ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
The State has timely filed its motion for rehearing in this cause contending that the error for which we reverse is harmless. After giving their contention full consideration, we disagree.
The test for harmless constitutional error is not whether a conviction could have been had without the improperly admitted evidence, but “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). This test was applied by The Court of Criminal Appeals in Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516, 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (En Banc). It is well established in Texas that this rule includes the assessment of punishment. See Jordan v. State, 576 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ex Parte Flores, 537 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). An appellate court cannot guess or surmise that the error is harmless, but must be able to determine from the record that the error did not affect the verdict. If the court cannot so find, it may not properly decide that the error is harmless. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1182, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
In the case before us the appellant was found guilty of causing another’s death by committing a dangerous act while committing a felony. The jury assessed the maximum punishment allowed, life impris*13onment. Appellant’s statement “We stole a car and had an accident” was improperly admitted into evidence.
Whether or not the statement was made, and what meaning it had, were questions extensively developed before the jury by the direct and cross-examination of witnesses on presentation of the State’s case in chief and in rebuttal. The statement was also referred to by the State when it argued to the jury that appellant knew the car he was driving was stolen, and that he had no remorse over what happened.1 Though we might conclude that the testimony complained of is not necessary to support the conviction, Musgrave v. State, 608 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (on State’s Motion for Rehearing) (En Banc), we must be able to conclude from the record that the erroneously admitted evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Jordan v. State, supra, at 830. In light of the prominence given to the erroneously admitted statement, we find that there is a reasonable possibility that its admissions might have contributed to appellant’s conviction. We are unable to conclude from the record that the erroneously admitted statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This finding is further strengthened by the fact that the statement was used by the State in its argument on punishment. Although a life sentence may be appropriate under the facts of this case, that is not the question before us. If there is a reasonable possibility that the statement contributed to the length of appellant’s sentence, and we cannot say from the record beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not, its admission is harmful, whether or not it is harmless on the question of guilt. Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571-572 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), Jordan v. State, supra at 830.
For these reasons we cannot find the error harmless. The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
. State’s Attorney: “.... When he is in the hospital and everything is quiet, no threats then, the nurse walks in and says, what happened and did he say, I killed three men I don’t know if I can live with it? No, he said we stole a car. That is all it meant to him.”