producing his estimate of appropriations, the Governor is authorized by subsections (11) and (12) to require all officials and agencies applying for State appropriations to provide him with itemized estimates. He is authorized to *156provide for public hearings on all estimates and to revise such estimates submitted to him except estimates prepared for the legislative and judicial departments, and for the public schools; as to these, the Governor is required to include them in his budget without revision. Once the Governor submits the budget to the General Assembly, subsection (6) provides that it may not be amended to affect (a) the State’s debt obligations, (b) provisions made for the public schools and (c) provisions made for the payment of salaries required by the Constitution of Maryland. The General Assembly is authorized by subsection (6) to amend the bill by increasing or decreasing items relating to the legislature and judiciary; it may not, however, otherwise amend the bill except “to strike out or reduce” other items contained in the proposed budget.
Subsection (8) of the Budget Amendment authorizes the General Assembly to pass Supplementary Appropriation Bills after the Budget Bill has been enacted. Such a bill is required to provide the revenue necessary to pay the appropriation thereby made by a tax to be levied and collected as the bill directs.
As our predecessors observed in McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 97, 98 A. 2d 561, 564 (1953), the executive budget system imposes upon the Governor the sole responsibility of presenting to the legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State; it makes it impossible for the legislature so to change the plan proposed by the Governor as to produce a deficit; but it permits the legislature to make provision for any purpose not included in the Governor’s plan on the condition that it provide for the revenue which the accomplishment of its purpose necessitates.
The constitutional authority of the legislature to enact Supplementary Appropriation Bills under subsection (8) was obviously not intended to constitute the only means by which it could shape and implement the fiscal policy of the State through its law-making function. The prime mechanism through which the legislature could express its *157fiscal will as elected representatives of the people was through enactment of the Budget Bill. The Budget Amendment requires that the budget submitted by the Governor contain those items mandated by subsection (4), which include appropriations “for such other purposes as are set forth in the .. . laws of the State.” It is simply wrong to hold, as the majority does, that because the Governor may require those applying for public money to provide him with itemized estimates — which he may “revise” — that somehow this authority enables him, in his sole discretion, to exclude from his budget items plainly required to be included therein by subsection (4). The constitutional provision for Supplementary Appropriation Bills was not intended as a singular substitute for the basic power of the legislature to provide for the appropriation of money from the State Treasury; it simply assured “that the fiscal requirements of the State, as fixed in the Budget prepared by the Governor and passed by the General Assembly, shall not be enlarged unless a tax to meet the increased need is incorporated in the proposal as an integral part of it.” McKeldin v. Steedman, supra (203 Md. at 99).
It is true, as the majority says, that the Governor’s plan of estimated appropriations may be dictated by a multitude of legislative enactments and that this could result in the Governor’s submitting a budget in an amount greater than existing revenues can defray. It is nevertheless his constitutional obligation under the Budget Amendment to include all constitutionally mandated items in his budget, as provided in subsection (4), and where he estimates that there will be a shortfall in available revenues, he must propose additional revenue measures for enactment by the legislature. Should the legislature fail to provide by law for the additional revenue, it will then have to strike out or reduce the appropriations provided in the Budget Bill in the manner permitted by the provisions of subsection (6) so as to bring the budget into constitutional balance, viz., total estimated revenues will be equal to or exceed total appropriations. Since a budget not in balance is unconstitutional and hence ineffective to appropriate money *158out of the State Treasury, the Budget Bill can in no event produce a deficit.
That the General Assembly, by enacting a general law, can compel the Governor to include an appropriation in his, Budget Bill for the next ensuing fiscal year is hardly new or novel. The Attorney General has unequivocally so held. See 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 130 (1958); 53 Op. Att’y Gen. 95 (1968); 53 Op. Att’y Gen. 90 (1968); 59 Op. Att’y Gen. 64 (1974). To the same effect, see G. Bell, State Budget Administration in Maryland (Univ. of Md. Bureau of Governmental Research 1957) at 11; 1951 Report of the Commission on Administrative Organization of the State (Sobeloff Commission).
Moreover, the Court has been greatly enriched in its consideration of this case by an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates of Maryland, acting jointly on behalf of the Policy Committee of the General Assembly of Maryland. Since the position taken by amicus corresponds with my own views, I quote from it liberally:
“Maryland’s adoption of an executive budget system has resulted in no transfer from the General Assembly of its fundamental power to declare what the law shall be, in fiscal as in other matters. At most, the adoption of such a system shifted to the Governor a role of initiation or proposal; it did not give to the executive branch any power to overrule legislative policy determinations. The budget system arose from an existing problem and from the recognition that without some binding, rational plan for matching income and expenditures, the government was likely to incur mounting deficits. The purpose of the budget was to match income and expenditures on a yearly basis.
“If the budget is viewed simply as a technique for achieving an annual balance of income and expenditures, then there is no reason to object to any legislation requiring that the Governor’s *159budget for a coming year provide for a certain expenditure. The directive in no way disturbs the balance of income and outgo for the current or the ensuing year, and the General Assembly is not disrupting the control furnished by the budget mechanism. Thus, [the lower court’s] suggestion that permitting the Legislature to mandate an item in a future gubernatorial budget bill is permitting it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly (i.e., pass a supplementary appropriation bill calling for expenditures in the same fiscal year covered by the Governor’s budget plan without raising the revenue to pay them) is inapt.”
“A reading of the complete report of the Goodnow Commission makes it clear that the primary purpose and aim of the Budget Amendment which that report proposed was to prevent a budget deficit; in other words, in the planning of state finances, to make certain that income matched outgo on a yearly basis. . . .
“Allowing the General Assembly, by enactment of a general state law, to require the Governor to include and to fund in a subsequent budget an appropriation for the purposes of that law in no way contravenes this objective. On the contrary, it accommodates the need for a balanced budget while, at the same time, it protects the power of the Legislature as the ultimate law-making and policy-determining body in our state government. The Governor still has the power, within the guidelines established by the General Assembly by law, to allocate the general revenues of the state among the various programs provided by law and to determine the extent to which these programs shall be funded. If in his opinion the general revenues of the state will not be sufficient, then it *160is incumbent upon him to make this fact known to the Legislature so that it may levy such taxes as it deems best to provide the necessary revenue.”
Amicus further points out that it is not necessary to rely upon a general understanding of the intent and purposes of the Budget Amendment to support the power of the General Assembly to provide by law for mandated items. That power, it says, is spelled out explicitly in subsection (4) of the Budget Amendment which establishes “mandatory budget items,” each of which is of equal dignity, force and viability. Amicus urges that the requirement of subsection (4) (g) that the Governor’s budget contain an estimate of all appropriations “for such other purposes as are set forth in the .. . laws of the State” has precisely the same force and effect on the Governor in preparing the Budget Bill as does each of items (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). In this connection, the report of the Goodnow Commission which drafted the Budget Amendment includes this language:
“Our first thought in drafting the proposed amendment has been: First — To impose upon the Governor the sole responsibility, within the limits of the Constitution and the provisions of existing law, of presenting to the Legislature a complete and comprehensive statement of the needs and resources of the State based upon: (a) Estimates made by those applying for State moneys; (b) Evidence brought out at public hearings on those estimates; and (c) Administrative revision by the Governor of all estimates, except those for the Legislature and the judiciary, and for purposes for which provision has been made by the Constitution or existing law.” Dept, of Legislative Reference, The Maryland Budget Amendment 12 (1917) (Emphasis added.)
It is also to be noted that Maryland Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 15A, § 21A provides that “[I]n the preparation and submission of the budget bill and of any supplements thereto, ... the Governor shall not change the language or *161provisions of this Code or of other statutory law of this State.” As to this, the amicus brief states:
“[0]nce Chapter 867 was duly passed and signed by the Governor, it became a valid statutory direction binding on the Governor. The specific language of the Budget Amendment, and Code, Article 15A, §21A, require compliance with the provisions of Chapter 867 by the Governor and other members of the executive branch in the preparation and submission of the state budget and the annual budget bill.
“In 1968, the Attorney General expressed his opinion that the Budget Amendment and Code, Article 15A, §21A would require the Governor to include an appropriation in the annual budget where a state law called for such an appropriation. 53 O.A.G. 95. In issue were certain laws providing for scholarships. In cases where those laws specifically provided that funds ‘shall be placed [or included] in the budget from year to year’, the opinion concluded, ‘there is no room for discretion, and the Governor must include [funds to cover the scholarships] in his budget as mandatory appropriations.’ (p. 96)
“Similar reasoning was applied in another 1968 opinion of the Attorney General, where, although it was concluded that the act creating the Maryland Hospital Commission did not direct an expenditure of funds and therefore could not be construed as a legislative mandate to the Governor to provide funds for the Commission in his annual budget, it is nevertheless clear that the Attorney General would have concluded that compliance by the Governor would have been required (under Constitution, Article III, §52 (4) (g) and Code, Article 15A, §21A) had the language of the statute constituted a legislative mandate. In arriving at his conclusion, the Attorney General pointed out that the act *162creating the Hospital Commission provided that its members should serve without pay and that it should have ‘such staff, officers and employees as may be provided for in the Budget from time to time’, thus clearly leaving the matter of funding to the Governor’s discretion. 53 O.A.G. 90.
“The Attorney General reached the same conclusion, i.e., that in preparing his annual budget, the Governor must comply with valid legislative enactments, in an even more recent opinion dated May 28, 1974 .... 59 O.A.G. 64. Despite the unmistakable conclusion there reached, that Senate Bill 424 of the 1974 session, which called for appropriations in the Governor’s budget in amounts ‘not to exceed’ $150,000 and $100,000 to provide certain scholarships, was not an appropriation and therefore not required to comply with subsection 8 of the Budget Amendment, the Attorney General stated his opinion that ‘some kind of scholarship program is required to be developed and funded through the State Budget’ (p. 65, emphasis in original; see also p. 69).”
* * *
“In the case at bar, Chapter 867 was and is a clear direction to the Governor to implement its requirements in the appropriation to the Department of Human Resources in his annual budget. The mandate is as clear as if Chapter 867 had stated expressly, ‘The Governor shall include in his annual budget an appropriation to the Department of Human Resources to cover payments to foster parents at a rate not less than that paid by the Department of Juvenile Services’. Unless the Governor made the mandated appropriation (one for a purpose as set forth in the laws of the state within the meaning of Constitution, Article III, § 52(4) (g)), he would be changing the provisions of Chapter 867, a duly *163enacted state law, a result impermissible under Code, Article 15A, § 21A.”
I think the short of it is that the Governor’s failure to fund the provisions of Chapter 867 was plainly violative of the Constitution of Maryland and of Code, Art. 15A, § 21A. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the lower court.
Judges Smith and Digges authorize me to state that they concur in the views expressed in this dissent.