dissenting. Although I agree that the relief sought by Phillip Richie is not moot because of the potential for recurrence, I must respectfully dissent. The practical effect of the majority opinion is to hold that any student, whether in the Lead Hill, Pine Bluff, or Littie Rock School District, has a mandated right to have appeals of suspensions heard by the school board. This is so, according to the holding, even when the suspensions are for half a day. That interpretation reaches an absurd result because I can now foresee school boards being inundated by suspension appeals. See Hensen v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 319 Ark. 491, 892 S.W.2d 250 (1995). I respectfully disagree.
The predecessor of Ark. Code Aim. § 6-18-507(b) (Supp. 1995) was enacted as part of Act 169 of 1931. Since that time, the General Assembly has directed the Arkansas Department of Education [”ADE”] to establish school district student discipline policies. 1983 Ark. Acts Ex. Session 77, 104. The Arkansas Code now reads in relevant part:
(c) The school discipline policies shall:
(3) Establish procedures for notice to students and parents of charges, hearings, and other dm process proceedings to be applicable in the enforcement and administration of such policies by the school administrator and by the school board.
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-502(c) (Supp. 1995)(emphasis added). In turn, the ADE, pursuant to this express authority from the General Assembly, promulgated the following provision:
Suspension: Schools may suspend students from school. A suspension is defined as dismissing the student from school for any time period not exceeding 10 days. For a suspension, the United States Supreme court in Goss v. Lopez required that a student be accorded the minimum due process requirements under the United States Constitution. Districts should only use suspension and/or expulsion when ah other alternatives fail. Districts should afford suspended students the following rights:
1. Prior to any suspension, the principal or his/her designee, shah advise the student in question of the particular misconduct of which he/she is accused, as weh as the basis for the accusation.
2. The pupil shah be given an opportunity at that time to explain his/her version of the facts to the school principal or his/her designee.
3. Written notice of suspension and the reason(s) for the suspension shah be given to the pupil.
4. Any parent, legal guardian, or person acting as a parent shah have the right to appeal to the superintendent or his/ her designee.
Arkansas Department of Education Rules and Regulations Governing Development, Review and Revision of School District Student Discipline and School Safety Policies § 6.04(B).
When reading § 6-18-502(c) together with the ADE rules, it is clear that minimal due process is achieved pursuant to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974), which is ah that is required. Although not favored, repeal of a statute by implication may be effected when there exists “an invincible repugnancy between the former and later provisions that both cannot stand together.” Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 639, 887 S.W.2d 290, 291 (1994). Furthermore, the implication must be “clear and irresistible.” Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 289 Ark. 528, 532, 715 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1986).
Section 6-18-507(b), originally enacted in 1931, calls for appeals before the school board relating to any suspension, which is clearly repugnant to Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-502(c) (Supp. 1995), originally enacted in 1983, which directs the ADE to promulgate appropriate procedures to satisfy due process requirements. Mandatory appeals for any and all suspensions, no matter how short the duration, goes well beyond the General Assembly’s subsequent enactment to address due process requirements and delegate rule-making authority to the ADE.
The due process afforded to Phillip Richie with respect to the three-day suspension is consistent with the ADE rules discussed above. Because the ADE rules were promulgated under a later act of the Arkansas General Assembly and because the majority’s reading of the 1931 Act leads us to an absurd and impractical result, I would affirm.
Dudley, J., joins.