(concurring).
Recognizing the major importance of our decision today, I am constrained to set forth those reasons which occasioned my decision in this matter. The issues as I perceive them are whether, assuming the validity of the recall provision, there has been sufficient compliance with the terms of that provision as to require the acceptance of the tendered petitions. Secondly, and most importantly, is the question of the validity of a recall concept in light of the language of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. I recognize, as noted by Mr. Justice Eagen, that often a constitutional issue is not reached where a cause can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds. While this is generally a salutary principle, I agree with Mr. Chief Justice Jones that it would not be appropriately applied in this instance. In view of the interest of numerous communities in this Commonwealth concerning the feasibility of a recall provision, 1 believe it to be our responsibility, since the question has been raised, to address the constitutional issue and thereby avoid the uncertainty that would otherwise prevail.
For various reasons, the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Jones found that the petitions offered by the appellees were insufficient. In my judgment that finding can be sustained solely upon the invalidity of the affidavits notarized by the fifteen circulators and/or coordinators.1 I *36accept and concur in the reasoning of the Court in declaring these petitions invalid. Since the elimination of these signatures reduces the total.of valid signatures to a number insufficient to require the Board to accept the petition, it is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the remaining categories of signatures which were also deemed to be invalid.
The most serious question presented is that of the constitutional validity of a recall provision. I believe that the third clause in Article yi, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution stands as a clear limitation on the power of the legislature in that it establishes the sole and exclusive means for removing from office any elected official in the Commonwealth,2 regardless of whether the elected office concerned is considered a “constitutional” office, or an office created by legislative fiat. This interpretation, in my view, is mandated by a plain and untechnical reading of the language of that provision. I therefore concur with the holding of the Court that the recall provision in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter is unconstitutional.
A proper analysis of the meaning and import of a constitutional provision must begin, as always, with an examination of the language itself. Further, we are reminded at the outset that the Constitution is not to receive a technical construction, but is to be interpreted in light of ordinary language, Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374, 22 A. 641 (1891), and that it is entitled to a construction, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the intent of its makers. O’Connor v. Armstrong, 299 Pa. 390, 149 A. 655 (1930); Moers v. City of Read*37ing, 21 Pa. 188 (1853). With these fundamental principles of construction in mind, we turn to Article VI, Section 7, which provides in full as follows:3
All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers elected by the people, except the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.
A plain reading of this provision reveals three distinct clauses relating to the removal of “civil officers”.
The first clause applies, without limitation, to “all civil officers,” and directs that such officers “shall be removed” on conviction of crime or misbehavior in office. This Court has held many times that this provision is mandatory, Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 402 Pa. 542, 167 A.2d 480 (1961), even self-executing, Commonwealth v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 161 A. 323 (1932), and that it applies to all officers, whether they are appointed or elected, and whether they are the so-called “constitutional” officers, or those holding an office created by legislative act. McSorley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 390 Pa. 81, 134 A.2d 201 (1957).
The second clause to Article VI, Section 7 is cast, however, in different terms. It employs language not mandatory nor compulsory but rather directory and advisory *38stating that “ [a] ppointed civil officers . . . may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed.” (emphasis added). Recognizing this distinction in the language, our decisions have permitted the power of removal of appointed officials to be vested in other than the Governor, Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 131 A. 253 (1925) and have also permitted conditions to be imposed upon the exercise of the power of removal, such as “cause.” See, e. g., Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, supra; Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956).
The third and final provision for removal contained in Article VI, Section 7 is found in clause three: “All civil officers elected by the people . . . shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause ... on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.” (emphasis added). A close reading of this language is not necessary to observe that, like the first clause in Article VI, Section 7, its terms are mandatory, admitting of no exceptions. It indisputably applies to all elected officers, and sets forth in unambiguous language the exclusive method, absent impeachment, conviction of crime or misbehavior in office, of removing such elected officers.4 No other construction may reasonably be imposed on the language.
The dissenters, however, assert that this clause applies only to “constitutional” officers, contending that offices created by the legislature are excluded from the operation of this provision. Such a construction, in my view, is anomalous and completely untenable. The position taken by the dissenters not only requires different interpretations of identical language, but it completely undercuts the symmetry provided by all three clauses of Article VI, Section 7. While each of the three clauses has a distinct application, they are clearly interrelated, providing a comprehensive and exclusive mechanism for *39removal.5 The first clause touches all officers, requiring without exception removal upon “conviction.” The second clause comports with the common law principle that the power to appoint comprehends the power to remove. Clearly, appointed officers are subject to removal upon “conviction” as well. Elected officials, also subject to removal upon conviction, can be removed by operation of the third clause for reasonable grounds.
The dissenters attempt to support their view that clause three of Article VI, Section 7 may be ignored in this instance by relying upon a distinction that has been made in some of the early decisions of this Court between constitutional and non-constitutional offices. Until 1927, this Court had not specifically held that the third clause of Article VI, Section 7 was other than the exclusive method of removing elected officers.6 However, in Milford Township Supervisors’ Removal, 291 Pa. *4046, 139 A. 623 (1927), the Court adopted the rule that Article VI, Section 7 did not apply to elected offices created by the legislature. The notion that this provision is mandatory only to constitutionally created elected officers was first expressed in dictum in Bowman’s Case, 225 Pa. 364, 74 A. 203 (1909).7 The Milford, Court, through tortuous reasoning, elevated this dictum for the first time to a rule of decision, and established the dichotomy between constitutional and non-constitutional elective offices in order to exclude the latter from the provisions of the third clause of Article VI, Section 7.8
It should be noted that the majority of the decisions which have considered the distinction between constitu*41tional and non-constitutional officers were matters concerning appointive officials.9 The second clause of Article VI, Section 7 was obviously intended to incorporate the common law principle that the power to appoint also encompasses the power to remove. See, e. g., Field v. Commonwealth, 32 Pa. 478, 481-82 (1859) and cases cited therein. While at times the language of these decisions may obfuscate their true rationale, a close reading compels the view that the simple principle announced is that the legislature is in fact the appointing authority in each instance where it has created the office, even though it may have provided for another officer or agency to actually make the appointment of a person to fill the office.10 Since the language of this clause is directory and the legislature is not mandated to provide an unfettered right of removal, such a scheme would not be in violation of the terms of this clause. Additionally, since this clause confers an unfettered right of removal upon the “appointing authority”, this power is not exceeded by a more restrictive removal procedure.
These decisions however provide no support for the Milford Court’s attempt to transplant this dichotomy in *42cases of elected officials. First, it must be reiterated that although the language of the second clause is advisory, the language of the third clause is mandatory and must be followed. Further, the use of the phrase “all civil officers elected by the people” eliminates any legitimate basis for the exclusion of any group within this class.11
The fallacy of the Milford Court’s reasoning becomes more apparent in view of its concession that Article VI, Section 7 “is not limited to what are frequently termed constitutional officers . . . ”. 291 Pa. at 52, 139 A. at 625. That Court then attempted to avoid the effect of this fundamental concession by construing Article XII, Section 1 of the 1874 Constitution (now Article VI, Section l)12 as superseding the express terms of Article VI, Section 7. This interpretation, reached without reference to a single authority, is abhorrent to the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that specific provisions, such as Article VI, Section 7, unless otherwise clearly indicated, must prevail against inconsistent general provisions. Buckley v. Holmes, 259 Pa. 176, 102 A. 497 (1917). Article XII, Section 1 has nothing at all to do with the removal of civil officers.
*43In the 1874 Constitution, all provisions concerning the removal of civil officers 13 were contained in Article VI, entitled “Impeachment and Removal from Office.” Sections one through three of this Article set forth all provisions concerning impeachment. Section four (now Article VI, Section 7) set forth the only available processes for removal other than impeachment. On the other hand, Article XII was entitled “Public Officers”;14 Section one of this Article, the provision relied upon in Milford, accomplished no more than to give the General Assembly the power to provide for the creation, election and appointment of officers “whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution . . . ” Pa.Const. of 1874, art. XII, § 1. These powers, particularly where the office created is an elective one, are wholly distinct from removal.15 I can find no basis for the Milford Court’s interpretation of this provision as superseding Article VI, Section 7. Such a construction constitutes not only a serious distortion of the plain language of the Constitution, but subverts the fundamental purpose of the third clause in Article VI, Section 7, which was undoubtedly to provide a greater degree of security in of*44fice to the elected officials than the appointed officials provided for in clause two. I am therefore compelled to view the Milford decision as a blatant exercise of judicial legislation, reaching a result which ignores the clear intent of the document it was interpreting for the purpose of achieving the Court’s theory of government.
This Court has not hesitated in the past to disregard prior precedent where it believed that a decision was based on erroneous or invalid premises. See, e. g., Frame v. Sutherland, 459 Pa. 177, 327 A.2d 623 (1974).16 It is my firm conviction that.the Court today is duty bound to correct the distorted interpretation of Article VI, Section 7 propounded by the Milford Court and blindly followed by its progeny.17 My. own view is that we should restore to that section its true meaning, rather than exacerbate the confusion which will undoubtedly be occasioned by the majority and dissenting opinions today.
There are those in the dissent who have implied that the insistence upon compliance with the clear meaning of the Constitution would thwart progress and pervert the will of the people in the municipality instantly involved. I remind them that the Constitution embodies the wishes and aspirations of all of the people of this Commonwealth and they alone must be and should be the final arbiters as to the validity of any proposed change in the terms of that document. No segment of the population, no branch of government is entitled to assume this authority. The framers of the Charter, as illustrious as they might have been, and the people of Philadelphia, in adopting those provisions, were nevertheless circum*45scribed by the power they received from the legislature. Thus, this is not a question of the right of the people of Philadelphia nor the eminence of the framers of the Home Rule Charter, but the authority of the legislature to confer upon a municipality a right to act in this manner. The ultimate source of power which determines the legitimacy of the legislative delegation is the people of the Commonwealth and their views have been expressed through their Constitution. The perimeters provided by the Constitution may not be exceeded without an affirmative expression from all of the citizens of this Commonwealth. As I have stated, it is my view that the people have expressed through their Constitution an intent to set forth carefully defined methods by which elected officials may be removed during their term of office. I cannot agree with the dissenters who would ignore these provisions, nor can I accept the view of Mr. Chief Justice Jones, who would attempt to modify these procedures. If, in fact, the people of Pennsylvania are convinced that recall is a desirable governmental device, they alone must make that decision through their established procedures for amending the Constitution.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this concurring opinion.. These petitions accounted for 114,286 purported signatures.
. All such officers, of course, are also subject to removal by the process of impeachment, see Pa.Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 5, 6, or upon “conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime.” See Pa.Const. art. VI, § 7, cl. 1. Furthermore, the power of those promulgating a home rule charter is derived from the power invested in the legislature, and therefore obviously cannot exceed the bounds of legislative power.
. For the sake of clarity, I refer to this provision throughout as Article VI, Section 7. In the Constitution of 1874, this provision was found in Article VI, Section 4. On May 17, 1966, Articles VI, VII, and XII of the 1874 Constitution were consolidated and renumbered in Article VI.
. See note 2, supra.
. In his dissenting opinion, post at p. 293, n. 41, Mr. Justice Roberts attempts to argue that the constitutional methods for removal should not be considered exclusive by asserting that such construction was rejected by this Court in Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867). I am curious, however, as to how he can rely on that case for his proposition, considering that the McCombs Court was construing the Constitution of 1838. It should be emphasized that the 1838 Constitution did not contain the comprehensive removal scheme added to the Constitution of 1874. Rather, the former Constitution contained a provision analogous only to the first clause of Article VI, Section 7. See Pa. Const, of 1838, art. VI, § 9. In my view, there is no basis for interpreting constitutional language by relying on a case decided before that language existed.
Further, McCombs addressed the question of the right of the legislature to attach conditions to a term of office. To interpret this power to include the right to provide ultimate means for removal fails to recognize the distinction between a condition of office and the procedure to be followed for removing an incumbent from an office. While a violation of a condition of office may ultimately result in a ground for removal, that is nonetheless distinguishable from the actual process of removal that may be required. Thus, under the third clause of Article VI, Section 7, the legislature is free to determine what may constitute reasonable grounds for removal, however, it is not free to provide a different process for attaining removal. As to this, the third clause of Article VI, Section 7 is exclusive.
. See Comment, Current Problems in Pennsylvania Law, 99 U.Pa. L.Rev. 829, 837 (1951).
. In Bowman’s Case, supra, the Court struck down a statutory procedure for removing an elected justice of the peace, a constitutionally created office, as violative of the third clause of Article VI, Section 7. The Court unfortunately ventured beyond the precise issue in that case, however, to say that “nonconstitutional” offices may not be within the constitutional provisions for removal. This dictum was not only patently unnecessary to the Court’s decision, but was included without any citation of authority for its validity.
. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts asserts that Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901), Commonwealth ex rel. Braughler v. Weir, 165 Pa. 284, 30 A. 835 (1895), and Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436 (1867), support his proposition that, as to elected officials, the dichotomy was recognized prior to this Court’s decision in Milford. It should first be noted that all of these cases dealt with the power of the legislature to abolish a legislatively created office. The dissenting opinion therefore fails to acknowledge the distinction between the abolishment of an office and the removal of an officer from an existing office. In the cases relied upon, the dichotomy was used only in connection with the right of the legislature to abolish a legislatively created office. These cases thus provide no support for the legitimacy of this dichotomy where the consideration is the right to remove an incumbent from an existing office. Abolition of an office is a matter wholly distinct from removal, and is therefore irrelevant to the question presently at bar. See, e. g., Carey v. Altoona, 339 Pa. 541, 16 A.2d 1 (1940); Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. 213, 35 A. 199 (1896).
It should also be noted that Commonwealth ex rel, Vesneski v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328, 108 A. 829 (1919) likewise provides little support to the position taken in the dissent. While the Vesneski Court repeated the dictum from Bowman’s Case, supra, it specifically held that the elected burgess in that case was removable solely by the methods provided in the Constitution.
. See, e. g., Naef v. City of Allentown, 424 Pa. 597, 227 A.2d 888 (1967); Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 402 Pa. 542, 167 A.2d 480 (1961); Buell v. Union Township School District, 395 Pa. 567, 150 A.2d 852 (1959); Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Reinhardt v. Randall, 356 Pa. 302, 51 A.2d 751 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel. Houlahen v. Flynn, 348 Pa. 101, 34 A.2d 59 (1943); Kraus v. Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 30, 10 A.2d 393 (1939); Suermann et al. v. Hadley, 327 Pa. 190, 193 A. 645 (1937); Weiss v. Zeigler, 327 Pa. 100, 193 A. 642 (1937); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 161 A. 323 (1932); Muir v. Madden, 286 Pa. 233, 133 A. 226 (1926); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Bern, 284 Pa. 421, 131 A. 253 (1925).
. This concept has on occasion been expressed by referring to the officer empowered by the legislature to fill the office as the “agent” of the legislature. See, e. g., Watson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 386 Pa. 117, 125 A.2d 354 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 131 A. 253 (1925).
. This view is supported by the fact that the clause expressly excludes certain specified elected civil officials not intended to be covered within its provisions. Thus, the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius clearly applies. See Pane v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways, 422 Pa. 489, 222 A.2d 913 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. Witkin, 344 Pa. 191, 25 A.2d 317 (1942). The Milford Court, however, apparently ignored this basic rule of construction.
. Article XII, Section 1 provided in full as follows:
All officers whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law: Provided, That elections of State officers shall be held on a general election day, and elections of local officers shall be held on a municipal election day, except when, in either case, special elections may be required to fill unexpired terms.
Article XII, Section 1 was consolidated on May 17, 1966, with Articles VI and VII, renumbered to its present Article VI, Section 1, and amended to delete the proviso.
. A provision governing the removal of judges of the courts of record was included in the Judiciary Article, Article V, Section 15. Pa.Const. of 1874, art. V, § 15.
. In 1966, Article XII, Section 1 was consolidated with, inter alia, the provisions of Article VI, and the new Article VI was entitled “Public Officers”. See note 12, supra. In Mr. Justice Pomeroy’s dissenting opinion, post at pp. 263-264, n. 10b, it is contended that this consolidation should be viewed as a legislative “adoption” of the judicial gloss imposed on the former Article XII, Section 1. Such reasoning, however, is clearly strained. If the legislature had intended the former Article XII, Section 1 to operate as an exception to the third clause of Article VI, Section 7, it could have so provided by express language. This it did not do. The 1966 reconsolidation should therefore be interpreted according to what it accomplished; the grouping together, in Article VI of the Constitution, all provisions relating to “public officers”.
. While the power of appointment traditionally encompassed the power of removal, no such corresponding power was recognized in the case of an elected official.
. This writer dissented in Frame, expressing the view that the majority’s opinion in that case could be justified only by rejecting longstanding prior cases relevant therein. The crux of my dissent in Frame was that the majority reached its result by simply ignoring those previous decisions.
. See, e. g., Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948).