Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,

dissenting:

We are confronted here, fundamentally, with a right to vote issue. There is nothing complicated or technical about it. It is a very basic right. As a matter of fact, and I find this unfortunate, one gets the impression from the majority opinion that the right to vote by initiative is something sub-tie and elusive — when the truth is, we have a simple and elementary issue. I think the difficulty stems from a begrudging attitude which the majority opinion assumes on the Charter-given right to vote on an initiative. I find this especially unfortunate in this early stage of Home Rule which is rooted in the right to vote.

Instead of following the nationally recognized principle that an initiative should be construed liberally to allow the people to vote,1 the majority contorts and narrows the meaning of this convention center initiative so as to say that it encompasses only “administrative/executive” acts. I would have thought that almost every informed person in local affairs knew that the purpose of this initiative is to repeal the legislative decision to construct the convention center. In any event, I will show through well-established precedents that the decision to reverse a policy to have a capital project is an appropriate subject for initiative.

Before doing so, I will say preliminarily what this case is not about. It is not about whether a convention center in this city is a good idea. It may very well be a good idea. But that is, or should be, none of this court’s affair. We are here dealing with something far more important to this city than a convention center, an inanimate object. I cannot equate a building project with a government. We have before us an issue going to the integrity of government. That is to say, we are considering whether the citizenry has been denied the right to vote on this capital project, which is classically a matter for initiative. The right is unmistakably present in the constitution of *882this capital city (the Charter of the District of Columbia).

A review of the chronology of events is instructive. The Convention Center Referendum Committee has been attempting diligently to take this issue to the people for almost two years, but it has been thwarted at every turn. In net effect, this large body of the citizenry was first told it was too early to exercise the right to initiative and now it is being told it is too late. They should not be treated this way.

The Charter Amendments granting the right to initiative and referendum went into effect on March 10,1978. The Charter Amendments instructed the District of Columbia Council to adopt implementing legislation by September 6, 1978. The Council did not do so. The Convention Center Referendum Committee submitted their initiative bill on October 1, 1978, but the Board refused to accept it, because of the Council’s failure to adopt implementing legislation though required by statute to do so. The Committee proceeded to collect signatures nonetheless, ending up with some 15,-000 names.2 The petition they circulated contained their own summary of the bill since the Board of Elections and Ethics had declined to prepare a summary because the Council had not yet enacted enabling legislation. After getting the requisite number of signatures, the Committee sought a preliminary injunction to order the Board to accept their petitions. The Board refused. We upheld that refusal on February 28, 1979 in Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and Ethics, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 550 (1979), on the ground that the Charter Amendments were not self-executing and must await implementing legislation. We indicated rather ominously, however, that if the Council continued its inaction the Court might later be required to take a fresh look and determine whether to order equitable relief.

On June 7, 1979, the Council’s enabling legislation, the Initiative Procedures Act, finally went into effect. Immediately thereafter, appellants launched their second attempt to have their initiative put on the ballot. The Initiative Procedures Act3 provided that in the normal case the Board would prepare the summary statement of the bill to be circulated on the petitions for signatures. As a dispensation, however, petitions circulated prior to October 1, 1978, were allowed to be accepted without the Board’s approval of the summary statement or form of the petition. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1119.2.

The Convention Center Referendum Committee resubmitted the same petitions of the citizenry on June 13, 1979, but the Board refused them for the second time, stating that the petitions concerned an improper subject for initiative according to the Initiative Procedures Act’s “Dixon Amendment.” D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1116(k)(7). This provision required the Board to deny a petition which “would negate or limit an act of the Council pursuant to section 47-224.”4 Id. The Board rea*883soned that section 47-224 set forth the District’s budgetary process; this initiative concerned a capital project already approved in a District budget request and congressional appropriation; the initiative would “negate” the authority of the District Government to proceed; and therefore, the initiative was prevented by the Dixon Amendment. This amendment was adopted in the tardy legislation implementing the Charter, and was promptly applied by the Board to reject once again this initiative. Without relying on the Dixon Amendment, the majority adopts a similar position in its separation of powers — executive act only — position. In essence, the majority is telling appellants that they are now too late to vote on the convention center because the money has been appropriated and partly spent and only executive details remain to be accomplished.

The sole ground given by the majority for refusing the electorate the right to vote here is that this initiative goes to an executive, rather than a legislative, function. Naturally, I agree with the majority’s discussion on the fundamentals of separation of powers, and with the general principle that legislative acts alone are subject to initiative. However, it takes a jaundiced reading of the Convention Center Initiative • to conclude that only administrative-executive acts are covered.

The actual law proposed to be enacted make the legislative purpose clear. Section 3 states:

After the effective date of this measure, the District of Columbia Government shall not construct or operate a convention center or acquire land for that purpose.

That seems plain enough and the majority opinion acknowledges that this is a legislative purpose. Additional sections of the bill call for the disposition of property acquired and the termination of contracts, which could be called executive functions,5 but they do not alter the underlying legislative purpose — to stop construction of the convention center. Had it not been for the Council’s delay in adopting implementing legislation, the Board itself would have reduced the proposed law to a summary statement. Consequently, it is unfair to penalize appellants for any impression in the surplus language of the summary statement and bill, and hold that executive details rather than legislative decisions are at stake.

Whether one looks at the summary statement or the actual proposed law, it is manifest that the purpose of this initiative is to stop construction of the convention center. It would take an inimical reading of it to conclude otherwise. Courts have agreed that

“[t]he right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.” [Citizens Against a New Jail v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.App.3d 559, 561, 134 Cal.Rptr. 36, 37 (1977) (citation omitted).]

E.g., Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 468, 102 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649 (1972) (“It is the duty of the courts to guard jealously this [initiative] power of the people.”); Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 450 P.2d 653 (1969); Bishel v. Middletown, 21 Conn.Supp. 212, 151 A.2d 893 (1959); Dulaney v. City of Miami Beach, 96 So.2d 550 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1957); Stadle v. Battle Creek, 346 Mich. 64, 77 N.W.2d 329 (1956); State ex rel. Freeze v. Taylor, 90 Mont. 439, 4 P.2d 479 (1931); State ex rel. Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 269 N.W.2d 73 (1978); City Commission of Albuquerque v. State, 75 N.M. 438, 405 P.2d 924 (1965); Meridian Development Co. v. Edison Township, 91 N.J.Super. 310, 220 A.2d 121 (1966); Potash v. Molik, 35 Misc.2d 1, 230 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1962); Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. 1, 40 S.E.2d 702 (1946); State ex rel. City of Middletown v. Middle-*884town, 140 Ohio St. 368, 44 N.E.2d 459 (1942); Glass v. Smith, 150 Tex. 632, 244 5.W.2d 645 (1952); State ex rel. Benham v. Cheever, 71 Wyo. 303, 257 P.2d 337 (1953). The Initiative Charter Amendments should be viewed like an election statute, which this court has stated must be construed in favor of the franchise, in the absence of compelling reason to do otherwise. Kamins v. Board of Elections, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 187 (1974). It is authoritatively stated that

[i]t is a general rule that grants of power to municipal corporations to adopt municipal legislation by exercise of initiative or referendum are to be liberally construed, to the ends of permitting- rather than restricting the power and to attaining rather than preventing its object. [5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.51, at 203-04 (3d rev.ed.1969) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).]

Thus, the law requires a mind set to favor the right to vote unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise.

The majority opinion produces no convincing reason to deny the right to vote on this initiative. The crux of its argument appears to be that once the Council makes the legislative decision to build a capital project and Congress does not disapprove and appropriates the money, “all that is left to be accomplished is the management and successful execution of the project” by the Mayor. (Ante at 879.) That statment ignores the proposition that the legislative decision itself can be reversed, as appellants now seek to do, having been foreclosed at the earlier stage.

Nothing in the Home Rule Act prevents the Council from reversing a legislative policy, even after funds are appropriated. To be sure, the Mayor is the chief executive officer of the District and must be responsible for all financial transactions and take custody of public funds appropriated by Congress for the District. But, the appropriation of money does not force the Mayor to spend the money; it merely authorizes the expenditure.

The Council originally approved the convention center,6 and has the power to withdraw its approval and stop the project. What the Council can do the people can do through initiative. Case law supports this analysis.

It has long been understood that reversal of a legislative decision must also be termed legislative and not administrative. In State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Edwards, 305 Mo. 431, 266 S.W. 127 (1924), an ordinance repealing an existing ordinance providing for the condemnation of a right of way and establishment of a bridge approach was held to be subject to referendum. The court rejected the argument that the second ordinance was merely administrative, holding that since the original ordinance was legislative in character, the change in policy must also be legislative. “It needs no argument to demonstrate that a legislative act cannot be repealed in whole or in part by an administrative order. Such act can only be repealed by a later legislative act.” Id. at 440, 266 S.W. at 130.

On facts similar to this case, citizens attempted to use an initiative to prevent the City of Santa Cruz from “own[ing], leaspng], maintainpng], or operatpng] a convention facility” on a certain property, after the city had approved the project and entered into contracts for construction. Teachers Management & Investment Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz, 64 Cal.App.3d 438, 446, 134 Cal.Rptr. 523, 528 (1976). The court held that

*885the people of Santa Cruz were not powerless to act through the initiative to change a policy of their city. The existence of binding agreements cannot prevent a public entity from abandoning or rescinding its plans to proceed with a public works project, although the change in policy may result in the entity’s being liable for breach of contract. [Id. at 448, 134 Cal.Rptr. at 530 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).]

A similar result was reached in Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793 (1972). A city council had appropriated funds for a golf course and commenced construction, when citizens tried to bring an initiative to have the land used for another purpose. The court defined the issue as whether the council’s decision to own and operate a golf course at the site was administrative or legislative, and decided it was legislative because it involved a change in basic city policy.

While an administrative decision is not subject to reversal by the initiative (or referendum), the people nevertheless have the right to propose legislation amending or repealing the previously established legislative policy, the same as the council can do if it so desires. The power to legislate, by implication, includes the power to amend or repeal existing legislation. [Id. at 582, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).]

In reversing a legislative decision to build a capital project, administrative and executive details will inevitably be involved. If the initiative contains both legislative elements and executive elements, it should be allowed to go to the electorate even though the executive details may be inappropriate subjects for initiative. It has been stated

the courts will not interfere if upon ultimate approval by the electorate such proposal can have a valid field of operation even though segments of the proposal or its subsequent applicability to particular situations might result in contravening the organic law. In other words, if an examination of the proposed amendment reveals that if adopted it would be legally operative in part, even though it might ultimately become necessary to determine that particular aspects violate the Constitution, then the submission of such a proposal to the electorate for approval or disapproval will not be restrained. [Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities, 104 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla.1958).]

See also Rivergate Restaurant Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 369 So.2d 679 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) (referendum election to restrict smoking in public places would be enjoined only if proposed law was invalid in its entirety).

Mere mention of financing or land disposition in the initiative proposal does not alter the underlying nature of the policy decision. It is in those cases which involve only administrative details, but do not reach the underlying legislative policy, that courts have disallowed initiative or referendum. The majority quotes a leading text writer on the difference between legislative and executive acts. The next sentence of the text is instructive and might well also have been quoted:

Similarly, an act or resolution constituting a declaration of public purpose and making provision for ways and means of its accomplishment is generally legislative as distinguished from an act or resolution which merely carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative body. [5 E. McQuillin, supra, § 16.55, at 214 (emphasis added).]

In Dooling v. Fitchburg, 242 Mass. 599, 136 N.E. 616 (1922), referred to by the majority as the seminal case, the court disallowed a referendum which would have prohibited an officer from signing “a specified contract with a named person to do a defined thing for a specified price ... [because that] is not a legislative act.” Id. at 601, 136 N.E. at 617. In contrast, however, the court expressly acknowledged, “[i]t is an act of legislation to authorize the construction of a public building, to set a boundary to its cost and to provide money to pay for it.” Id. (emphasis supplied). According to the definitions of legislative act *886in Dooling and McQuillin, the references in this initiative to funds and property for the convention center do not negate the fundamental legislative character of the initiative, because these details merely “provide ways and means of its accomplishment.” McQuillin, supra.

The majority also seeks support in Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3 P.2d 778 (1931). In Monahan, as in Dooling, the referendum was disallowed because it did not go to the legislative decision to own and operate a municipal building, but merely to the executive act of purchasing the land for the incinerator. “The act of purchasing a parcel of real estate is no more legislative than the act of purchasing a fire engine and truck.” Monahan, supra at 585, 3 P.2d at 780. Significantly the court went on to say that if the electors of the city wished to take further action with regard to the incinerator, they could repeal the underlying authorization for the city to issue bonds and purchase property. Id. at 586, 3 P.2d at 781. A similar case relied on by the majority is State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, 149 Neb. 847, 32 N.W.2d 918 (1948), where the first act to acquire a site for an auditorium was said to be administrative, and therefore not subject to referendum. The court said

We hold it was an act of legislation to direct and authorize the construction of a public building, to fix the cost, and provide bonds to pay for it, but that it is an executive and administrative duty to select the site, buy same, select plans and let a contract, provide precise cost of various items, terms of payment, and numerous other conditions incident to building a large municipal auditorium. [Id. at 858, 32 N.W.2d at 923.]

See also Burdick v. San Diego, 29 Cal.App.2d 565, 567, 84 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1938) (court disallowed referendum which sought to make minor changes in specifications and form of contract without attempting to reverse the underlying policy to build police station, but said that city council’s decisions to erect station, to appropriate money, to approve plans, specifications and form of contract, were all legislative acts subject to referendum).

The rationale behind Ballantyne, Mona-han, Burdick and similar cases is that municipal business could not proceed if a referendum could be held on each step needed to carry out a legislative policy. State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, supra at 858, 32 N.W.2d at 923. While courts differ at times on precisely what steps in undertaking a capital project are legislative, and where the line is crossed into administrative detail, there can be no doubt that when an initiative like the one here attempts to totally reverse the decision to have the capital project, it is legislative.

The majority makes the point that an initiative practically if not formally, may block the execution of a legislative policy until the outcome of the election. (Ante at 875). This is not sufficient reason to deny the electorate one chance to reverse a policy, especially since they were deprived of the opportunity initially. If an initiative were launched but failed to gain the approval of a majority of voters, and a second or third initiative attempted to block the same project, a time might well come when the equities of the situation would dictate that the initiative be disallowed. This situation arose in Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973) and the companion case, Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 474 P.2d 247 (1970). In 1968, the people of King County approved a referendum to construct a multipurpose stadium by a 62 per cent vote. Later, an initiative was launched to challenge the site of the stadium. The Supreme Court of Washington in Paget held that site selection was a legislative act, and allowed the initiative to proceed. But two years later, the voters were called on a third time to vote on an initiative which would terminate the stadium project. The third vote was the subject of Ruana v. Spellman, supra where the court said

[t]here is no doubt that the original decision to erect a stadium was legislative in nature. The people have voted thereon. Paget v. Logan, supra, held that, at the stage the project was then in, site selection was legislative. The people *887have voted thereon. [81 Wash.2d at 824, 505 P.2d at 449.]

From all that appears the court used the executive/legislative distinction to disallow the Ruano initiative because it was inequitable to allow the electors yet another “bite of the apple.”

The equities here are quite different. Unlike Ruano v. Spellman, supra and Ballantyne v. Leeman, supra this is not a situation where there has already been a popular vote approving the project and a disgruntled minority is trying to block the expression of the public will. Here, the people constantly have been trying to express their will under the charter, but have been repeatedly blocked — first by Council inaction and now by this Court’s hypertechnical interpretation of their initiative.

It has been wisely stated:

[T]he initiative could be used to reverse or alter the original policy — presumably even after it has been largely carried out — because the local legislative body, acting legislatively, can do so.
This analysis presents a problem when, for example, a county board of supervisors makes plans to build a courthouse, passes a resolution to that effect, purchases property, enters into contracts, and then finds the project challenged by an initiative to rescind the previous acts and proposing a different site for the courthouse .... In such a case a notion of laches might be used to prevent a belated use of the initiative to attack a measure which could have been timely attacked by a referendum before the part performance. However, if the public would approve the initiative, with the knowledge that public funds would thereby be wasted by abandonment of a partially completed project, then perhaps it is not a court’s place to prevent it from doing so. [Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 Cal.L.Rev. 1717, 1736 (1966).]

Of course, oh the facts of this case, a referendum could not have been used to halt the original budget request for the convention center appropriation, because the Charter Amendments granting the right to referendum were not operative until long after the budget request passed. Any notion of lach-es is unthinkable here. Appellants have always diligently pursued all avenues to the vote.

There can be no more classical subject for popular vote than the decision to construct a major capital project, such as a convention center. On the facts of this case, it would be particularly egregious to deny citizens a vote because they are “too late” when the delays which facilitated spending of funds for the project were caused by governmental inaction.

The majority opinion stresses that after the Council approved the project and Congress appropriated the money, only executive functions remained to be accomplished by the Mayor and that, through the Appropriations Act, Congress intended to vest the Mayor with the sole responsibility for carrying out the project (ante at 878-880). Though this Committee has been pushed from pillar to post, the majority seems here to be making the point to the Committee that it is now too late with its initiative because the die is cast for construction of the convention center. The majority is either saying that or it is saying that only the Mayor may now decide not to construct the center and the initiative’s purpose is therefore not reachable by initiative as initiatives reach only legislative action.

No matter which way the majority opinion is read, it will not hold water. To illustrate, it is of extraordinary interest that one of the most authoritative members of Congress on the matter of the convention center, Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for the District of Columbia, had this to say on this subject:

Congress, of course, did not mandate a convention center, but rather authorized a convention center, and authorized the city, if they determined this is what they wanted to do, to do it within certain budgetary limits. But I think Congress made itself clear that its involvement was solely on the upside budgetary limit, de*888sign and location. Whether to go forward with it or not was entirely up to the city. That was certainly my understanding. [District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 959 (1979).]

As to the majority’s point that legislative repeal is not available to the Council and hence not open to an initiative — due to “separation of powers mandated by Congress” — this is a proposition I must confess I do not understand. I had thought it elementary that what a legislature can legislate it can repeal. In fact, in Duran v. Cassidy, supra, which is pinpointed at the question of initiatives, this is made clear. There, the court states, “[t]he power to legislate, by implication, includes the power to amend or repeal existing legislation.” Id. 28 Cal:App.3d at 582, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 799.

During a Senate hearing, Chairman Le-ahy was informed by counsel for the Referendum Committee of the argument being made elsewhere that

the District's] hands were tied, even if the- City Council changed its mind on the convention center, they would argue they would have no authority to implement that change of mind. They are arguing that they are required to borrow and spend the money and go through with the project including requesting future appropriations.

To this, Senator Leahy commented:

This is an interesting argument, but I doubt any of the 535 Members of Congress would agree. [District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 959 (1979) (emphasis added).]

Getting down to earth on this whole affair, Chairman Leahy went right to the heart of the matter and put the question directly to Mayor Barry in this fashion:

Mr. Mayor, do you feel at all that the series of steps in turning down the attempt of some citizens groups under the Home Rule Charter to have a convention referendum, do you feel that might in any way be going against the type of home rule that the citizens say they want?
MR. BARRY. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think so.... I have made probably a 180-degree turn on this whole question of referendums .... as Mayor, and having the lack of restraint for full budgetary authority, I don’t think we get the full weight of it... . As citizens go to referendums and turn these things down, / don’t think citizens of the Nations’s Capital can stand that sort of pressure.
MR. LEAHY. Do you think citizens in the District of Columbia should have a right to a referendum on capital projects?
MR. BARRY. I don’t think so, which is a 180-degree change in my position. [Id. at 878-879 (emphasis added).]

That sheds a bit of light on the series of frustrations this body of the citizenry (the Committee) has had to endure. Small wonder at this late hour the Committee has still not been able to launch the initiative— though it is a right expressly granted in the Charter; and an initiative on the convention center would be a classical example of the utilization of the right.

On another occasion, Senator Leahy had this to say on the unfortunate history of the attempts to obtain this initiative on the convention center:

I have had a large number of Senators express to me that they were surprised to see the initiatives get blocked.... [A] lot of Senators were quite surprised that this happened. These were Senators strongly in favor of home rule, and they indicated they were surprised that one of the biggest aspects of home rule, the initiative aspect, was blocked.
I make that point for whatever it is worth. I was surprised, too.
ajc * * * sfc ‡
I wish they had gone otherwise and allowed the referendum to go forward. But that is a decision they have made, and ... I don’t think this committee *889could or should reverse, but rather simply watch what happens next in the court procedures. [Id. at 959-60) (emphasis added).]

It does not become this young government in the capital of the nation to adopt a begrudging attitude on the Charter-given right to vote. This is essentially the basis of Home Rule. It would be a different matter entirely if this case involved a group of citizens who appeared for the first time at a late hour seeking to harass the government and impede its processes. But nothing of the sort is present. If one were to take that view of the efforts of the citizenry in this case, it would be evident that a genuine appreciation of sound governmental administration is fundamentally lacking.

But most of all, it does not become this court, after its long delay, to tell this large group of citizens who have labored so long to obtain their Charter right that — of all things — events have passed them by and they are now too late; and the city government has now become unreachable by this initiative.

I had not expected that at some time I would be writing a dissent to a decision of this court in which I felt obliged to urge that the right to vote be honored. I regret this is necessary. Just as we must protect “expression and association without regard to the ... truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered,” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445, 83 S.Ct. 328, 344, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), so must the right to vote equally be protected no matter that there may be apprehension at the result. The vitality of the government depends upon this. “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964).

I must dissent.7

. See infra, pp. 883-884.

. Exhibit N at R. 48.

. Section 1-1116(c) provides that

Within fifteen (15) calendar days after the receipt of an initiative or referendum measure by the Board of Elections and Ethics, the Board shall:
(1) prepare a true and impartial summary statement, not to exceed one hundred (100) words, bearing the serial number of the measure, and expressing the purpose of the measure. Such statement shall not intentionally create prejudice for or against the measure_ [D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 1-1116(c).]

. This section states

Adoption of budget by Council — Enactment of appropriations by Congress.

The Council, within fifty calendar days after receipt of the budget proposal from the Mayor, and after public hearing, shall by act adopt the annual budget for the District of Columbia government. Any supplements thereto shall also be adopted by act by the Council after public hearing. Such budget so adopted shall be submitted by the Mayor to the President for transmission by him to the Congress. No amount may be obligated or expended by any officer or employee of the District of Columbia government unless such amount has been approved by Act of Congress, and then only according to such Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Mayor shall not transmit any annual budget or amendments or supplements thereto, to the President of the United States until the completion of the budg*883et procedures contained in this Act. [D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224.]

. Section 2 of the proposed law, defining “District of Columbia Government” as used in section 3, is similarly over-inclusive, in that it refers to both the City Council and the Mayor, as well as to any other government agent which might be authorized to execute the convention center project.

. Surely the majority does not mean to suggest in note 6, ante, that there was never an expression of legislative intent by the Council to authorize the convention center. To so hold would be to say the Mayor can unilaterally request appropriations for capital projects. Necessarily, this approach would indicate that the legislature’s (the Council’s) role in budget-making and decision-making for the District is negligible. It apparently has escaped the attention of the majority that a spokesman for Congress than whom there is none more authoritative on the subject (Senator Leahy) has already expressed himself to the exact opposite of the majority opinion on this particular aspect of the case (see dissenting opinion at 887-888).

. If this decision should stand, the citizenry will be left in confusion on what, under the District of Columbia Charter, is a proper subject of initiative or referendum. Some are permitted to go to a vote, this one is not. It seems to me that no aspect of the law is of more importance to the people in this jurisdiction; and no decision of this court potentially has more far-reaching implications than this one.