concurring.
I very much regret the failure of the public defender to present oral argument in this case and in the related case of State v. Sanchez, No. 69741, still under advisement. The cases involve important issues of criminal trial procedure, in the modification of traditional procedures and the constitutional implications of these modifications. Oral argument is especially helpful in cases of this kind. The public defender, having brought the case here on constitutional grounds, should follow through by arguing orally. If the failure to argue is occasioned by inadequate financial resources, I hope that the legislative and executive branches will take notice.
Turning to the merits, I do not retreat from the position I took in State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 296, 98 *54L.Ed.2d 256, in which I suggested that the provision of procedures in “child abuse” cases which differed from those applicable to other cases has “equal protection” implications. The majority of the Court held otherwise, however, and so I follow their holding.
The statute in issue represents a substantial departure from the usual procedures. It should be applied with care, and preferably only when necessary. This is the teaching of State v. Seever, 733 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. banc 1987). But, for want of a particularized objection, I too perceive no plain error. Inasmuch as the extrajudicial statements can be used for some purposes, furthermore, there is no facial invalidity.
As the principal opinion points out, there is no issue in this case as to the use of an extrajudicial statement when the person making the statement is “unavailable.” This and other substantial problems about departure from the traditional norms of trial remain to be answered.
On the issues ruled by the principal opinion, I concur.