dissenting.
[¶ 16] Because, in my view, the Hearing Officer applied 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(5) (2001) in a way that is consistent with its plain language and with established workers’ compensation principles, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 17] Title 39-A M.R.S.A. section 201(5) provides:
5. Subsequent nonwork injuries. If an employee suffers a nonwork-relat-ed injury or disease that is not causally connected to a previous compensable injury, the subsequent nonwork-related injury or disease is not compensable under this Act.
39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(5) (2001) (emphasis added). Although I agree that subsection 201(5) requires the Hearing Officer to disregard the subsequent nonwork-injury or disease in calculating the amount of benefits, I disagree with the Court that the language of subsection 201(5) prohibits the Hearing Officer from taking into account, in any manner, the effects of Pratt’s subsequent nonwork-injury. The nonwork-re-lated heart attack was properly considered only in determining the extent of Pratt’s actual capacity for work, and thus in deciding the statutory section pursuant to which Pratt is entitled to benefits.
[¶ 18] To determine whether an employee with a partial physical incapacity is entitled to total incapacity benefits, the employee must demonstrate both that no *357work is available in the local community and that he or she is not physically able to perform full-time work in the State labor market, whether or not any work is available. See Lamphier v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2000 ME 121, ¶ 1, 755 A.2d 489, 490; Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Ctr., 1999 ME 105, ¶ 17, 735 A.2d 478, 483.
[¶ 19] The most accurate way for a Hearing Officer to determine the overall incapacity of an employee is to take into account the employee’s entire physical capacity, the availability of employment, and other nonwork-related factors affecting employability such as the employee’s age, intelligence, work experience, and training. See Johnson v. Shaw’s Distrib. Ctr., 2000 ME 191, ¶ 12, 760 A.2d 1057, 1060 (permitting consideration of nonwork-related factors). Although we have stated that employees may try to meet their burden to show the unavailability of employment with any competent evidence, including labor market surveys, see e.g., Poitras v. R.E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc., 430 A.2d 1113, 1118 (Me.1981); Warren v. Vinalhaven Light & Power Co., 424 A.2d 711, 714-15 (Me.1981), the usual and best method of demonstrating the unavailability of work in the employee’s local community is for the employee to actually search for work. This method is typically much less expensive than hiring a labor market expert and also encourages the employee to actually “test the water” to discover the availability of employment.
[¶ 20] Subsection 201(5) provides that when an employee suffers a subsequent nonwork-injury that is causally unrelated to a previous work injury, the latter injury “is not compensable under this Act.” 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(5). The Court construes this language as prohibiting the Hearing Officer from considering, in any way, the effects of the subsequent nonwork-injury, requiring the Hearing Officer to determine the employee’s earning capacity hypothetically, i.e., as if the subsequent nonwork-injury had not occurred. This approach is not mandated by subsection 201(5) and is impractical in its application. Rather than allowing the Hearing Officer to determine the employee’s level of incapacity and then attributing a percentage to each injury, the Court’s construction of subsection 201(5) requires the Hearing Officer to determine what an employee would be able to earn as if that employee had suffered one injury, the work-injury, and not the other non-work-injury.
[¶21] This will place a difficult burden on employees with causally unrelated subsequent nonwork-injuries to prove their entitlement to 100% partial or total benefits based on their work-related injuries alone, because such emphasis will require the employee to show the theoretical unavailability of work as if the subsequent nonwork condition had never occurred. The determination of availability will be purely hypothetical, and an actual work-search will be of very limited value. Moreover, it will be difficult for the Hearing Officer to determine the employee’s employability based on hypotheticals.
[¶ 22] The most practical way to apply subsection 201(5), and the method most consistent with the language and with established principles, is for the Hearing Officer to do what was done in this case, i.e., to determine the employee’s employability based on all his circumstances, including his entire physical and mental capacity and then determine the relative contribution of each injury and reduce the liability of the employer by that percentage attributable to the causally unrelated subsequent non-work-related injury.
[¶ 23] Apportionments are not new to Workers’ Compensation law. We have long recognized a right of apportionment among insurers in cases involving multiple *358work injuries.8 Title 89-A expressly requires apportionment in cases of multiple work-related injuries to determine the applicable law. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(6) (2001); see Me. Ins. Guar. Ass’n. v. Folsom, 2001 ME 63, ¶ 13, 769 A.2d 185, 191. Similarly, we have recognized an employer’s right of set off when an employee receives a duplicative recovery for a subsequent injury in another state. LaPointe v. United Eng’rs and Constructors, 680 A.2d 458, 460-61 (Me.1996). In each of these situations, the apportionment or set off is calculated by first determining the employee’s overall work-capacity in light of all the circumstances relating to the employee. Johnson, 2000 ME 191, ¶ 12, 760 A.2d at 1060.
[¶ 24] In this case, the Hearing Officer considered the totality of Pratt’s circumstances, including his age, education, and work-experience, along with his nonwork-related physical limitations, and concluded that Pratt is not physically able to perform full time work in the State labor market. Accordingly, Pratt is entitled to benefits pursuant to the total incapacity statute, former 39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B (1989), repealed and replaced by P.L.1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 212 (2001)). The Hearing Officer then reduced Fraser Paper’s liability for total incapacity benefits by 20% based on the contribution of the employee’s nonwork-related heart condition to his total incapacity. Thus, Pratt’s incapacity caused by his nonwork-related heart condition was not compensated, in accordance with the language of subsection 201(5). The Hearing Officer’s construction of the statute is consistent with its plain language and the method used to factor in the nonwork-related heart condition is fair and workable. I would affirm the decision.
. Apportionment among insurers in multiple-injury cases originated as a judge-made doctrine, see, e.g., Kidder v. Coastal Constr. Co., 342 A.2d 729, 734 (Me.1975), but is now codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 354(2001).