dissenting and concurring.
I respectfully disagree with that portion of the majority’s opinion that construes *861legislation regulating mobile and manufactured home parks, G.L.1956 chapter 44 of title 31 (the act), as preventing the owners of such parks from terminating a periodic tenancy therein, and from commencing an eviction action to regain possession of the premises, unless the owner demonstrates that its reasons for doing so fall within one of the enumerated “limitations” in § 31-44-2(a). The majority’s interpretation of § 31-44-2(a) precludes mobile-home park owners from terminating tenants for non-renewal of their leases or for any other lawful reasons unless the reasons fall within one of the statute’s six “limitations.” But one searches in vain for any language in that statute to support such a construction. Contrary to the majority, I can discern no clear or unambiguous language in the statute indicating that the Legislature ever intended such a result.
I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to enforce the earlier-enacted Public Laws version of § 31-44-2(a) (P.L.2000, ch. 109, § 45 enacted July 7, 2000) over the version contained in the 2000 Reenactment of the General Laws (effective per G.L.1956 § 43-4-18(d) “on and after December 31 of the calendar year of their reenactment”). The current version of § 31-44-2(a) includes “the changes made by the 2000 Reenactment of this title which were not included in the 2000 amendment.” See § 31-44-2 compiler’s note. These changes to the earlier version of § 31-44-2(a) were not included in the 2000 amendment to that statute as set forth in P.L.2000, ch. 109, § 45.
Note that one of the changes in wording to the statute is that the 2000 Reenactment dropped the statute’s reference to “reasons,” leaving only the word “limitations” to describe the six enumerated sub-paragraphs in the statute. The compiler (“office of law revision”) is specifically authorized by G.L.1956 § 43-4-18(a)
“to reenact annually specific titles of the general laws which shall be amendatory to the general laws of Rhode Island, 1956, as amended, for the purposes specified in § 22-11-3.4. Substantive changes contained in the reenactment of these titles shall be brought to the attention of the general assembly annually in a ‘Statutes and Statutory Construction’ bill, prepared by the law revision office, for general assembly approval or disapproval.”
In addition to authorizing such changes, G.L.1956 § 22-11-3.4 requires that the compiler
“shall rearrange, rephrase, and consolidate the public laws and acts and resolves of the general assembly so that redundancies may be avoided, obsolete enactments eliminated, contradictions reconciled, omissions supplied, and imperfections cured. The law revision director has no authority either to change the law or to alter the substance of the statutes but shall alert the general assembly annually to specific changes which may be required.”
The changes in the present version of § 31-44-2(a) were part of the 2000 Reenactment, but they were not included in any “ ‘Statutes and Statutory Construction’ bill.” Apparently, they were not considered substantive in nature because they merely “rearrange[d], rephrase[d], and consolidate^]” the language to clarify the original intent of the General Assembly. Therefore, because these changes in the 2000 Reenactment of § 31-44-2(a) do not conflict with any version of the act passed by the General Assembly, see § 43-4-18(c) (stating that acts passed by the General Assembly control over conflicting amendments that are part of reenactments), I believe that this version of the statute should be enforced as the law in effect at the time we decide this case. See Solas v. *862Emergency Hiring Council of the State of Rhode Island, 774 A.2d 820, 826 (R.I.2001) (“[T]his Court has traditionally applied the law in effect at the time we consider an appeal.”)- Moreover, we have held that, in cases like this one, if a statutory change is non-substantive, remedial, or procedural, then we apply the law in effect at the time of the appeal rather than at the time the cause of action arose. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063, 1067 (R.I.1996).
Although § 31-44-2(a) enumerates six “limitations” with reference to the termination of a mobile-home tenancy, any one of which “takes precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance” (emphasis added), there is no indication in § 31-44-2 or elsewhere that the Legislature intended that the enumerated limitations in § 31-44-2(a) would constitute the exclusive and only grounds for a mobile-home-park owner or operator to terminate a tenancy. In any event, it certainly failed to use any language that clearly and unambiguously so provides.
I reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, none of the enumerated “limitations” in § 31-44-2(a) conflict with the express provisions of G.L.1956 § 34-18-37 (allowing termination of periodic tenancies), provisions that are expressly incorporated by reference into § 31-44-2(a). These provisions allow an owner or landlord to terminate a periodic residential tenancy by providing the tenant with the requisite advance written notice of such termination. Thus, § 31-44-2(a) expressly provides, in its first sentence, that “[a] tenancy may be terminated by a park owner or operator pursuant to chapter 18 of title 34 [the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act].” Section 34-18-37(b) of that act expressly allows landlords to terminate periodic tenancies like this one upon providing the tenant with proper advance notice. Hence, the specific legislation dealing with the termination of tenancies in mobile and manufactured home parks expressly incorporates by reference the provisions of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. These landlord-tenant-act provisions allow for nonrenewals, for terminations of periodic tenancies, and for evictions of tenants who unlawfully hold over after the lawful termination or expiration of their tenancy.
Second, the enumerated limitations in § 31-44-2(a) take precedence only over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance. But allowing nonrenewals, terminations of periodic tenancies, and evictions for unlawfully holding over after terminations occur in no way conflicts with any of the enumerated other “limitations” in § 31-44-2 for terminating mobile-home-park tenancies.
Third, conspicuously absent from § 31-44-2(a) is any language or other indication that the enumerated “limitations” set forth therein were intended to constitute the exclusive or only bases for terminating a mobile-home-park tenancy. Compare, e.g., Fla.Stat .Ann. § 723.061(1) (West 2001) (“A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile home only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section.”). It is one thing for the General Assembly to specify that such provisions take precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance, but it is quite another for the Legislature to require that the “limitations” constitute the exclusive grounds for terminating a mobile-home-park tenancy. Here, the General Assembly provided for the former but not for the latter. Because the General Assembly has included no language in the statute evincing an intention to change or to override the otherwise applicable common and statutory law of this state allowing termination of residential tenan*863cies on other lawful grounds, I do not believe we should construe § 31-44-2(a) to do so. Indeed, the statute in question (§ 31-44-2(a)) fails to include any language from which one could even infer an exclusivity provision, much less does it clearly and unambiguously so provide by its express terms.
Fourth, under conventional rules of statutory interpretation, “when apparently inconsistent statutory provisions are questioned, every attempt should be made to construe and apply them so as to avoid the inconsistency * * Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987). Thus, “[wjherever a general provision shall be in conflict with a special provision relating to the same or to a similar subject, the two (2) provisions shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both * * G.L.1956 § 43-3-26. Accordingly, I would hold that only when a provision of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act expressly conflicts with a provision of the more specific legislation addressing mobile and manufactured home parks would the latter take precedence, but only if effect cannot be given to both provisions. But nowhere in the latter act is there any conflict with those sections of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act that allow for termination of periodic tenancies and for evictions of tenants who unlawfully hold over after such terminations. Indeed, § 31-44-2(b) seems to expressly contemplate such terminations when it provides for a minimum period of “not less than sixty (60) days” for a tenant to be notified “to remove from the premises.” This specific provision would take precedence over the conflicting portion of § 34 — IS—37(b), which allows a landlord to “terminate a month-to-month tenancy or any periodic tenancy for more than a month or less than a year by a written notice” that is delivered to the tenant “at least thirty (30) days before the date specified in the notice.” But it would not prohibit a mobile-home-park owner from terminating a periodic tenancy for a reason other than one enumerated in § 31-44-2(a). Thus, while the Act provides mobile-home tenants with greater protection from nonrenewals and terminations of periodic tenancies than other tenants enjoy, it does not go so far as to preclude such terminations except for one of the six “limitations” listed in § 31-44-2(a). This reading construes the two provisions “so that effect may be given to both.” Section 43-3-26.
Fifth, if periodic tenancies could not be terminated at the conclusion of the term except upon one of the “limitations” stated in § 31-44-2(a), then the Legislature’s provision for a mandatory “written lease of not less than one year unless the resident requests in writing a shorter term, or unless a resident in writing states that he or she does not desire a written lease,” § 31-44-7(1)(xiv), becomes virtually meaningless. See Brennan, 529 A.2d at 637 (holding that “[a] statute or enactment may not be construed in a way * * * if at all possible, to render sentences, clauses, or words surplusage”). After all, if a tenant cannot be terminated by the mobile-home-park owner at the conclusion of the lease term unless the termination complies with one of the six enumerated “limitations” specified in § 31-44-2(a), then the required minimum one-year-lease term becomes largely superfluous because the tenant cannot be terminated in any event unless the owner complies with one of the six reasons listed in the statute. Given the mandatory notice provisions for raising the tenant’s rent and for terminating any tenancy, what would be the legislative purpose for mandating term leases of one year or longer if the owner could not terminate the lease in any event during or at the expiration thereof absent compliance *864with one of the enumerated “limitations” set forth in § 31-44-2(a)?
I note also that, pursuant to § 31-44-5(b), park owners and operators are forbidden from taking reprisals against their resident tenants for having engaged in “any protected lawful action.” Moreover, “[a]n increase in rent, nonrenewal of lease, refusal to offer a lease, or termination of tenancy, taken by a [landlord] against a resident * * * within six (6) months after the resident * * * has taken any protected lawful action, creates a rebuttable presumption that the act by the [landlord] is a reprisal.” Id. (Emphasis added.) And a “[reprisal may be pleaded as a defense in any court proceeding brought against a resident or prospective resident after he or she has taken any protected lawful action.” Id. But if an owner of a mobile-home park could not terminate a periodic tenancy or refuse to renew a lease except for one of the six “limitations” set forth in § 31-44-2(a), then the above-referenced provisions in § 31-44-5(b) prohibiting “nonrenewal of lease” and “termination of tenancy” as a reprisal for a tenant taking any protected lawful action would appear to be unnecessary. If the majority’s interpretation wére correct, then the owner could not terminate or fail to renew such an expired or holdover tenancy in any event — irrespective of whether the termination constituted a reprisal — unless the grounds for doing so fell within one of the “limitations” set forth in § 31-44-2(a).
Thus, it seems to me that the more coherent interpretation of all language in this act — and the General Assembly’s presumed but unexpressed intent — is that a mobile-home-park owner may refuse to renew a lease or terminate a periodic tenancy for any lawful reason, as long as, in doing so, the tenant receives the requisite advance written notice as provided for in § 31-44-2(b) (sixty days) and as long as such action does not amount to a reprisal against a tenant for having taken a protected lawful action. But if the reason for the termination implicates any one of the “limitations” set forth in § 31-44-2(a), then those “limitations” take precedence over any conflicting provisions of any other law or contractual provision, and the owner must comply with their terms if the termination is for one of those six enumerated reasons. Such an interpretation gives effect to all provisions of the act, and gives precedence to any provisions in the act that conflict with the provisions of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Yet, at the same time, it respects the Legislature’s apparent decision to allow owners to terminate periodic mobile-home-park tenancies and not to renew leases at their expiration as provided for in that latter act, as long as such conduct does not constitute a reprisal for the tenant’s taking a protected action.
This interpretation also avoids converting mobile-home-park residents into de facto permanent tenants. For that is the practical effect of limiting a park owner’s reasons for termination to those enumerated in § 31-44-2(a). Under the majority’s interpretation, unless a tenant fails to pay rent, fails to comply with applicable law, fails to adhere to rules and regulations relating to mobile and manufactured home parks, or unless the tenant fails to comply with one of the other “limitations” in § 31-44-2(a), the tenant has a right to remain in the park as a tenant for the indefinite future and cannot be terminated for any other reason. Although, as the majority suggests, such an incursion into an owner’s property rights may well survive federal constitutional scrutiny in a case that properly raises such a challenge, our state constitution could be construed to raise a higher bar than its federal counterpart to uncompensated takings of private property. In any event, because of the radical *865nature of creating such quasi-permanent tenancies against the will of park owners, I would require a much clearer statement from the Legislature before I would ascribe such a potentially confiscatory purpose to the framers of this legislation— especially when the act as drafted is already chock full of anti-reprisal measures and other extraordinary protections for mobile-home tenants against arbitrary terminations — without taking the unwarranted step of judicially grafting onto it an exclusivity provision that the text of the statute simply cannot support. See Brennan, 529 A.2d at 637 (holding that “in interpreting a legislative enactment * * * the court must attempt to ascertain the [legislative] intent by considering the enactment in its entirety and by viewing it in light of circumstances and purposes that motivated its passage. * * * A statute or enactment may not be construed in a way that would attribute to the Legislature an intent that would result in absurdities or would defeat the underlying purpose of the enactment. * * * Moreover, we have indicated that when apparently inconsistent statutory provisions are questioned, every attempt should be made to construe and apply them so as to avoid the inconsistency and should not be applied literally if to do so would produce patently absurd or unreasonable results.”).
Although the act contains no statement or other indication that the “limitations” enumerated in § 31-44-2(a) were intended to constitute the exclusive or only grounds for terminating a mobile-home-park tenancy, the majority, nevertheless, decrees this to be so, apparently believing that mobile-home-park tenants deserve even greater protections beyond those express additional safeguards that the General Assembly has afforded to mobile home tenants in the act. But even if I were to concede, ar-guendo, that as a policy matter, mobile-home-park tenants deserve even greater protections from terminations and evictions than the act currently provides — and the act certainly gives them much greater protections than other residential tenants presently enjoy — I do not believe that a mere judicial belief in the righteousness of this policy is enough of a warrant for this Court to legislate the extent and degree of what those heightened protections should be. I believe the General Assembly has specified the additional protections that it desired to extend to such tenants in enacting chapter 44 of title 31. Although clearly providing mobile-home-park tenants with greater protections than conventional residential tenants, the General Assembly neglected to go so far as to prevent them from suffering a termination at the end of a periodic tenancy — as long as that termination does not constitute a reprisal for the tenant’s taking a protected action, as long as the owner complies with the “limitations” of § 31-44-2(a) (if the termination implicates any of the six “limitations” fist-ed therein), and as long as the tenant receives the requisite sixty-days-advance-written notice. Thus, I would not construe § 31-44-2(a) as providing that mobile-home-park tenants can be terminated only for one of the six enumerated “limitations” set forth in that statute — at least when the Legislature, in its wisdom, declined to go this far in its framing of that law.
In other respects, I concur in the results of the Court’s opinion. Thus, I would reverse the Superior Court and vacate the judgment in its entirety.