with whom
RUDMAN, J., joins,dissenting.
[¶ 23] I agree that because the historical facts in this case are not in dispute, that the entry of summary judgment is appropriate. See Tondreau v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 638 A.2d 728, 730 (Me.1994). Our review of that judgment is de novo, see Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575, and my review of the facts and the law leads me' to conclude that Mary Jane Hallissey remained an actual resident of Whiting, and that summary judgment should have been entered in her favor.
*1075[¶ 24] Hallissey is a mother who is attempting to better herself through a legal education. The University of Maine School of Law is located in Portland. One cannot commute there from Whiting. As do other students who attend post secondary or graduate schools away from home, Hallissey took a temporary residence in the Portland area for the purpose of attending law school. As a mother charged with the care of a younger child, naturally she took her younger son Patrick to live with her for part of the school year in her temporary residence in Cape Elizabeth.
[¶ 25] Hallissey’s actual residence, however, remained in Whiting. The term “actual residence” means “a real residence, a residence existing in truth.” City of Marlborough v. City of Lynn, 275 Mass. 394, 176 N.E. 214, 215 (1931). I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that Hallissey vacated her Wanting home. In fact, Hal-lissey maintains an actual residence in Whiting, where she lives, except when attending law school, owns a home, is registered to vote, registers her vehicles, and docks her boats. Hallissey testified that she frequently returned to Whiting throughout the academic year and that she worked in Whiting during her summer breaks. She was in the Portland area only when law school was in session.
[¶ 26] The Court concludes that 20-A M.R.S.A. § 5204(4) (1993) was not intended to give parents a choice between two School Administrative Districts. Title 20-A, section 5205(5), however, specifically allows a parent, who establishes a temporary residence because of employment, to school her children in either the District of her permanent residence or the District of her temporary residence. See 20-A M.R.S.A. § 5205(5) (1993).8 The statute does not require the parent to choose the same District for all her children, and indeed is not to “be construed to abridge [a] student’s rights in the school administrative district unit where the student permanently resides.” Id. The student in this case is Brendan, and his unquestioned permanent residence is Whiting. See id.
[¶ 27] The District has a clear obligation pursuant to section 5204(4) and the Agreement, to pay tuition for Brendan’s attendance at John Bapst High School. Hallis-sey has a right to attend law school and to temporarily reside in the Portland area, and to have her son Patrick attend school in Cape Elizabeth when he temporarily resides there. See 20-A M.R.S.A. § 5205(5). Such should not result in her losing her status as a resident of Whiting any more than college students lose their status as residents of their home towns.
[¶ 28] I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Hallissey.
. Section 5205(5) states:
5. Temporary Residence. A student who temporarily resides in a school administrative unit shall be considered a resident of that school unit if the student is living with a parent, who because of employment, moves from place to place. This subsection may not be construed to abridge that student’s rights in the school administrative unit where the student permanently resides.
20-A M.R.S.A. § 5205(5) (1993). This section applies to Hallissey’s situation as her move to Cape Elizabeth to attend law school is directly related to her employment.