dissenting.
In Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Cr.App.1985), this Court cautioned police officers of this State that the viability of Art. 6687b, Sec. 13, V.A.C.S., which provides, inter alia, that “Any peace officer *185may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for the purpose of determining whether such person had a driver’s license as required by this Section,” is in question in light of what the Supreme Court stated and held in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).1
And yet today, and notwithstanding what the Supreme Court stated and held in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, a majority of this Court has the audacity to hold that a police officer may now lawfully stop and detain a motorist who is driving a motor vehicle that has one or more items of equipment that are not “in good working order and need adjustment.” The majority holds that such gives the officer probable cause to stop and detain the motorist. The fact that the item or items of equipment may not be in violation of the law is irrelevant and immaterial. I dissent to such holdings.
I also dissent to the majority doing other than what it was supposed to do after it granted the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
This Court granted the State’s petition for discretionary review in order to review the decision of the Houston [First] Court of Appeals that was handed down in this cause. See Vicknair v. State, 670 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1983).
Today, however, a majority of this Court does not see fit to review the decision of the court of appeals, but, instead, rewrites the majority opinion of the court of appeals that was written by Justice Cohen. I dissent to such action.
I also dissent to the majority opinion reversing the decision of the court of appeals. I believe that the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence because the arrest that occurred in this cause was made without warrant and was not supported by probable cause.
Without citation of any case law authority, the majority opinion holds that the arresting officer had probable cause to stop the motor vehicle that appellant was driving because it has now discovered after the fact of the arrest that one of the taillight lenses on the vehicle that appellant was driving prior to when he was arrested was not “in good working order and needed adjustment.”
I agree that a police officer who sees a motorist violate a traffic law is authorized to stop that vehicle. However, I am unable to agree that a police officer may stop a motorist when he does not see such a violation occurring.
Thus, in this instance, we must ask the following question: What traffic law did the arresting officer see appellant violating when he stopped him?
The record is clear that the police officer stopped the appellant because he had been erroneously informed by his instructors at the police academy, as well as by his supervisors in the police department, that if a taillight lens on a motor vehicle was “cracked to the extent you could observe white light coming through the rear” such constituted a traffic violation. However, Art. 6701d, Section 111, V.A.C.S., which might govern, does not provide that having such a taillight lens is a violation of the law, but, instead, provides that it is a violation of the law if the lens does not emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 1000 feet to the rear. Thus, having a taillight lens that emits both a red light and a white light, or a combination of lights, is not violative of Section 111, provided that the lens emits a red light plainly visible from a distance of 1000 feet to the rear. Of course, the Legislature could change this law to prohibit a taillight lens from emitting more than a red light, but it has not chosen to do so.
*186In his testimony, the arresting officer admitted that he stopped appellant only because he believed that the taillight lens on the vehicle that appellant was driving was in violation of the law. There is absolutely no evidence before this Court that when the arresting officer stopped appellant’s vehicle that he was concerned about whether or not the taillight lens was “in good working order and needed adjustment.” He thought he saw a violation of the law, but in fact did not see any violation of the law.
The State, in its petition for discretionary review, argues that the question is not whether the State could have successfully prosecuted the appellant for not having a valid taillight lens, but, instead, is whether the officer had probable cause to stop appellant because he, the officer, had probable cause to believe that appellant’s taillight lens was in violation of the law. I agree with the State that the issue is whether the officer had probable cause to stop appellant. However, in this instance, but because of the facts that were adduced in the trial court, I find that the reasons the State gives to support its conclusion that the arresting officer had probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle borders on asking this Court to approve police departments of this State erroneously instructing its officers on the law and then later asking this Court to uphold arrests of our citizens by those same police officers because they were acting in good faith. I, for one, am not ready to adopt or approve such an “Orwellian” argument.
The majority reasons that a person may violate our traffic laws by driving a motor vehicle with equipment that does not violate the law, but because such equipment is not “in good working order and needs adjustment,” that is probable cause a violation of the law has occurred.
By the majority’s decision, it will now be necessary for every motorist of this State, in order to escape having his vehicle labeled “probable cause,” to daily take his vehicle to a State approved inspection station and have his vehicle inspected. Ask yourself: Notwithstanding the fact that my motor vehicle has a valid certifícate of inspection, are all of the following items on my automobile in good working order and do not require any kind of adjustment: “Horn, windshield wipers, inside mirror, steering wheel, seat belts, brakes (service and parking), tires, wheels and rims, exhaust system, exhaust emission system, beam indicator, both tail lamps, both stop lamps, license plate lamp, both rear red reflectors, turn signal lamps, and both head lamps”? If you do not know, or are not sure, whether all of these items on your automobile are in good working order, and also do not need any kind of adjustment, and even though you cannot visibly see that any of the items might need any repair or adjustment, you should, nevertheless, but immediately, take your vehicle to a State approved inspection station and get it inspected; otherwise, your vehicle might constitute probable cause for some police officer to stop you. Of course, enroute to the inspection station, by driving your vehicle, you run the risk that it will be labeled by some police officer “probable cause.” I also add: Be sure to have your automobile reinspected tomorrow. Do this on a daily basis. Better yet, purchase a State approved inspection station, incorporate, and sell stock in the corporation, because after today’s decision by this Court that stock’s value should soar to the heavens due to the great increase in the number of inspections that will or should occur. After today’s majority opinion becomes the law, if everyone does what the majority opinion implicitly mandates, some persons might still be able to say, as some persons have been prone to say in the past, that American made automobiles are not the best made automobiles in the world. However, after today, if everyone does what the majority opinion implicitly mandates, I do not believe those same persons will be able to say that American made automobiles are not the most inspected automobiles in the world.
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully register my dissent through this dissenting opinion.
. The Supreme Court held in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that illegal random police stops of vehicles driven on the public streets or highways for license and registration checks were unlawful. It also held that officers must have at least a reasonable suspicion that some law is being violated before Aey can make stops for license or registration checks. This is because random license and registration checks are just as intrusive as a roving border patrol stop. See and compare United. States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).