concurring:
I concur in the decision to remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County for further proceedings, but for other reasons. I question seriously the propriety of what I consider to be this court’s sua sponte entertainment of a legal argument not heretofore addressed by a Pennsylvania trial court.
Our court is not possessed of original jurisdiction except in cases of mandamus and prohibition ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction and in the issuance of writs of habeas corpus. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 741.1 The instant matter does not fall within any of these exceptions. Accordingly, as I see it, we are without jurisdiction presently to hear the issue presented in this case which was not ruled upon in the first instance by a trial court.
The General Assembly of this Commonwealth, pursuant to Article 5, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, has clothed us with “exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas ... except such classes of appeals as are ... within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Commonwealth Court.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742. (emphasis added). We are further empowered to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any order brought before [us] for review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706. (emphasis added). In doing so, we may remand and direct the entry of an appropriate order or require further proceedings. Id.
*526Thus, we are a court without plenary or extraordinary jurisdiction, this power having been bestowed by the Pennsylvania Legislature, in its wisdom, upon our Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 726. Similarly, since we have no powers beyond that granted to us by the Legislature, we cannot, accordingly, enlarge our jurisdiction. See Toll v. Toll, 293 Pa.Super. 549, 439 A.2d 712 (1981), affirmed, 498 Pa. 536, 448 A.2d 1379 (1982).
Our Rules of Appellate Procedure prescribe the complete and exclusive means by which matters come before us. (Historical Note following Pa.R.App.P. 103.) Rules 341 and 702 authorize appeals as of right from final orders of lower courts or administrative agencies, and Rule 902 prescribes the manner by which an appeal is taken as of right from a lower court to an appellate court.
The instant case is before us on remand by the United States Supreme Court because of an intervening change in the law on commencement of paternity actions since the decision of this court, Paulussen v. Herion, 334 Pa.Super. 585, 483 A.2d 892 (1984), affirming the bar of appellant’s action on behalf of her minor child because of the lapse of the six-year statute of limitations period in effect at the time of the proceeding in the lower court2 and the denial of review by our Supreme Court (1985).
The United States Supreme Court, on appeal, Paulussen v. Herion, 475 U.S. 557, 106 S.Ct. 1339, 89 L.Ed.2d 521 (1986), refused to reach appellant’s constitutional claim that the statute {see supra note 2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because of this legislative change. The pertinent language of its remand order reads as follows:
Our examination of Pennsylvania law leaves us uncertain as to the legal consequences of the enactment of the new 18 year statute of limitations. If, however, Pennsylvania were to interpret § 4343(b) to require sup*527port payments dating back to the filing of the original petition, the constitutionality of the 6-year statute of limitations would be irrelevant. Because Pennsylvania should have an opportunity in the first instance to resolve this issue of state law, and because we are reluctant to address a federal constitutional question until it is clearly necessary to do so, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration in light of the intervening change in state law.
Id. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 1340. (Emphasis added).
This order is a clear and unequivocal mandate to us to remand this matter directly to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County to determine what effect, if any, the new legislation has upon the instant case.
To reiterate, the directive from the United States Supreme Court says that “Pennsylvania should have an opportunity in the first instance to resolve this issue ...” Id. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 1340. This means that the judicial process of determining conflicts or issues should be followed. That begins with the trial court. Then, from a final order of that court, comes the review by the appellate court. By assuming jurisdiction, our court is being deprived of the wisdom of counsel and the trial judge who, in the first instance, should rule on the issue involved.
Indeed, entertainment of issues sua sponte by this court has found disfavor with our Supreme Court. In Wiegand v. Wiegand {Wiegand I), 226 Pa.Super. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), this court addressed sua sponte the constitutionality of Sections 11 and 46 of the then Divorce Law, 23 P.S. §§ 11 and 46, which allowed women, but not men, to obtain divorces from bed and board, reasonable alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and costs, in light of the adoption of Article I, § 27 (the Equal Rights Amendment) to the Pennsylvania Constitution. We never considered the issues properly preserved for appeal, which were whether the trial court had erred in refusing husband’s counsel’s request to cross-examine the wife concerning disposition of her own estate and whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding counsel fees of $5000.
*528The Supreme Court granted review, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975). Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, clearly outlined the function of this court:
The Superior Court by sua sponte deciding the constitutional issue exceeded its proper appellate function of deciding controversies presented to it. The court thereby unnecessarily disturbed the processes of orderly judicial decisionmaking. Sua spdnte consideration of issues deprives counsel of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues and the court of the benefit of counsel’s advocacy.
Id., 461 Pa. at 485, 337 A.2d at 257.
Because the constitutionality of these provisions was never questioned by the parties either in the trial court or in their briefs in the Superior Court, we conclude that this issue was not properly before that court. We therefore reverse and remand to the Superior Court for consideration of the issues properly presented by the parties.
Id., 461 Pa. at 483-84, 337 A.2d at 257.
It must therefore be concluded that the Superior Court should not have considered an unpresented issue, but instead resolved the appeal on the basis of the issues raised by the parties.
The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the cause remanded to the Superior Court for consideration of the issues raised at trial and properly preserved for appellate review.
Id., 461 Pa. at 485, 337 A.2d at 257-58.
On remand, (Wiegand II), 242 Pa.Super. 170, 363 A.2d 1215 (1976), this Court, in properly addressing the issue of whether the trial court had erred in disallowing cross-examination of the wife regarding the disposition of her own estate, reversed on the basis of Judge Watkins’ dissent in Wiegand I, supra.
Therefore, as I see it, the posture which we erroneously adopted in Wiegand I is no different from the position the majority has taken in the instant case.
*529Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2573 provides for direct remand from our appellate courts to the trial court specified in the order of remand if, as is the case with the majority’s disposition here, a direction for further proceedings in the lower court is included in the order.
When an intervening change in a law relevant to the disposition of a matter on review before the U.S. Supreme Court occurs, the practice of that High Court, as provided for in § 2106 of the Judicial Code of the United States, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 et seq. (Law.Coop.1977), is to remand the cause for appropriate action in deference to state courts on questions of state law. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964); see also Watts v. Seward School Bd., 381 U.S. 126, 85 S.Ct. 1321, 14 L.Ed.2d 261 (1965); Missouri ex rel. Wabash R.R. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U.S. 126, 47 S.Ct. 811, 71 L.Ed. 575 (1927).
I take issue with the majority’s observation that we face a dilemma instantly. The issue concerning the effect of the new statute, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4343(b), upon the proceeding at bar is not before us, nor can it be in light of the language of the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court vacating the judgment, supra 475 U.S. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 1340, and our consequent lack of jurisdiction to hear a matter not yet ruled upon by any lower tribunal of this Commonwealth. Our determination of the retrospective effect of the new statute is tantamount to the rendition of an advisory opinion. This would be presumptive of the lower court’s determination upon remand. Cf. Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 368 A.2d 648 (1977) (a court cannot rule on constitutionality of legislation not yet adopted by the electorate); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Pub. Util. Co., 187 Pa.Super. 590, 146 A.2d 352 (1958).
I perceive no basis for us to become embroiled in a legal debate weighing the potential effects of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4343(b) at the present time. I agree with the result insofar as remand of the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County is proper. However, in light of my *530foregoing exposition, I believe that the lower court should be directed to proceed consistent with the mandate issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, supra.
KELLY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.. Section number references to Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. are to the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101 et seq.
. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6704(e). The new statute, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 4343(b), now provides for commencement of paternity actions within 18 years of birth.