filed the following concurring opinion.
I concurred in the result in this case and heartily endorse the holdings and indeed substantially all of the reasoning of the majority necessary for the holdings in the case. In my opinion, however, some aspects of the applicable law should have received additional emphasis and I am not able to agree with certain statements in the majority opinion which seem to me to perpetuate a prior error and, in any event, are unnecessary to the decision of the case.
Although subsections 1, 2 and 3 of §42, as prospective measures are, in my opinion, not unconstitutional or invalid on their face either as a taking of private property for public use without just compensation or as a denial of due process of law as being arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory, I think it *574should be clearly pointed out that this does not mean that in a particular case the application of subsections 1, 2 and 3 may not be unconstitutional and invalid as to the particular property as a violation of the State and federal constitutions prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, depriving a person of his property without due process of law or possibly denying a person the equal protection of the laws. Although I think all of this is implicit in the majority opinion and, in part explicit in that opinion, it seems wise to me to emphasize these applicable principles at this time so that the administrative officials who have the responsibility of enforcing subsections 1, 2 and 3 will avoid the constitutional pitfalls likely to be present in such enforcement. The usual way to control vehicular traffic at street intersections is by means of the erection of stop signs or, if they will not be effective, by the erection of traffic lights. There may well be factual situations in which the only reasonable way to meet the particular situation is by use of one of these usual methods and not by the attempted enforcement of subsections 1, 2 and 3, as such enforcement possibly would not effectuate the purpose of those subsections or be otherwise unreasonable. We should clearly indicate now that in this sensitive area of private property rights involving in many (if. not most) instances a person’s use and enjoyment of the land on which his home has been erected, this Court will examine with a critical eye, any enforcement of these subsections alleged to be unreasonable, arbitrary, capri-cious or discriminatory.
. The majority has most properly pointed out that the case at bar is readily distinguishable from the decision of this Court in- Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957), on which the chancellors below relied in sustaining subsections 4 and 5 of the Ordinance. As I am quite convinced, however, that Grant was erroneously decided and that we should, as soon as the occasion arises, overrule it, I cannot agree, with the statement in the majority opinion that “we reaffirm our holdings in Grant * * I cannot accept the legal theory .upon which the decision in Grant was based, i.e., that there is only a difference in degree between a zoning ordinance that restricts future uses and one that requires existing uses to stop *575after a reasonable time and that this reasonable time is to be determined by a “reasonable” period of “amortization” set out in the ordinance providing for the elimination of existing nonconforming uses. In my opinion, the difference is a fundamental difference in kind and the “amortization” principle cannot be applied to confiscate vested property rights without the payment of just compensation.
It may well be, of course, that the application of the “amortization” doctrine relied on in the Grant case will be limited to billboards only, as they “seem to occupy a category in and to themselves” as the majority points out was indicated in the dissent1 in Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N. Y. 2d 553, 571, 152 N. E. 2d 42, 52 (1958), and will not be applied to the *576usual private property rights in nonconforming uses. If not ultimately overruled competely, the decision in Grant should be so limited.
The difficulty is that the language of the opinion in Grant is so broad and the theory upon which it rests so appealing to those who apparently desire to eliminate nonconforming use “by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change” — to use the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 260 U. S. 393, 416, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160, 67 L. Ed. 322, 326 (1922), quoted in the majority opinion — that new applications of that language and of that theory are sought by legislative bodies which affect substantial and important private property rights. The case at bar is an excellent example of this very thing3 and I think it wise to file a caveat at this time to the correctness of the decision in Grant and its possible future application by this Court.
As the majority points out, substantially all of the decisions in regard to “amortization” appear in Grant, Harbison and 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 62 (1960) and it would not be appropriate to consider them in detail in this concurring opinion. The “dissenting” opinion (see Note 1) of Judge Van Voorhis in Harbison, however, so completely expresses my views on the impropriety of applying the “amortization” theory to destroy ultimately what I consider to be vested private property rights in nonconform*577ing uses, that I think it would be helpful to quote from that opinion. Judge Van Voorhis said:
“This citation of authority is enough to display the confusion into which this subject is becoming involved in some jurisdictions in consequence of departing from the established rule. The courts find themselves obliged, without any guiding principle, to pick and choose between instances where a prior non-conforming use will or will not be protected in the courts. It is generally implied in discussions of the subject that the sponsors of the zoning movement were merely temporizing with the courts by leading them in the beginning to hold that a prior use constituted a vested right. The facts in the cases cited, where there has been a departure from that rule, illustrate how impossible it would be to confine a ruling like the one in this case to a junk yard, or to determine judicially what would be a reasonable period of time for removal in a specific case within the meaning of the Constitution. * * *
“In practice this spells confusion, instability, inability to diagnose what are legal rights, inconsistency, arbitrariness and discrimination in administrative and court decisions, and an avalanche of litigation. That Pandora’s box is opened, regardless of the best possible intentions on the part of all concerned. Nor is the judgment appealed from an unwarranted interference by the courts in the province of the municipal legislature. It simply follows precedent from the beginning of zoning practice. The new rule has the additional infirmity that it opens wide new fields of discretion in administrative law without any workable standards by which it is to be guided.
“The lack of any principle in applying the novel theory of ‘amortization’ betrays a fundamental weakness in the theory. Zoning, like other public programs, is not always best administered at the hands of its enthusiasts. The existence of non-conforming uses has spoiled the symmetry in the minds of zoning experts. It has bulked so- large in this context that, desirable *578as the elimination of nonconforming uses may be, it has sometimes been presented as though it were more important than ordinary property rights. * * * The fault found with eminent domain is that it failed to achieve the object of destroying the owner’s right in his property without paying for it. Consequently the most promising legal theory at the moment is known as ‘amortization’. This- theory is discussed in some of the cases and in most of the law review articles which have been cited as upholding constitutionality of these measures. ‘Amortization’ is explained as follows: ‘ “The only positive method of getting rid of non-conforming uses yet devised is to amortize a non-conforming building. That 'is, to determine the normal useful remaining life of the building and prohibit the owner from maintaining it after the expiration of that time.” ’ The opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d at page 455, 274 P. 2d at page 41 adds: ‘The length of time given the owner to eliminate his nonconforming use or building varies with the city and with the type of structure.’
“This theory to justify extinguishing nonconforming uses means less the more one thinks about it. It offers little more promise of ultimate success than the other theories which have been tried and abandoned. In the first place, the periods of time vary so widely in the cases which have been cited from different States where it has been tried, and have so little relation to the useful lives of the structures, that this theory cannot be used to reconcile these discordant decisions. Moreover the term ‘amortization’, as thus employed, has not the same meaning which it carries in law or accounting. It is not even used by analogy. It is just a catch phrase, and the reasoning is reduced to argument by metaphor. Not only has no effort been made in the reported cases where this theory has been applied to determine what is the useful life of the structure, but almost all were decided under ordinances or statutes which prescribe the same time limit for *579many different kinds of improvements. This demonstrates that it is not attempted to measure the life of the particular building or type of building, and that the word ‘amortization’ is used as an empty shibboleth. This comment applies to the ordinance at issue on this appeal. There could be no presumption that all junk yards, all auto wrecking or dismantling establishments, and all improvements assessed for tax purposes at not more than $500 will or have any tendency to depreciate to zero in three years. This shows that the ordinance in suit could not possibly have been based on the amortization theory.
“Moreover this theory, if it were seriously advanced, would imply that the owner should not keep up his property by making necessary replacements to restore against the ravages of time. Such replacements would be money thrown away. The amortization theory would thus encourage owners of nonconforming uses to allow them to decay and become slums.” (Pages 52-54 of 152 N. E. 2d; pages 572-575 of 4 N. Y. 2d).
If there are any adequate answers to these observations, the adjudicated cases applying the “amortization” theory have not, in my opinion, yet expressed them. I have concluded that there are no such adequate answers.
. Although the opinon of Judge Van Voorhis of the New York Court of Appeals in the Harbison case is called a “dissenting” opinion, the fact is that there is no majority opinion in the Harbison case. The “opinion” of the Court by Judge Froessel was only concurred in by Judge Burke. Judges Desmond and Fuld only concurred in the result “upon the principles stated in People v. Miller, 304 N. Y. 105, 108, 109, 106 N. E. 2d 34, 35, 36 (1952).” These principles were that where there is an inconseqential nonconforming use which does not amount to a vested right (raising pigeons as a hobby was involved in Miller) and the deprivation of that use will not substantially affect the owner’s property rights in the use of his premises, the zoning ordinance prohibiting such a nonconforming use will be upheld. Chief Judge Conway and Judge Dye concurred with the opinion of Judge Van Voorhis, so that 3 of the 7 judges of the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the principles annunciated by Judge Van Voorhis, while only 2 of the 7 judges agreed with the principles set forth by Judge Froessel. It should also be pointed out that the result in the Harbison case was to reverse the Appellate Division, without costs, and to remand the case to the Special Term to take testimony relating to the nature of the surrounding neighborhood, the value and condition of the improvement on the premises, the nearest area to which th.e property owners might relocate their junk and cooperage yard, as well as any other reasonable costs which would bear on the kind and amount of damages which the owners might sustain and whether the owners might be able to continue operation of their business if not allowed to continue storage of barrels or steel drums outside their frame building. In other words, the remand was to determine if the ordinance was in fact unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious as applied to the owners in the particular case.
. Mr. Justice Holmes also made an observation in the Mahon case which is quite relevant: “The protection of private property-in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States.” (Page 415 of 260 U. S.; page 160 of 43 S. Ct.; page 326 of 67 L. Ed.).
. Even the learned chancellors below fell into error in trying to follow what they understood was the decision in the Grant case. It is small wonder that the members of legislative bodies and the holders of administrative offices may also fall into error.