DISSENTING OPINION
ONION, Judge.Our brethren deny petitioner’s application for habeas corpus. Judge Morrison and this writer have concluded that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States require that we vigorously dissent to such action.
The record reflects that the petitioner was convicted of the offense of Robbery and assessed a punishment of life imprisonment as a habitual criminal in the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County on December 31, 1954. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. 280 S.W.2d 752. The appellate record before this Court contained no statement of facts, bills of exception or appellate briefs. No attorney appeared of record.
On June 26, 1967, prior to the effective date of the 1967 amendment of Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. and the decision of this Court in Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Sept. 14, 1967), this Court ordered .the Honorable Byron Matthews, present Judge *937of the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County, to conduct a hearing upon the petition for habeas corpus in which the petitioner alleged that at the time of his appeal he was indigent, not represented by appellate counsel and that he did not waive the same. In ordering the hearing, we specifically called the trial court’s attention to Douglas and Meyes v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33; Anders v. State of California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493; Entsminger v. State of Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S.Ct. 1402, 18 L.Ed.2d 501.
At such hearing, the petitioner was present and represented by appointed counsel, Hon. Grady Hight, and Judge Matthews has now transmitted the facts developed together with his findings of fact.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Matthews found that the petitioner was indigent (the pauper’s oath on file was not brought forward in the original appellate record); that he was represented by court appointed trial counsel, Hon. Joe Shannon, Sr., but desired to represent himself with appointed counsel remaining at his side during the trial.
It further appears from the record that another attorney, Hon. John E. McLean, who was not present during the trial, signed the motion for new trial (merely stating, “verdict contrary to the law and evidence.”), with said court appointed counsel; that McLean and Shannon were both present at the hearing on motion for new trial, the sentencing, and when notice of appeal was given. Judge Matthews toncluded that McLean’s appearance was at the request of some undetermined person other than the petitioner or the court, though the memory of all was hazy on this issue.
Douglas and Meyes v. People of State of California, supra, established the right of an indigent appellant to counsel on his first appeal, and Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, holds that it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to deprive a person because of his indigency of any rights of appeal afforded all other convicted defendants, including a free transcript or record.
While the record does not reflect that the indigent petitioner requested court appointed appellate counsel, neither does it reflect an affirmative waiver by him. Petitioner’s actions at the trial indicating a desire to represent himself with appointed counsel at his side would not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel on appeal. See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253. Further, there is no indication that he evidenced any wish to represent himself on appeal.
In Swenson v. Bosler, supra, the United States Supreme Court said:
“It is now settled ‘that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend upon a request.’ Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513, 82 S.Ct. 884, 889, 8 L.Ed.2d 70. When a defendant whose indigency and desire to appeal are manifest does not have the services of his trial counsel on appeal, it simply cannot be inferred from defendant’s failure specifically to request appointment of appellate counsel that he has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the appointment of appellate counsel.”
It appears from the record that at the time of the sentence, court appointed counsel considered an appeal in the case to be “a very frivolous thing.” Attorney McLean also reached the same conclusion. It appears to have been the practice and custom in Tarrant County at the time for appointed counsel not to take the case beyond sentencing without further orders *938of the court.1 In all fairness to the appointed counsel and the trial judge then presiding, there was at the time no requirement that appointed counsel follow the case on appeal. Savage v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 576, 237 S.W.2d 315; Spalding v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 329, 127 S.W.2d 457.
Such practice, however, flies into the teeth of the recent holding in Anders v. State of California, supra, where the Supreme Court stated:
“Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court— not counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.”
It should be re-emphasized that in the petitioner’s appeal from his 1954 conviction, no statement of facts, bills of exception, or briefs were filed. It appears no effort was made by either attorney to obtain a statement of facts or to discuss the matter of appeal with petitioner. The petitioner was confined in jail and was transferred 2 or 3 days after sentence to the Dallas County Jail during the period prescribed by law in which to request a statement of facts.
“Such procedure automatically deprived him of a full record, briefs, and arguments on the bare election of his appointed counsel, without providing any notice to him or to the reviewing court that he had chosen not to file the complete record in the case.”
Entsminger v. State of Iowa, supra.
This Court affirmed petitioner’s life sentence after having seen only what the Supreme Court denominates as a “clerk’s transcript” in Entsminger.2 There is no showing on the original appeal or at the writ hearing that this is all that petitioner desired to have forwarded on appeal. And at such time it clearly was the general rule, that in absence of a statement of facts, only fundamental errors will be revised and every presumption will be in favor of the regularity of the conviction, the charge of the court, and of the sufficiency of the evidence. 1 Branch’s Anno.P.C.2d Ed., Sec. 622, p. 598.
We simply cannot conclude from the record before us that petitioner should be denied an adequate and effective review of his conviction on his first appeal on the ground that some attorney in addition to his court appointed counsel appeared at the hearing on the motion for new trial and at the sentencing either as an amicus curiae or at the request of some undetermined person. This is particularly true under the circumstances here presented *939where neither attorney McLean or court appointed trial counsel or petitioner could recall the nature of McLean’s connection with the case, and there is no showing that petitioner accepted him as his counsel. In fact it is petitioner’s undisputed testimony that he never talked to McLean or his court appointed counsel before, during or after the hearing on motion for new trial.
The majority assumes that attorney McLean was not court appointed. Judge Matthews found that McLean appeared at the request of some undetermined person other than the petitioner or the court, but he did add that the memory of all was hazy on this issue. The record appears to us to be just as consistent with the fact that attorney McLean was court appointed as with the conclusion that he was not. Nevertheless, the majority seeks to equate McLean’s status with that of employed counsel of appellant’s own choice. The record does not support such equation. Regardless of McLean’s status, we observe that court appointed counsel did not withdraw, or attempt to withdraw, and was still representing the indigent petitioner at the time of sentence and notice of appeal.
Further, we cannot agree that the result reached in Evans v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 401 S.W.2d 602, without citation of authority or reasoning, should be extended and applied in the case at bar. To do so would cast the burden upon this indigent petitioner and others like him to show, while still represented by court appointed counsel, that any other lawyer who injects himself into the case without request, is not counsel of his own choice. In Evans it was undisputed that the appellant had employed the attorney following her arrest for prostitution, and the only question involved was his authority thereafter to have entered a plea of guilty for her to such misdemeanor charge without her being present.
Still further we cannot agree that the fact that this indigent petitioner while confined in the Texas Department of Corrections filed his applications for writs of habeas corpus, pro se, in Federal Court constitutes an adequate substitute for his right to counsel on appeal or constitutes a waiver thereof. There can be no waiver of a right which can no longer be exercised. Crawford v. Beto, 385 F.2d 156 (5th Cir., October 9, 1967). Cf. Williams v. State of Alabama, 5th Cir., 1965, 341 F.2d 777.
Applying the relevant considerations which were decisive in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453; Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 and Pate v. Holman, 5th Cir., 341 F.2d 764, there can be little question but what Anders, Swenson and Entsminger are to be applied retroactively just as Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, Douglas and Meyes v. People of State of California, supra, and Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, supra, have been.
To recapitulate, it is undisputed that the petitioner (1) was indigent at the time of his appeal, (2) that he manifested his desire to appeal, (3) that his appeal was without benefit of counsel, statement of facts or appellate briefs. We cannot find anything in the record to constitute an intelligent waiver of an effective review of his conviction on appeal. Certainly the appearance “out of the blue” of an attorney not requested by the petitioner, who does not discuss the case with him, is of the opinion that an appeal would be frivolous and who takes no further action after notice of appeal is given cannot constitute a waiver by the appellant.
The case at bar represents a much stronger case than Crawford v. Beto, supra. Crawford, a state prisoner, based his petition for habeas corpus on the fact that he sought to appeal his state court conviction but was without the aid of counsel. He was represented by retained counsel at his trial and through a motion for new *940trial. He requested the trial judge to appoint appellate counsel but his request was denied. Crawford appealed his own case, preparing the appellate brief with the aid of a fellow jail inmate. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Crawford v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 95, 282 S.W.2d 222. Crawford’s family then borrowed money to employ an attorney to file a motion for re-hearing in this Court! The motion was denied. In Crawford, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said:
“We hold that appellant was denied his constitutional right to counsel on appeal. We further hold that the employment of counsel to prepare and file the motion for rehearing was not an adequate substitute for his right- to counsel on appeal. There can be no waiver of a right which can no longer be exercised. Cf. Williams v. State of Alabama, 5 Cir., 1965, 341 F.2d 777.”
It is interesting to note that the Court does not discuss the question of indigency, but apparently assumes such fact from the record before it.
In the case at bar we would hold that petitioner was denied his constitutional right to counsel on appeal. He is entitled to an out of time appeal. Crawford v. Beto, supra; Ex parte Mixon, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 417; Mixon v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 401 S.W.2d 806.
We are not unmindful of the reporter’s testimony at the writ hearing that the shorthand notes of petitioner’s trial were misplaced in 1964 in the move from one courthouse building to another. It may well be that these notes may have now been located, or that in an out of time appeal the parties will be able to agree upon a statement of facts.
We need not decide until the perfection of the out of time appeal whether the petitioner is entitled to a new trial.
We respectfully dissent.
MORRISON, J., concurs.. The abandonment by a court appointed attorney of an indigent defendant’s appeal may well deprive a convicted defendant of his constitutional rights. Swenson v. Bosler, supra; Loper v. Beto, 383 F.2d 400 (5 Cir., 1967); United States ex rel. Maselli v. Beincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2 Cir., 1967); Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5 Cir., 1966); Edge v. Wainwright, 347 F.2d 190 (6 Cir., 1965); Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (5 Cir., 1965).
. Compare present Article 40.09, Sec. 1, V.A.C.C.P. as to matters that the clerk must include in record on appeal, whether designated or not.