*187OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TEAGUE, Judge.The facts of this cause reflect that James Wallace Vicknair, hereinafter appellant, was stopped by a patrolling Houston police officer for driving an automobile with a “fractured” tail light lens, which the officer characterized as “an equipment violation.” There is no evidence in the record that appellant’s vehicle did not have a valid and clearly visible inspection sticker on it at the time when the officer caused the vehicle to come, to a stop. The State has never asserted that there is evidence to the contrary. The only reason the police officer gave for causing appellant’s vehicle to come to a stop was the “fractured” tail light lens. Therefore, for purposes of this opinion, we will assume that appellant’s vehicle had a valid and clearly visible inspection sticker on it when the officer caused it to come to a stop. The fracture in the tail light lens permitted some white light to be emitted with red light. After being stopped, the officer requested appellant to exhibit and display his driver’s license, but appellant could not produce a valid driver’s license because his driver’s license had been previously revoked. After passengers in appellant’s vehicle were ordered to and did exit from the vehicle, the officer saw in plain view a pistol and marihuana. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed at least five pounds of marihuana, for which appellant was charged and later convicted pursuant to his plea of guilty to the court, which plea had been obtained pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, which provided that appellant would be permitted to appeal the trial court’s overruling his motion to suppress. See Art. 44.02, V.A.C.C.P. Punishment was assessed by the trial judge at five years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections.
On direct appeal, the First (Houston) Court of Appeals reversed, see Vicknair v. State, 670 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.App.—1st 1983), holding that because the fractured tail light lens on appellant’s automobile did not violate Art. 6701d, § 111, V.A.C.S., initially there was no lawful stop of appellant’s vehicle, thus causing the ensuing seizures to be unlawful under Art. 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. Also see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), which decision is usually given credit for establishing in our law the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. However, that phrase was actually coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
§ 111 provides in pertinent part the following:
... every motor vehicle ... shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps mounted on the rear which, when lighted as required by Sec. 109 [of Art. 6701d, supra,] shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 100 feet to the rear, ...
The court of appeals based its holding that there was an unlawful stop of the appellant’s vehicle upon the arresting officer’s testimony that the red light emanating from the fractured tail light lens on appellant’s vehicle was visible to him at all times. In its opinion, the court pointed out the following: “There is no evidence whatsoever in this record that appellant’s car failed to emit a red light plainly visible at a distance of 1000 feet to the rear, as required by § 111. On the contrary, the arresting officer testified that it did emit a red light visible to him at all times at an unstated distance to the rear. Since no one testified that appellant’s car failed to emit a visible red light, there was no basis at all to justify the original detention. This distinguishes this case from Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83, 86-87 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).” (287).
The officer further testified that he had been instructed at the Houston Police Academy, as well as by his supervisors in the police department, that if a tail light lens on a motor vehicle was “cracked to the extent that you could observe white light coming through the rear” this constituted a violation of the traffic laws of this State. The court of appeals rejected the officer’s “good faith” belief concerning the law governing stopping a motorist driving a motor vehicle having a “fractured” tail light lens:
*188“This was a warrantless arrest. A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. Tex.Code Pro. Ann. art. 6701d, § 153 (Vernon 1977). However, what this officer testified he observed did not constitute an offense under § 111 of art. 6701d, and the officer’s well-intentioned but mistaken belief that it did will not legitimate this search. Scott v. U.S., 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). ‘Instead of motive or intent, the court must view the circumstances objectively to determine whether they support the justification.’ Nickerson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1983). If the circumstances do not support the justification claimed for an arrest or search, the evidence illegally seized must be suppressed. Tex.Code Crim.Pro. Ann. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979).” (287).
We now find that we are in agreement with what the court of appeals stated and held.
On original submission, a majority of this Court did not address the court of appeals’ interpretation of § 111, supra, but found that the fractured tail light lens did not pass the criteria established for annual inspection, thus finding that a violation of Art. 6701d, supra, had occurred. This enabled it to hold that the initial stop of appellant’s vehicle and the ensuing search and seizures were lawful.
We find that a brief analysis of the applicable provisions of Art. 6701d, supra, assists us in determining whether a motor vehicle can be stopped for a minutia defect or flaw in its equipment, and the evidence does not show that the vehicle did not have a valid and clearly visible inspection sticker on it.
§ 111, supra, is found among the sections dealing with equipment which are accumulated under the subheading entitled “Art. XIV — EQUIPMENT.” § 108 of Art. 6701d, supra, which sets forth the scope and effect of regulations under this Article, states that it is a misdemeanor offense to drive a motor vehicle which is in an unsafe condition, or which does not contain the necessary equipment, or which has equipment that is not in proper condition and adjustment as required in Art. XIV, consisting of sections 108-139 of Art. 6701d, supra, i.e. equipment which has degenerated to the point of being unsafe equipment or, to put it another way, equipment that has become hazardous. The sections in Art. XIV specify the requirement of head lamps, tail lamps, reflectors, brakes, horns, mirrors, stop lamps, safety glazing material, and other items either required or found on motor vehicles.
§ 108(d) authorizes The Department of Public Safety to issue and enforce regulations establishing standards and specifications for equipment relating to approval, installation and adjustment. Art. XV, entitled “INSPECTION OF VEHICLES”, exemplifies that grant of authority to regulate and enforce the safety standards of equipment.
Art. XV, consisting of sections 140-142 of Art. 6701d, supra, mandates inspections of motor vehicles at official inspection stations, the necessity of obtaining an inspection sticker, and other particularities dealing with an annual inspection of a motor vehicle. The criteria which a motor vehicle must meet in order to obtain a required inspection sticker are not found among the sections of Art. XIV, which specify the regulations and requirements of equipment, nor are those criteria found in Art. XV, which concern the inspection of a motor vehicle. In fact, nowhere in Art. 6701d, supra, can this criteria be found. This is because the criteria is set out in elaborate detail in the “Rules and Regulations for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations and Certified Inspectors,” hereinafter Rules and Regulations, which can be found in the County Clerk’s Offices of every county of this State, as well as in every vehicle inspection station. See Tex.Public Safety Commission, 37 Tex.Adm.Code Sec. 23.41 (November, 1977) (“Inspection Items, Procedures, and Requirements”).
The criteria for obtaining an annual inspection sticker for a motor vehicle is much more stringent than the standards for *189equipment set out under Art. XIV.1 Two standards co-exist: one standard for automobiles before its inspection sticker has expired, and another set of criteria to obtain inspection certification.
If a tail light emits a red light per § 111, but the dome to that tail light has a hairline fracture which would either emit some white light or allow moisture to penetrate the dome, the tail light would not pass inspection.2 Arguably, such a motor vehicle could be legally driven until the tail light degenerated to the point that it did not meet the standards of Art. XIV, § 111, i.e., failure to emit a red light for a distance of 1,000 feet, or until it violated Art. XV, i.e., driving a motor vehicle without a valid inspection sticker, whichever came earlier.
Given the above, it is or should be clear that the absolute longest one could drive his motor vehicle with an insignificant fracture in the vehicle’s tail light would be for the inspection period. If the tail light lens became fractured after inspection, but never degenerated to the point of either being a safety hazard or violating the standards of Art. XIV, the driver of the vehicle would be free from arrest.3
We find that in making the determination whether the tail light lens on appellant’s motor vehicle constituted a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code of this State we must not evaluate that tail light lens under the criteria for inspection found in the County Clerks’ offices or in licensed vehicle inspection stations throughout the State, because such would be an unreasonable requirement on the motorists of this State. Instead, we will make the determination whether a violation of Art. 6701d, § 111, supra, occurred when the arresting officer stopped appellant’s motor vehicle.
We find that the court of appeals application of § 111 to the present case is an appropriate one.4 There is no evidence in the record before us that the tail light on appellant’s vehicle failed to emit a red light as required by a plain reading of § 111. Nor is it logical to conclude that a sliver of white light, which did not “wash out” the red hue of the tail light, presented a safety hazard to anyone or anyone’s property, including appellant’s vehicle and the persons then located therein when the police officer stopped the vehicle.
Our research has not yet revealed anything of an authoritative nature that might *190be found in print that might reflect or indicate that the Legislature of this State intended to permit a peace officer to arrest without a warrant a citizen-motorist whose motor vehicle has not passed the rigorous criteria of inspection and there is no showing that the vehicle did not have a valid inspection sticker clearly visible to a peace officer, and which meets the requirements of Art. XIV, supra, and the vehicle is not a safety hazard. In this instance, there is no evidence in the record that the tail light on appellant’s vehicle failed to emit a red light as required by a plain reading of § 111. The arresting officer in this cause testified that the red light in the tail light on appellant’s vehicle was visible to him at all times.
The sole reason the officer gave for stopping appellant’s vehicle was that he believed appellant had committed a tail light “infraction” of the traffic laws. Given what we have stated, we find and hold that the officer was not justified in stopping appellant’s vehicle for that reason, nor did he have probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle. Also see and compare Willett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr. App.1970); Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1965). Furthermore, the inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith belief of the arresting officer was not sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest, search, or detention of appellant and his passengers. Talbert v. State, 489 S.W.2d, 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Contrast the above cases with such cases as Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex. Cr.App.1977); Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); and Soileau v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 544, 244 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1970). The opinions in each of those cases clearly reveal that there was some evidence of an initial legitimate traffic stop. Such does not exist here.
Because the evidence was seized as a result of an unlawful stop, it became inadmissible under Art. 38.23, supra. The court of appeals correctly so held. Its judgment is affirmed.
MILLER, CAMPBELL and WHITE, JJ., concur in the result. McCORMICK, J., dissents..Compare § 111, supra, requiring a tail lamp to emit a red light plainly visible from 1000 feet, with the criteria for inspection requiring inspection and rejection for “Lamp that does not completely emit a red light plainly visible 1000 feet to the rear” and "Lamp lens is cracked, broken, painted, missing, discolored, or does not fit properly.” Rules and Regulations, supra, at C-19. (Emphasis added.)
Other criteria for inspection include the following: "Tires — ‘Inspect for and reject any tire which has been repaired temporarily by the use of blowout patches and boots.’" (To be distinguished from nail hole plugs or patches which are not cause for rejection.) Rules and Regulations at C-14; "Wheel Assembly — Inspect and reject wheel nuts, studs, and clamps which are loose, broken, missing, or mismatched. Adequate thread engagement is imperative. Studs and nut threads on wheel lugs must engage completely through the entire threaded portion of the nut.’” Rules and Regulations at C-16; "Reflectors — Inspect and reject if reflector is discolored, deteriorated, or painted.’” Rules and Regulations at C-20; ‘Windshield Wiper— Inspect and reject if wiper blade has been damaged, hardened, or has badly worn rubber elements.'” Rules and Regulations at C-6; "Exhaust Emission System — (Applicable only to vehicles which are 1984 or later models; thus not applicable to this cause because appellant’s vehicle was an earlier model vehicle); ‘Inspect and reject if the air pump (air injection type) belt is loose or removed.” Rules and Regulations at C-18. Also see generally, “Vehicle Emission Inspection and Maintenance Rules and Regulations for Official Vehicle Inspection Stations and Certified Inspectors", June, 1984, which is a 155 page document complete with photographs, graphs, and charts.
. A "crack” is defined as "any break that allows moisture to penetrate the interior of the lamp unit or allows a white light to be emitted to the rear of any vehicle.” Rides and Regulations at C-18 and C-19.
. Art. 6701d, §§ 147 and 148(a), V.A.C.S., provides that "except for the offense of speeding, an officer may arrest and take into custody one seen committing a traffic offense." See, for example, Christian v. State, 592 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and the cases cited therein at page 629. Also see § 153 which provides: "Any peace officer is authorized to arrest without warrant any person found committing a violation of any provision of this Act.”
. The State, in its petition for discretionary review, states that "The Court of Appeals decision *190presents two issues for review by this Court: (1) Is Article 6701d, Section 111, V.A.C.S. violated by a taillight which emits both red and white light? The State says yes. (2) Did the arresting officers have probable cause to stop the appellant’s vehicle for a traffic offense? The State says yes.” (Page 2 of State’s P.D.R.) Thus, it is obviously clear that the State admits that § 111 is the applicable statute in question. Contrary ■ to the State, as did the court of appeals implicitly, we also answer the questions posed in the negative, but do so expressly.