dissenting.
The Court seriously errs when it denies the plaintiff a jury trial of her claim for breach of employment contract, on the basis of a decision of the Division of Employment Security. The error consists in the failure to consider the purpose of the administrative proceedings and the nature of the hearing before the appeals tribunal.
Because of the posture of the case as it comes to us, I give no consideration to the other points raised by the appellant May Department Store in arguing for reversal. The court of appeals ceased further inquiry after determining that collateral estoppel applies, and so I write only on the point they reached.
Collateral estoppel properly applied is a salutary doctrine, designed to reduce the volume of litigation and to settle controversies. Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. banc 1984). The doctrine, nevertheless, must be carefully confined so that litigants are not unduly impeded in the pursuit of their rights. There is a need for special care when, as a consequence of applying collateral estoppel, a party is deprived of a jury trial.
Our requirements for applying the doctrine are set out in Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979). The principal opinion seeks to apply the rule of that case, but does so mechanically and uncritically, giving no attention to the nature of the proceedings set up in bar in this case. The court ignores the “fourth factor,” of that opinion by making no inquiry as to
Whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.
Oates listed this fourth factor as one applied by “most courts.” Id. at 719.
Our opinion in Bank Bldg. & Equipment Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 687 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. banc 1985) leaves no doubt that this fourth factor is a part of the law of Missouri. In Bank Bldg., we looked at the nature of hearings before the State Tax Commission, at a time when it had a much broader jurisdiction and handled many proceedings which are now within the province of the Administrative Hearing Commission. We concluded that the decision of that Commission as to one year’s taxes did not operate as an estoppel in subsequent proceedings, even though the identical issue was presented. We gave weight to the informal nature of the Tax Commission’s proceedings and to the fact that the Commissioners were not necessarily legally trained. The teaching of Bank Bldg, is that, in determining whether to give collateral estoppel effect to an administrative agency’s ruling in a subsequent judicial proceeding, the nature of the prior proceedings must be considered. See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Emde, 706 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.App.1986) (small claims judgment not given preclusive effect because informal and summary procedures did not ensure a full and fair opportunity to litigate liability).
In accordance with this view, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) provides several exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. If there are “differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts” relitigation of an issue previously determined is not precluded in a subsequent action between the parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3) (1982). Comment (d) to § 28 elaborates on this exception, as follows:
There may be compelling reasons why preclusion should not apply. Por example, the procedures available in the first court may have been tailored to the prompt, inexpensive determination of small claims and thus may be wholly inappropriate to the determination of the same issues when presented in the context of a much larger claim.... The question in each case should be resolved *332in the light of the nature of litigation in the courts involved and the legislative purposes in allocating jurisdiction among the courts of the state.
Emde, 706 S.W.2d at 546.
The principal opinion gives no consideration at all to the nature of the procedure for making an unemployment compensation claim. It simply embodies the opinion of the court of appeals, without even discussing the circumstances which caused this Court to grant transfer. In what I have to say, I express no criticism of the diligent efforts of the employees of the Division of Employment Security, and particularly the Appeals Referees. They do their jobs well, in compliance with the governing purpose of the law they administer. They do not, however, sit to adjudicate rights outside their narrow sphere.
The Employment Security Law is designed to mitigate the effects of unemployment on individuals who are displaced through no fault of their own, by providing them with a minimal allowance until they have had time to look for other employment. Missouri Div. of Employment Secur. v. Labor & Industrial Rel. Com., 651 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. banc 1983); Section 288.-020, RSMo 1986. The benefits are funded by a surtax on employers, and the employer is an interested party because charges are based on employment experiences. Sections 288.100-.120, RSMo 1986. Thus, an employer with a history of high rate of turnover and layoff bears a heavier burden.
Disputes arise as to coverage, and so provision is made for a hearing procedure at which the employee and the employer may present their points on eligibility. Section 288.190, RSMo 1986. Because of the need for a prompt adjudication of eligibility, the policy of the law is that these proceedings be expedited. The purpose of the statute is defeated if an eligible employee does not receive regular payments. A lump sum at the end of litigation is highly inappropriate.
The initial determination is by a Deputy of the Division of Employment Security, on the basis of statements of the parties. Section 288.070, RSMo 1986; 8 Mo. CSR 10-3.-100.5. If the decision is in favor of eligibility benefits begin immediately, subject to the employer’s right of appeal. Section 288.070.4, RSMo 1986. If the decision is against eligibility the employee may appeal. Section 288.070.4.
The appeal is before an Appeals Tribunal, usually consisting of a single Appeals Referee. Section 288.190, RSMo 1986. This is the only hearing at which evidence is presented. Following this hearing, the Referee renders a written decision. Section 288.190.3, RSMo 1986. If compensation is being paid and the award goes against the employee, it is stopped; if the decision of the deputy has been unfavorable, a favorable decision by the Referee institutes payment. Section 288.070.5, RSMo 1986. Unless the state labor and industrial relations commission decides upon review that additional evidence is necessary, all subsequent proceedings, administrative or judicial, simply consist of a review of the record made before the Referee. Section 288.200, RSMo 1986. In determining the issue of collateral estoppel, the nature of this hearing must be considered.
The governing statute makes it clear that the proceedings for employment benefit claims are not intended to have any effect in other kinds of proceedings. The statute reads as follows:
Any right, fact or matter in issue, directly based upon or necessarily involved in a determination or redetermination which has become final, shall be conclusive with respect to the parties who had notice of such determination, redetermi-nation, or decision for all the purposes of the employment security law in any other proceeding ... (Emphasis supplied).
Section 288.200.2, RSMo 1986.
The statutes and regulations which govern the hearings before Appeals Referees demonstrate numerous departures from the norms of hearing procedure, so that the decision should not be applied as a bar to judicial proceedings. In at least four important particulars, the proceedings are in*333adequate for the determination of other rights.
(1) There is no provision for prehearing discovery. We stressed the importance of discovery in State ex rel. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. Rains, 706 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. banc 1986). Yet it would defeat the purpose of the unemployment compensation proceedings if they were to be delayed while depositions are taken;
(2) The Appeals Referee is not obliged to follow common law rules of evidence. The technical rules of civil procedure do not apply, so the appeals tribunal can determine on a case-by-case basis the procedure it finds suitable. This too is a concession to the need for expedition. The governing provisions are as follows:
The manner in which disputed determinations, referred claims, and petitions for reassessment shall be presented and the conduct of hearings shall be in accordance with regulations prescribed by the division for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not such regulations conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure....
Section 288.190.2, RSMo 1986.
An appeals tribunal shall follow in each case that procedure which it believes will best develop all of the pertinent facts with respect to the issues without regard to common law or statutory rules of evidence or technical rules of procedure....
8 Mo. CSR 10-5.015.3.
(3) There is no statutory requirement that the Appeals Referee be a member of the bar, or have any particular experience.
(4) The parties often are not represented by counsel. It is not enough to say that counsel may appear. A litigant who appeared in a court of record without counsel would undoubtedly be encouraged to obtain representation. Before the Appeals Tribunal, pro se appearances are a matter of course.
Unemployment benefits, furthermore, are extremely modest in amount. This claimant had no idea that she was putting her lawsuit in jeopardy by making a claim.
If the result stands, claimants may be positively discouraged from claiming unemployment benefits, if they have potential civil litigation. It would defeat the purpose of the law if claims were discouraged.
What is sauce for the goose, moreover, is sauce for the gander. If decisions of the Division of Employment Security estop the employees, a decision in favor of benefits would likewise estop the employer. I can think of at least four potential civil actions which might be impacted by unemployment compensation proceedings, as follows:
(1) An employee requests a service letter. The employer responds, giving a reason. The Appeals Referee holds that that reason was not established. Does this holding conclude the employer if the employee sues under § 290.140, RSMo 1986?
(2) An employer discharges an employee for alleged theft and causes the employee to be arrested. The Appeals Referee finds that there was no theft. Is the employer estopped in defending a false imprisonment suit?
(3) An employer places the reason for discharge in writing. The Referee finds that these reasons are not established. May the employer prove the truth of the reasons assigned in defending a libel suit?
(4) The employer discharges an employee for alleged misconduct. The employee alleges that the discharge was for racial or sexual discrimination. The Referee sustains the employee’s claim. Is the employer now set up for a discrimination suit?
The proceedings before the Appeals Referee are suitable to provide elemental due process in the speedy determination of the right to benefits. That is their only purpose. The principal opinion greatly enlarges this purpose.
My conclusion is in line with State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Emde, supra. The reason is the same. A proceeding in small claims court has a limited purpose, a limited amount in controversy, and informal procedures. To enlarge the effect would discourage litigants from taking small claims there. By the same token, the enlargement of the effect might discourage *334employees from making unemployment compensation claims, and might impede the employer in resisting claims.
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5)(c) (1982) carves another exception to the application of collateral estoppel if “the party sought to be precluded, as a result of ... special circumstances, did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.” This includes situations where “the amount in controversy in the first action may have been so small in relation to the amount in controversy in the second that preclusion would be plainly unfair.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5) comment j (1982).
This exception has been noted in a case denying collateral estoppel effect to a decision of an employment security tribunal. In Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1260 (App.1983) the court held that a finding of misconduct in a claim for unemployment compensation would not preclude a determination of the propriety of a discharge in an appeal from the decision of the State Personnel Board upholding the termination. The court contrasted the small amount in controversy in the unemployment case ($1,530) with the significant amount in controversy in the personnel matter ($17,715.77 plus reinstatement). 660 P.2d at 1259. It explained that issue preclusion should not apply if the circumstances of the particular case demonstrate some overriding consideration of fairness. Because the rights and remedies in each action were markedly different, the litigant was allowed a full opportunity to present his claims independently in each forum. 660 P.2d at 1260.
Other state cases holding that a proceeding to recover unemployment compensation benefits does not operate as collateral es-toppel in subsequent litigation are as follows: Salida School District v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, (Colo.1987); Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 228 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1986); Hahn v. Arbat Systems, Ltd., 200 NJ.Super. 266, 491 A.2d 58 (1985); Kjos v. City of Sioux City, 346 N.W.2d 25 (Iowa 1984).1
Cases taking a contrary position are found in New York,2 Wyoming,3 and in a case with another adequate basis, Indiana.4 Two Ohio courts have reached opposite results.5 The October 1986 issue of the Ford-ham Law Review expresses substantial criticism of the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in the Ryan case. See Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court Of Law?, 55 Fordham L.Rev. 63, 69, 80 (1986).
Unemployment compensation proceedings are essentially similar in all states. A degree of uniformity is imposed by federal law, because the federal government supplies substantial funding. Although there are decisions going both ways, a respectable majority of the reported cases support the views I express.
The principal opinion cites workers’ compensation cases in support of its holding.6
*335They are not in point. The nature of hearings before the Division of Workers’ Compensation is markedly different. The workers’ compensation proceedings provide for a full hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, under the civil rules of evidence. 8 Mo. CSR 50.2.010.21. Prehearing discovery is available. Section 287.560, RSMo 1986; State ex rel. River Cement Co. v. Pepple, 585 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Mo. App.1979). The administrative law judges deciding workers’ compensation cases must be duly licensed attorneys. Section 287.-610.1, RSMo 1986. The workers’ compensation proceedings, furthermore, are designed to provide conclusive answers to questions of causation of industrial injuries, and work-relatedness, with a special procedure superseding any right to trial by jury. Given the qualitative difference in the nature of these two tribunals, the extension of the preclusive effect given workers’ compensation cases to unemployment compensation hearings is not warranted.
The case should be retransferred to the court of appeals with directions to determine the other issues raised by the appeal.
. Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984).
. Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Com., 598 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1979).
. McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1336 (Ind.App.1986); but see Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Assoc., 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.App.1982).
. Distelzweig v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, No. 86AP-640, slip op., Tenth Appellate District (December 30, 1986); Pullar v. Upjohn Health Care Services, Inc., 21 Ohio App.3d 288, 488 N.E.2d 486 (1984).
. In Hines v. Continental Baking Co., 334 S.W.2d 140, 144-46 (Mo.App.1960), the Industrial Commission denied workmen’s compensation benefits because the employee had not sustained an accidental injury. In the employee’s subsequent personal injury suit, the court held the unap-pealed workmen’s compensation determination *335estopped the employer from asserting the occurrence was an accident within the scope of the workmen’s compensation laws. The employee collected for work-related injuries not cognizable under workmen’s compensation laws.
In Butcher v. Ramsey Corp., 628 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo.App.1982), the Referee denied the employee’s otherwise eligible workmen's compensation claim due to defective proof. The employee was then barred from asserting that the same facts alleged in her personal injury suit were not within the sole province of the workmen’s compensation laws.