filed a dissenting opinion,
in which CORNYN, ENOCH and BAKER, Justices, join.Barely two months ago, we issued mandamus because a trial court lacked the power to enjoin a grievance committee proceeding. State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.1997). We held that a district court lacks such power because the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure do not authorize such equitable relief. Id. at 576; see also Board of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex.1994); State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (Tex.1972). Today, the Court allows a district court to enjoin the Board of Law Examiners from discharging its responsibility, despite the fact that the Board was not a party to any proceeding in that court. Because I believe that mandamus is warranted in this case, I dissent.
This original proceeding arises from Jack G. Neal’s attempts to regain his license to practice law. His license was suspended in 1977 and again in 1988. In 1985, he was disbarred after being convicted of felony abuse of office while he was district attorney. In 1995, he petitioned the trial court for reinstatement. Although the State Bar appeared in the proceeding, the Board of Law Examiners was not made a party or given notice. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition for reinstatement and found that Neal presently possessed good moral character and had lived a life of exemplary conduct for the previous five years. The trial court ordered (1) that Neal’s law license be reinstated upon his passing the bar examination, and (2) that “the Board of Law Examiners not make additional inquiry into the moral fitness or character of Petitioner, Jack G. Neal.”
A proceeding for reinstatement of a law license is initiated by serving a copy of the petition on the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State Bar and placing a classified announcement in the Texas Bar Journal. Tex.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 11.04. Rule 11.06 provides the terms of the judgment the trial court may render:
If the court is satisfied after hearing all the evidence, both in support and in opposition to the petition, that the material allegations of the petition are true and that the best interests of the public and the profession, as well as the ends of justice, will be served, the court may render judgment authorizing the petitioner to be reinstated upon his or her compliance ... with Rule II of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas.... The judgment shall direct the Board of Law Examiners to admit the petitioner to a regularly scheduled bar examination in accordance with that board’s rules and procedures relating to the examination of persons who have not previously been licensed as lawyers in Texas or in any other state. No Judgment of reinstatement may be rendered by default. If after hearing all the evidence the court determines that the petitioner is not eligible for reinstatement, the court may, in its discretion, either enter a judgment denying the petition or direct that the petition be held in abeyance for a reasonable period of time until the petitioner provides additional proof that he or she has satisfied the requirements of these rules. The court’s judgment may include such other orders as protecting the public and the petitioner’s potential clients may require.
Tex.R. DISCIPLINARY P. 11.06. This rule does not give the trial court the power to order reinstatement on the sole condition that Neal pass the bar examination, or to enjoin the Board from investigating Neal’s moral character. Therefore, under Jefferson and McFall, mandamus should issue to set aside that part of the trial court’s order.
The Court states that the rules exempt candidates for reinstatement from the investigation the Board conducts on candidates for admission to the Bar. The Court’s interpretation ignores the history of Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 11.06. Until 1994, that rule stated that the trial court may “render judgment authorizing the petitioner to be reinstated upon his or her passing a bar examination....” Tex.R. Disciplinary P. 11.06 (amended 1994). In 1994, we amended Rule 11.06 to provide that a judgment may authorize reinstatement upon the petitioner’s “compliance within eighteen *232months ... with Rule II [of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar].” Rule II details the general eligibility requirements for admission to the Texas Bar, such as age, character and fitness, law study, and citizenship status, in addition to passing the bar examination. Rules Governing Admission to the Bar op Tex. 11(a) (1992). Under the 1994 amendment to Disciplinary Rule 11.06, a petitioner for reinstatement is now subject to the same requirements as anyone else seeking a license. Under Admission Rule IV, no one is “eligible for admission to the Texas Bar ... until the investigation of such person’s moral character and fitness has been completed, and it has been determined by the Board [of Law Examiners] that such individual possesses good moral character and fitness.” Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Tex. IV(a) (1992). Thus, a trial court’s finding of fact—that a petitioner for reinstatement possesses good character— does not exempt the petitioner from the Board’s investigation. To hold otherwise renders the 1994 amendment a nullity. It would result in inconsistent readmission standards from district to district. Disciplinary Rule 11.06 does not authorize a judgment exempting one seeking reinstatement from any of the requirements of Admission Rule II.
The Court argues that the rules could not possibly mean that two different institutions are empowered to inquire whether a disbarred attorney has sufficiently reformed to entrust him with a law license. The Court gives res judicata effect to the district court’s finding of good character on the date of judgment, as if good character were an immutable trait to be decided once and for all time. Under the Court’s reasoning, a lawyer with the district court’s stamp of good character could thereafter confess to the most heinous of crimes, and the Board of Law Examiners would have to let him sit for the bar exam. If he passes, our Clerk would have to give him his license. I would think the court would find it a comfort, rather than an anomaly, that the rules provide for checking and rechecking a disbarred lawyer’s character before setting him loose on the public.
Moreover, the Board did not receive notice of proceedings that could result in affirmative relief granted against it in the form of an injunction. Rule 11.06 does not purport to give the trial court jurisdiction over the Board for all purposes. Nor were the Board’s interests represented by the presence of the State Bar in the proceeding. The Board and the State Bar are separate entities with distinctly different interests. Section 82.004 of the Texas Government Code makes the Board the administrative body to “determine the eligibility of candidates for examination for a license to practice law in this state.” Additionally, Section 81.061 of the Texas Government Code expressly withholds from the State Bar the authority to “regulate or administer ... admission standards.” The State Bar’s appearance in the reinstatement hearing did not represent the interests of the Board.
Therefore, the trial court did not have the power to enjoin the Board, which was never a party to the proceeding. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 124 (“In no case shall judgment be rendered against any defendant unless upon service, or acceptance or waiver of process, or upon an appearance by the defendant, as prescribed in these rules, except where otherwise expressly provided by law or these rules.”); Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.1991) (judgment against one not a party to suit is error which may be raised for the first time on appeal).
The Court’s misinterpretation of the rules is contrary to their plain meaning and advances only bad policy. I therefore dissent.