Dissenting Opinion by ELDRIDGE, J., in which CATHELL, and BATTAGLIA, JJ., join.
ELDRIDGE, Judge,dissenting.
I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that cash tips paid directly to an employee by a customer constitute “wages” for the purpose of Maryland’s wage garnishment law. Today’s decision is unsound and contrary to previous opinions by this Court. For the reasons discussed below, I would affirm.
It is well-established in Maryland that “[a] garnishment proceeding is, in essence, an action by the judgment debtor for the benefit of the judgment creditor which is brought against a third party, the garnishee, who holds the assets of the judgment debtor.” Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159, 411 A.2d 430, 436 (1980). See, e.g., Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384, 298 A.2d 1, 6 (1972); Walsh v. Lewis Swim. Pool Constr., 256 Md. 608, 610, 261 A.2d 475, 476 (1970); Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 506-507, 224 A.2d 419, 421 (1966); Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 95 A.2d 273 (1953). The opinions of this Court have accordingly emphasized the principle that the creditor merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and can only recover to the same extent as could the debtor. Thus, in Maryland
“[t]he test of the garnishee’s liability is that he has funds, property or credits in his hands, the property of the debtor, for which the debtor would have the right to sue. * * * If the [debtor] could not sue the garnishee ..., the [creditor] cannot do so.”
Bendix Radio Corp. v. Hoy, 207 Md. 225, 229, 114 A.2d 45, 47 (1955).
In the instant case, the debtor-employee could not maintain an action against the garnishee-employer for payment of these *550tips because the employer is not hable to the employee for cash tips paid directly to the employee by her customers. Under no scenario is the employer liable to the employee for cash tips which the employer never possesses or controls. Since the debtor has no right to recover from her employer cash tips paid to her directly from her customers, the judgment creditor has no right to such a recovery. Where the creditor fails “to prove that such a liability existed,” there must be “a verdict for the garnishee,” J. Cueva Co. v. R. Lancaster Williams & Co., 145 Md. 526, 530, 125 A. 849, 851 (1924).
Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County National Savings Bank, 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983), is especially instructive on this point. In Hoffman this Court considered whether a check payable to the debtor from his retirement account was properly garnished from the debtor’s former employer to whom the check had been mailed. The Court of Special Appeals had concluded that the check constituted a credit in the hands of the garnishee-employer belonging to the debtor and was therefore garnishable. This Court disagreed. We noted that the retirement account check did not represent any debt which the employer owed to the debtor and that the employer had no real interest in the funds. A credit, we explained, is a monetary obligation that the garnishee-employer owes to the debtor. The check, however, could not be considered a credit because “it did not represent an obligation that the garnishee owed the debtor.” 297 Md. at 697, 467 A.2d at 762. Rather, the check was representative of an obligation owed by the retirement fund to the debtor. Thus, the creditor could not reach the retirement check in the hands of the debtor’s former employer.
Another firmly established principle of Maryland law is that only wages actually “due” at the date of attachment are subject to garnishment. In U.S. v. Williams, 279 Md. 673, 678, 370 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1977), this Court explained that “wages not actually due when the attachment is laid are not subject to attachment, primarily because the employee’s right to sue the garnishee has not matured.” See Maryland Code *551(1975, 1990 Repl.Vol.), § 15-601.1 of the Commercial Law Article (referring to “wages due”); § 15-602 (attachment of a judgment debtor’s wages constitutes “a lien on all attachable wages that are payable at the time the attachment is served or which become payable”); § 15-603 (employer-garnishee shall withhold all attachable wages payable to the judgment debt- or). Cash tips are simply never “due” or “payable” because they are money already paid to the employee directly from the customer.
Moreover, from the earliest cases, this Court has emphasized that garnishment concerns money or property which presently is, or in the future will be, in the hands of the garnishee. See, e.g., Parkville Federal v. Maryland National Bank, 343 Md. 412, 681 A.2d 521 (1996); Hoffman Chev. v. Wash. Co. Nat’l Sav., 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983); Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, supra, 287 Md. at 159, 411 A.2d at 436; Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, Inc., supra, 267 Md. at 384, 298 A.2d at 5; Walsh v. Lewis Swim. Pool Constr., supra, 256 Md. at 610, 261 A.2d at 476; Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., supra, 244 Md. at 506-507, 224 A.2d at 421; Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., supra, 201 Md. 616, 95 A.2d 273; International Bedding Co. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 146 Md. 479, 126 A. 902 (1924); Nicholson v. Crook, 56 Md. 55 (1881); Odend’hal. v. Devlin, 48 Md. 439 (1878); Wilson v. Ridgely, 46 Md. 235 (1877); Troxall v. Applegarth, 24 Md. 163 (1866); B & O. Co. v. Wheeler, 18 Md. 372 (1862). The majority cites no Maryland cases, and there are none of which I am aware, that have upheld a garnishment with regard to property that is not in the hands of the garnishee and will not come into the hands of the garnishee. Today’s decision is the first to sustain a garnishment involving money or property that is not, and never will be, in the possession of the garnishee.
To support its conclusion that, in using the term “wage,” the Legislature “intended to include all forms of remuneration, whether or not paid directly by the employer, except to the extent specifically excluded,” the Court relies on language in several statutes not pertaining to garnishment. The Court *552notes, for instance, that tips are included within the meaning of wages for the purposes of unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation laws, as well as within the meaning of “gross income” for federal and state income taxes. First, I fail to understand how these statutes have any bearing on garnishment proceedings. Certainly, tips are income and, therefore, tips are expressly included in workers’ compensation and income tax statutes where the purpose of those laws is to calculate a number to be used to determine the tax owed or to determine the benefit to which the person is entitled. The purpose of a garnishment proceeding, however, is plainly different. Garnishment “is a tool by which a judgment creditor can reach the assets of a judgment debtor in the hands of a third party, the garnishee.” Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, Inc., supra, 267 Md. at 384, 298 A.2d at 5. The purpose of garnishment is the seizure of money or other property actually in the hands of the garnishee, and if that money or property is not there, then it cannot be garnished. Second, those statutes which expressly include tips and gratuities within the definition of wages do not support the Court’s theory. To the contrary, the statutory language on which the Court relies demonstrates that the General Assembly knows how to draft a statute to include tips within the meaning of wages if it so desires.
Wages earned by an employee are considered as much a part of an employee’s assets as any other property. The General Assembly, however, has enacted a statute limiting the garnishment of wages in favor of the employee. See § 15-601.1 of the Commercial Law Article. The exemption statute embodies a compromise to accommodate both the principle that a debtor should not abandon his or her obligations and the principle that a debtor should not be deprived of every means of obtaining life’s necessities. See generally Robert L. Karwacki, Attachment of Wages in Maryland, 16 Md. L.Rev. 227 (1956) (discussing the exemption). Here, the Court circumvents the statutory exemption by creating the fiction of putting cash tips in the hands of the employer. In the Court’s *553view, cash tips are aggregated with an employee’s regular wages before applying the statutory exemption.
The implication of the Court’s fiction is troubling. Under the Court’s reasoning, if an individual works two part-time jobs, for example, neither of which pays a wage rising above the exemption amount, the wages could be aggregated for the purpose of garnishment. A writ of garnishment could be served on one or more of the employers simply because the wages from both jobs are already reported by the employers as income. The majority’s reasoning may encompass other situations in which funds, in the employee’s possession, are aggregated with wages in the employer’s hands for purposes of circumventing the exemption. This reasoning is unsound and inconsistent with the historic construction applied to the exemption statute. The Court has previously adhered to the principle that
“[t]he statute creating an exemption in favor of a class of persons least able to protect themselves and largely dependent on their wages for the support of themselves and others dependent upon them, should be given a liberal and not a technical construction.”
Wilmer v. Mann, 121 Md. 239, 248, 88 A. 222, 225 (1913).
Finally, “[a]s attachment proceedings are in derogation of the common law, their existence is dependent upon special provisions authorizing them.” Northwestern National Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, Inc., supra, 267 Md. at 384, 298 A.2d at 5 citing Killen v. American Casualty, 231 Md. 105, 189 A.2d 103 (1963). See Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, supra, 287 Md. at 158-159, 411 A.2d at 436 (court’s authority in garnishment proceedings is derived from a “ ‘special and limited statutory power,’ ” quoting Belcher v. Government Employees’ Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 720, 387 A.2d 770, 772 (1978)). Accordingly, this Court has consistently refused to uphold garnishments which were not specifically authorized by statutory provisions and rules. For example, in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 539 A.2d 1130 (1988), we held that, where no statute expressly subjects disability income pay*554ments owed to public employees to garnishment proceedings, the Court would not uphold the garnishment. Other cases have also refused to uphold garnishments which were not strictly in accordance with the statutes and rules. See, e.g., Parkville Federal v. Maryland National Bank, supra, 343 Md. 412, 681 A.2d 521; Hoffman Chev. v. Wash. Co. Nat’l Sav., supra, 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758. See also Brown v. Somerville, 8 Md. 444, 460-461 (1855) (The garnishment “process seeks to dispose of a man’s property without his consent, and in many cases without his knowledge, to the payment of his debts. It has always been strictly construed and required to be pursued according to the statute”).
Our prior opinions are inconsistent with the majority’s view that the General Assembly intended garnishable wages to include cash tips “except to the extent specifically excluded.” In so holding, the majority engages in judicial legislation, rewriting the wage garnishment law to conform with its own notions of fairness. If notions of fairness justify treating cash tips, paid directly by the customer to a waitress or waiter, as garnishable wages in the hands of the employer, it is for the General Assembly, and not for this Court, to say so.
Judges CATHELL and BATTAGLIA have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein and join this dissenting opinion.