concurring.
Appellant was indicted on two counts for the offenses of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. Tex. Penal Code Sections 22.021 and 21.11. Appellant waived a trial by jury. The court found appellant guilty of both charges and sentenced him to thirty years and twenty years imprisonment, respectively. Appellant’s conviction was affirmed by the Second Court of Appeals. Sledge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995).
This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to consider the following four grounds for review:
(1) Did the court of appeals err in holding Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.02 (1989) allows the State to convict a defendant based on an extraneous offense identified through a pretrial 404(b) motion?
(la) Did the court of appeals, sub silentio, extinguish the concept of extraneous offenses in the State of Texas?
(3) Did the court of appeals err in holding that article 21.02 takes precedence of Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution? (3a) Did the court of appeals err in holding that the petitioner’s due process rights were not violated when the petitioner’s convictions rest on unindicted extraneous acts?
In Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), we held that we shall defer to the court of appeals where its judgment is supported by the record evidence and it appears the court of appeals has discharged its duty “conscientiously by impartial application of pertinent legal doctrine and fair consideration of the evidence.... ” Arcila, supra, at 360. “This court should reserve its discretionary review prerogative, for the most part, to dispel any confusion generated in the past by our own case law, to reconcile settled differences between the various courts of appeals, and to promote the fair administration of justice by trial and appellate courts throughout Texas.” Arcila, supra, at 361, citing Tex.R.App.Proc. 200(b),(c); Degrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
An examination of the opinion of the court of appeals in the present case shows it to be in accord with our applicable case law and it applies the correct legal doctrine after a careful consideration of the evidence. Appellant does not aver it is in conflict with opinions of the other courts of appeal with respect to the issues presented. Accordingly, I would dismiss appellant’s petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted. However, because the Court has elected not to do so, I concur in the result for the reasons expressed herein.
The indictment alleged the offenses described therein occurred “on or about August 31, 1988.” Appellant filed a “request for notice of State’s intention to introduce evi-*258denee of other crimes, wrongs and acts.” At the hearing, the State alleged the conduct of appellant toward the victim had been continuous over a period of several years, though the indictment did not so allege. Appellant requested, at the hearing, that the State inform him of specific instances of conduct so as to enable him to prepare a defense.
In response, the State informed the court and appellant that it would not present evidence of any conduct that occurred on August 31, 1988. The State did inform appellant and the court it would present evidence that the acts alleged in the indictment occurred on two earlier occasions. The State also, in its Rule 404(b) notice, informed appellant of its intent to introduce evidence of other extraneous acts or offenses, i.e., conduct which occurred during the same criminal transaction as the charged offenses.
At the hearing, the State informed the trial judge that it would introduce evidence that appellant performed “on or about 1986-1987, in the defendant’s bedroom at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, anal penetration of R.C. with his penis, anal penetration of R.C. with his fingers.” The State also informed the court it would introduce evidence that appellant “on or about 1986, at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, while defendant forced R.C. to watch a pornographic movie, defendant forced R.C. to masturbate his penis, defendant penetrated the vagina of R.C. with his fingers, defendant forced R.C. to perform oral sex on him.” 1
The State, at the hearing, described, in considerable detail, the incidents referred to in the preceding paragraph.2 The trial court granted appellant a continuance of ten days to prepare for trial. Trial on the merits did not actually commence until more than six months after the hearing. Appellant’s implicit claims that he did not receive adequate notice to prepare his defense and that he was not given notice as to what acts of misconduct the State intended to prove up against him as its case in chief are thus without merit.
This Court has consistently held that the phrase “on or about” in an indictment puts the defendant on notice to prepare for proof that the alleged act or acts of criminal misconduct occurred within the applicable statute of limitations period. Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Scoggan v. State, 799 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Recently, in another child sexual assault case with facts similar to the present case, although the indictment alleged an offense occurring “on or about” a specific date, the appellant had engaged in a continuous course of criminal misconduct with the named victim over a period of several years (though all within the statute of limitations period). The evidence presented at trial did not establish specific dates on which the criminal misconduct occurred. This Court held, in effect, the language “on or about” contained in the indictment permits the State to prove the offense alleged in the indictment with evidence of acts of sexual misconduct involving the defendant and the named victim which occurred at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period (but occurring before the date of presentment of the indictment). Mireles v. State, 901 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (plurality op.).
Appellant received adequate notice of the charges against him so as to meet his due process right to be able to prepare an adequate defense.3 Indeed, unlike the appellant in Míreles, supra, appellant was given notice of what acts of misconduct the State would attempt to prove up against him. Further*259more, he was granted a ten-day continuance to prepare and trial itself did not commence until over six months after the hearing. Appellant does not demonstrate any notice deficiency, much less one that could have impacted his ability to prepare his defense. Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Finally, appellant does not offer a persuasive argument that Art. 21.02 conflicts with Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
With respect to appellant’s contention he was, in effect, convicted based on extraneous offenses, it is my opinion the incidents identified at the hearing were not extraneous offenses at all, but were part of a stream of continuous acts of criminal sexual misconduct with the victim named in the indictment. The State was free to present evidence of any specific instances of sexual misconduct involving appellant and the named victim that occurred within the statute of limitations period. The two specific instances of misconduct the State identified at the hearing that they would attempt to prove up at trial were properly alleged in the indictment, differing only in that the dates they allegedly occurred were antecedent to that alleged in the indictment. This difference, however, is immaterial. Míreles, supra.4
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
. The victim is referred to by her initials throughout this opinion.
. The indictment alleged that appellant, on or about the 31st day of August, 1988, did: Then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of R.C., a child younger than 14 years of age who was not the spouse of said defendant by inserting his finger into the female sexual organ of R.C.; Count Two: And it is further presented in and to said court that the said Roger Dale Sledge in the County of Tarrant and State aforesaid on or about the 31st day of August, 1988, did then and there intentionally, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of said defendant, engage in sexual contact by touching the breast of R.C., a child younger than 17 years and not the spouse of the defendant....
. The indictment meets the requisites of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.02, including the implicit notice requisite of Article 21.02, Section 6.
. It should be noted the State may well be unable, on double jeopardy grounds, to retry a defendant acquitted in a cause with facts similar to the present case where it elected to present evidence of one or more acts of criminal sexual misconduct (without specifically identifying them in advance of trial). The acquittal would, in effect, apply to all acts of criminal sexual misconduct involving the defendant and the same victim that occurred during the period prior to the date of presentment of the indictment. Should the State elect to proceed on one or more specified acts of misconduct (specified in advance via proper notice to the court and the defendant) and an acquittal results, the State may be able to reindict the defendant for the acts not so specified.