concurring.
Discretionary review should not have been granted in this cause. Compounding that initial mistake, the majority decides an issue that is not before us, decides it wrongly, and then improperly applies the standard it has mistakenly adopted. Though the majority has (almost inadvertently) reached the correct result, I must protest virtually every step of the wayward course taken to that goal.
I.
Among several good reasons for refusing review in this cause, most compelling is that appellant has presented no reason for such review. See Tex.Cr.App. Rule 302(c). Appellant does not claim the court of appeals’ opinion is in conflict with that of another court of appeals, this Court, or any other court, statute, or rule of law. Appellant points out no deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance. Instead, he argues to this Court only that “[a] close reading of the Record, Statement of Facts, Briefs, Opinion, and Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing ... clearly demonstrate that Appellant’s trial counsel, Paul Hanneman, was ineffective in his assistance to Appellant.” This is insufficient under 304(d)(5), supra, to invoke this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction, nor is any other reason readily apparent. The petition should be refused. Degrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
II.
The issue seized upon by the majority, whether to “follow in full the Strickland *60standards in determining effective assistance and prejudice resulting therefrom,” is not before this Court. The court of appeals’ opinion was delivered September 21, 1983, and the petition for discretionary review filed little more than a month thereafter, both well before the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) [hereafter Strickland ]. Thus the issue decided by the majority has not been briefed or argued by the parties, nor decided by the court of appeals. This not only goes well beyond this Court’s mandate to “review decisions of the eourt[s] of appeals,” Art. 44.45(a) and (b), it also denies the “adversarial testing” called for by Strickland itself. This is not only procedurally incorrect, it forces this Court to take upon itself the roles of both State’s attorney and defense counsel as well as judge. I am compelled to dissent to this headlong rush to answer a question no party to this cause has posed. Lacking the benefits of a properly framed issue, a decision on that issue by the court of appeals, and arguments from both parties, we are in a poor position to decide this important question. It is no wonder, given this posture of the case, that the majority’s conclusions are so weakly supported.
As appellant has been afforded no opportunity to answer the conclusions put forth in the majority opinion, I will point out one or two of the major flaws in its reasoning.
III.
Most disturbing is the majority’s pronouncement that “in no sense can the language or intent of the framers of Art. I, Sec. 10, be interpreted to include a right to effective assistance of counsel greater than that provided by Strickland.” Op. at p. 56. This statement is particularly presumptuous in light of the fact that no one herein has advocated such an interpretation. The majority’s statement therefore amounts to an assertion that it has considered all such arguments that could possibly be made and found them wanting. I make no effort to canvas such sweeping considerations. I do, however, find the majority’s conclusion unsupported.
To begin with, the premise that the language of Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Texas Constitution “was obviously modeled on the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution” has never been properly demonstrated.1 While it is true that both Sec. 10 and the Sixth Amendment deal with the right to counsel, that alone is not strong indication that the later provision is modeled on the earlier. It is only indicative that forebear-ers insisted on assuring the right, taking statements designed to do so from any other reasonably accepted source. See Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Tex. Cr.App.1983) (Concurring Opinion). It would be equally supportable to say the Texas “right to be heard” provision is modeled on the Connecticut constitution adopted in 1818.2 Our provision is almost identical to the Connecticut provision, whereas our Art. I, § 10 is worded completely differently from the Sixth Amendment.
Detailed exegesis is inappropriate here, but to say that the Texas constitutional *61provision is “modeled on the Sixth Amendment” is irrelevant even if true. The fact that the framers of the Texas Constitution worded the provision differently at all, when they could have simply conformed our Bill of Rights to pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution, demonstrates that they had somewhat different guarantees in mind. So when addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of state law we need not follow slavishly the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, any more than we need adhere to the Connecticut courts’ interpretation of their constitution. Just because language was once drawn from another source does not mean that we abdicate for all time our historical responsibility to interpret our own laws and Constitution. The majority’s assertion at this late date that the provisions are in essence identical denigrates our own role as well as the efforts of the founders of this Republic and State.
Furthermore, to say that “this Court has consistently and consciously applied a federal constitutional standard in all effectiveness cases” (Maj. opinion, p. 55 •) is misleading at best. In Caraway v. State, 417 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), which the majority cites as the beginning of this adoption of the federal standard, this Court was addressing a claim that the defendant had been denied his right to effective assistance of counsel “guaranteed to him by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the federal constitution.” Id. at 163. No mention was made of the Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 10. In such a case it was of course appropriate to evaluate the claim in light of federal decisions interpreting the federal constitution.
However, when this Court in deciding a claim under state law approvingly cites language from a federal court opinion we do so only because we find the language helpful or the reasoning persuasive. In adopting the “reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance” test from MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (CA5 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 86 S.Ct. 121, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961), we in no way bound ourselves to follow future pronouncements on the subject from the Fifth Circuit or any other federal court; not when we are interpreting Texas law. It means simply that we cast about for a “reasonably acceptable definition” of effective assistance of counsel, and having found one, made it our own. Brown, supra, (Concurring opinion). As Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has stated:
“This court like others has high respect for the opinions of the Supreme Court [of the United States], particularly when they provide insight into the origins of provisions common to the state and federal bills of rights rather than only a contemporary ‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable people may differ over time and among the several states. It is therefore to be expected that counsel and courts often will refer to federal decisions, or to commentary based on such decisions, even in debating an undecided issue under state law. Lest there be any doubt about it, when this court cites federal opinions in interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it finds the views there expressed persuasive, not because it considers itself bound to do so by its understanding of federal doctrines.”
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983) (footnote omitted). This Court is of course possessed of similar autonomy.
IV.
The first prong of the Strickland standard is the same as our own, whether counsel rendered “reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland, however, represents the first time the Supreme Court of the United States has applied that standard, the first time that Court has “directly and fully addressed a claim of ‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.” 104 S.Ct. at 2062. This Court, by contrast, has been faced often with the question of whether particular trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. We have a well developed body of caselaw on the subject, applying our stan*62dard of reasonably effective assistance in a wide variety of contexts. We need not look to federal authority for other than “guidance” in applying that standard to the instant case.
Whether counsel rendered effective assistance is the only question before us in this case. The majority’s adoption and application of Strickland’s “prejudice test” is unwarranted when neither appellant, the State, nor the court of appeals has done an analysis of the harm suffered by appellant due to the alleged failures of his trial counsel. Indeed, because the court of appeals found that appellant was rendered effective assistance of counsel, there was no need to address the question of harm. Nor is there a reason for this Court to do so. See, Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 508-09 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), in which this Court though “mindful” of the recent decision in Strickland found that “[w]e need not analyze this case in light of the two-pronged Strickland test, however, because we do not find that appellant’s counsel was ineffective as our prior decisions construe that term or that he was not ‘reasonably effective’ as the Supreme Court construes that term.”
As for the majority’s assertion that our caselaw has never provided a higher standard of effective assistance than that of Strickland, I find the cases cited at page 56 not entirely supportive of that proposition:
Jones v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 526, 265 S.W.2d 116 (1954), does not address Art. I § 10 and does not conclude that counsel’s assistance was ineffective or amounted to “no counsel at all.” Turner v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R., 241 S.W. 162 (1922), does stand for the proposition for which it is cited, that Art. I § 10 was violated when an agent of the State prevented counsel from rendering effective assistance. The case was reversed without a showing of harm. Counsel was not allowed to talk to his client in private. When he finally got the opportunity, defendant told him of some evidence which counsel asked for a continuance in order to investigate. That was denied. What impact the evidence might have had on the case is not shown.
As for the cases cited for the proposition that a showing of harm was required before a conviction would be reversed for ineffective assistance, Fuller v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 558, 37 S.W.2d 156 (1931), did not cite the Texas Constitution. The Court stated, “In a felony case of less than capital, the law does not make the presence of an attorney essential.” Id., 37 S.W.2d at 157. That has not been the law in this state since June 1, 1959, the effective date of an amendment to former Art. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now 26.04) requiring the appointment of counsel in all felony cases. That occurred four years before the Supreme Court applied this rule to the states through the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). So for those four years, at least, Texas did provide that protection based solely on state law.
Fletcher v. State, 396 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Cr.App.1965), as the majority says, came soon after the Sixth Amendment had been applied to the states through the Fourteenth by Gideon, supra. Perhaps for that reason, this Court addressed only a federal standard: “We are unable to agree that appellant was deprived of his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, or that a different result would have been reached by the jury but for any of the acts or omissions of his court appointed trial counsel.” Id. at 396. There is no showing from the opinion that the defendant even made a claim under the laws or Constitution of Texas.
Jones v. State, 388 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Cr.App.1965), is the most problematical of all, because it is difficult to tell for what proposition it stands. Among other things the Court there noted that the defendant “was represented at his trial by counsel of his own choosing ...” Id. at 430. This is no longer relevant after Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), abolishing the distinction in standards between retained and appointed *63counsel. See also Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Jones also states that counsel’s failures to object to inadmissible evidence may have been trial strategy, before stating there was an abundance of other evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Again, neither state nor federal law was explicitly cited.
These cases do not stand for the proposition that Texas constitutional and statutory law have never provided a higher standard of effective assistance than federal law. Nor is that issue before us. Until such time as a defendant claims that Texas law does provide such higher protection, we should not issue what is in effect an advisory opinion that it does not.
V.
After its needless effort to justify adopting the Strickland prejudice test, the majority immediately demonstrates the folly of such an effort by improperly applying that test. Point by point, the majority isolates each failing of trial counsel and concludes that that particular failure did not undermine confidence in the result of the trial:
“It is obvious from a review of the entire record that in certain respects trial counsel rendered sub-par assistance. But in the particular instances where this occurred, it has not been shown, as required by Strickland, that there is a reasonable probability, or a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that the result of the proceeding would have differed had trial counsel’s assistance been effective.”
Maj. opinion, p. 59.3 But this is not the way to test appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance, even under Strickland. Under that standard, appellant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 104 S.Ct. at 2068. It is the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors that must be evaluated, not the effect of each individual error. “In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” 104 S.Ct. at 2069. The majority’s weighing only of the individual impact of each individual error shows a basic misconception of the test the majority has erroneously followed. Such misconception demonstrates one of the difficulties inherent in applying another court’s test rather than standards this Court has developed itself over the course of years.4
VI.
Our grant of review was no broader than the ground for review. Eisenhauer v. State, 678 S.W.2d 947, 956 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Clinton, J., dissenting). We did not grant review to decide whether we should adopt the nebulous standards of the Supreme Court of the United States as the law of this state governing ineffective assistance claims.5 We granted appellant’s petition only to review the court of appeals’ decision, under applicable state law relied on by appellant and the State, that appellant was rendered effective assistance of counsel at trial. I agree with the majority that at least as far as this record indicates, he was. For example, in his supplemental *64brief to the court of appeals appellant argued, “The record is silent with no indication that defense counsel attempted to contact, interview or secure any psychiatric or psychological experts for the trial.” Supplemental Brief, p. 9. But the burden to show that counsel did not thoroughly investigate the possibility of this viable defense is appellant’s. We may not presume such lack of investigation from a silent record. As the majority properly points out, appellant is free to attempt to develop a record that more fully supports his claims by way of writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly, while the majority has reached the correct result in this case, I deplore its decision of an issue not properly before us, and its gratuitous abdication of the duties and responsibilities of this Court.
Therefore, I concur only in the judgment of the court.
MILLER, J., joins this opinion.. The only authority cited for this proposition (majority opinion, n. 4) is unpersuasive. Mr. Braden makes just a bare assertion that "the similarity between [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments] and Section 10 is striking.” He does not even claim that our original Texas constitutional provision was modeled on the federal one. Indeed, persuasive historical evidence exists that it was not: that Texians were influenced greatly by their Mexican experience is already documented, and its laws had trial procedures for defendant to be heard by himself and counsel. However, again, this is not a fit occasion to address the matter since it is not properly before the Court.
. Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both ...”
The analogous Connecticut provision, Art. I, § 9, provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and by counsel ...”
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on the other hand, provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
. Emphasis here and throughout is supplied by the writer of this opinion.
. The treatment of the individual claims occasionally leaves something to be desired as well, notably the majority's conclusion at p. 58 that "[ejven if counsel was ignorant of the law and ineffective in allowing these extraneous offenses to come in, there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the mistake. The underlying burglary in the capital murder was overwhelmingly established and ample evidence supported a conclusion that appellant and his friends were unsavory characters.” Surely the majority does not mean to hold that if the State offers sufficient evidence of the charged offense, and also proves incidentally that a defendant and his friends are “unsavory characters," admission of proof of extraneous offenses is harmless. But what else is to be made of this statement?
.Understanding, of course, that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the minimum standard of effective assistance and that this Court could not interpret Texas law to provide less protection. Butler v. State, 726 S.W.2d 151, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), reh. denied June 18, 1986.