Robert Thomas appealed the trial court’s denial of relief on his pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he sought to set aside an indictment for the offense of aggravated assault on the ground of prior jeopardy.
Thomas contends that his previous conviction in a justice of the peace court of the lesser included offense of assault by contact, arising from the same transaction that is the basis of the felony indictment, constitutes prior jeopárdy. The State contends that the proceedings in the justice of the peace court were void for want of jurisdiction, because no complaint arising from the same transaction was filed in the justice of the peace court at the time of the proceedings, and that the proceedings in the justice of the peace court involved a different transaction.
Thomas was arrested on May 2,1987, for the commission of assaultive offensives against Wilda Faye Hill and against Eddie Mayberry. On May 12, 1987, an assistant district attorney sent a copy of the first page of the offense reports on both charges and an information form, with none of the blanks filled in, to Justice of the Peace John Hawkins. A cover letter accompanied this material plus additional material related to two other defendants. The letter stated that the above entitled offenses have been reduced to justice of the peace court. The “above entitled offenses” set forth were; “Robert Lynn Thomas, Assault by Contact”; “Travis Lampkin, Disorderly Conduct”; and “James Lee Livesy, Disorderly Conduct.”
On May 18, 1987, a complaint charging Thomas with causing bodily injury to Eddie Mayberry by stabbing him with a knife (aggravated assault) was signed and sworn to by Mayberry before Bowie County Justice of the Peace Ben Grigson. On May 22, 1987, Thomas, who had been held in jail since his arrest on May 2, 1987, was taken before Justice of the Peace Hawkins where he pleaded guilty to an offense or offenses of assault by contact and was sentenced to the time he had already served in jail1. On June 30, 1987, a Bowie County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Thomas charging him with assault with bodily injury.2
As stated in Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 28.13 (Vernon 1966), a former judgment of acquittal or conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction bars any further prosecution for the same offense. This principle applies even if the prior prosecution was for a lesser included offense. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970); Benard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).3
*603Double jeopardy is an affirmative defense, and the appellant has the burden to produce evidence supporting the jeopardy claim. Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Wockenfuss v. State, 521 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ward v. State, 520 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). A plea of former jeopardy constitutes nothing more than a pleading and does not establish the truth of the issues of fact alleged therein. Zimmerman v. State, 750 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
In order to invest a court with jurisdiction over a criminal case, a charging instrument must be filed with that court. Whitehead v. State, 710 S.W.2d 645, 653 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 745 S.W.2d 374 (1988). See, McAfee v. State, 363 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1963); Tex. Const, art. V, § 12(b). In a justice of the peace court, the charging instrument is a written complaint signed and sworn to by the complainant.4 Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 45.16 (Vernon 1979). A judgment on a plea of guilty entered without the filing of a written complaint is void. Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Bragg v. State, 109 Tex.Crim. 632, 6 S.W.2d 365 (1928). It is generally recognized that a void proceeding has no effect in support of a plea of formal conviction or acquittal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); Benard v. State, supra; Barnes v. State, 79 Tex.Crim. 395, 185 S.W. 2 (1916); Rivera v. State, 716 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986).
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 80(d) provides in pertinent part:
Presumptions in Criminal Cases. The court of appeals shall presume that [the defendant] ... pleaded to the ... charging instrument ... unless such matters were made an issue in the court below, or it otherwise affirmatively appears to the contrary from the record.
In the present case, it appears that both exceptions to the presumption apply. The issue in the district court was whether Thomas pled to two offenses in the justice of the peace court or only to the offense involving Wilda Faye Hill, a totally separate matter from the allegations involving Eddie Mayberry. The trial judge framed the issue before the district court when he addressed counsel by saying, “You’ve got one conviction, and there are two original offenses, totally separate transactions, separate events, separate evidence. Now, can you tell me, or either one of you tell me, which one he was convicted on?”
Justice of the Peace Hawkins had written a letter indicating that both offenses had been reduced to assault by contact for handling by his court; however, at the hearing in district court, he testified that the letter was not based upon his own recollection and that he could not represent to the court that the letter was accurate. He testified that the docket sheet did not show whether one or both of the original charges were reduced and that the docket sheet indicated that it could be only one case, because his practice was to have a separate docket sheet for each charge. He further observed that although portions of two separate offense report extracts had been furnished to him, only the report on Wilda Faye Hill for assault with bodily injury had a notation in handwriting that the charge was being reduced to the justice *604of the peace court as an assault by contact. The offense report extract sheet on the aggravated assault offense involving Eddie Mayberry did not have a notation on it that the charge was being reduced.5 Thus, there was evidence indicating that only one assaultive offense against Thomas was taken up by the justice of the peace court and that it was not the charge involving Eddie Mayberry as the alleged victim.
There were handwritten annotations by the assistant district attorney on the assault offense report involving Hill to the effect that the charge was to be reduced to justice of the peace court for trial as an assault by contact. No such annotation was made on the aggravated assault offense report involving Mayberry as the alleged victim.6
Deputy Sheriff Wallace Jones testified that Justice of the Peace Hawkins advised Thomas that he had been charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and assault with bodily injury, and that “the charges have been reduced.” However, the docket sheet reflects only one charge against Thomas being before the justice of the peace court, there is only one docket sheet in the record, and the singular word charge is used on that docket sheet. The weight to be given this conflicting evidence was for the judge of the district court.
The burden on Thomas was to show that he had previously been convicted or acquitted in a court having competent jurisdiction for the same or a lesser included offense arising from the same transaction as the aggravated assault offense for which he was indicted. The district judge was the finder of fact in the hearings on September 24 and November 5, 1987, on the question of former jeopardy, and it was his duty to determine if Thomas had met his burden of proof.7 After hearing the testimony of all of the witnesses and viewing all of the documentary evidence, the judge made a determination that Thomas had not done so. We find that there is a basis in evidence for that decision.
The order of the district court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to that court.
. Assault by contact is a Class C misdemeanor and is punishable by a fíne only. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 1974); Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(3) (Vernon Supp.1988). Therefore, the sentence to “time already served” was unauthorized. In a trial where a defendant pleads guilty to the court and has his punishment assessed by the court, punishment outside the statutory range does not render the entire judgment void. Rather, it invalidates the sentence. Rivera v. State, 716 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1986, pet. ref'd), citing Ramirez v. State, 587 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
. The sworn complaint filed by Mayberry on May 18, 1987, and the subsequent indictment of Thomas for aggravated assault based on that complaint are material because the defense counsel argued to the trial judge that so long as the first conviction in the lower court was made on any charging instrument, whether by complaint, information or indictment, re-prosecution of the higher grade of the offense is barred. He added that it was uncontroverted that a complaint was filed on May 15 charging Thomas with aggravated assault. His reliance on that complaint as a charging instrument in the justice of the peace court is misplaced. Although the complaint was actually filed on May 18, it could not have been related to a charge referred to in the letter of May 12 from the assistant district attorney to the justice of the peace, since it did not then exist. This is the only compjgint or charging instrument referred to by the defense, and it charges the offense of aggravated assault, an offense not within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace court.
.In Benard, the court held that a conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a further prosecution for the same offense, regardless of whether the first prosecution was had upon complaint, information or indictment. The court also held that a void proceeding could not serve as a bar to the subsequent proceeding and could have no effect in support of a plea of *603former conviction and that "[T]he mode used in commencing a criminal prosecution (i.e., whether upon complaint or information or indictment) does not affect the fact that it is State action.” We conclude from this that some mode of charging instrument is necessary to commence a prosecution in a court. The defendant has failed to establish that a charging instrument of any kind existed to confer jurisdiction upon the justice of the peace court with regard to the aggravated assault charge which the appellant contends was referred to the justice of the peace court for trial as an assault by contact offense. Benard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
. Block #2 on the offense report forms introduced as Defense Exhibits 7 and 8 is labeled Complaint No. We conclude that this is not evidence that a formal sworn complaint was prepared as a charging instrument for the described offense. Rather, it appears to be a control number used by the police department for processing the offense report.
. The ledgers referred to as docket books and introduced into evidence as Defense Exhibits 3 and 4 contained entries made by a deputy sheriff who processed the appellant after the justice of the peace court proceedings, as does the letter signed by a deputy sheriff from the Bowie County Sheriffs Department, which was admitted as Defense Exhibit 5. The conclusionary remarks on those documents made by a deputy sheriff as to the charges having been reduced to justice of the peace court were not binding on the district court.
. Leon Pesek, Jr. testified that, as the assistant district attorney handling the case, he did not intend to nor did he reduce down the aggravated assault charge involving Mayberry for prosecution in the justice of the peace court.
. Contrary to the assertion in the dissenting opinion, the State twice raised the issue of the justice of the peace court jurisdiction over the aggravated assault charge during the district court hearing on September 24, 1987, and again during the district court hearing on November 5, 1987.