dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate judgment and grant a new trial on the basis of improprieties in the district attorney’s closing remarks.
In spite of an agreement by the court and both the prosecution and defense counsel that the closing arguments be transcribed in their entirety and that objections be reserved until the addresses were concluded, Mr. Lee’s counsel interrupted the district attorney’s closing at least fifteen times, joined by co-defendants’ counsel. The trial judge repeatedly acquiesced in counsels’ requests for cautionary instructions and directions to the district attorney to be more careful in his statements. On at least five occasions counsel voiced suspicion that the prosecuting attorney was attempting to encourage the defense to request a mistrial. However, at no time did defense counsel make such a request. Appellant Lee’s counsel specifically stated:
“It is my opinion that Mr. Geary is trying to force us to ask for a mistrial in this case . . . . The defendants have invested much time and money in the defense of this case. We would like it to go to the Jury to have it adjudicated one way or the other.” (NT 470a-71a) (emphasis added).
*576If the prosecutor had engaged in intentional or grossly negligent misconduct and a mistrial would have been granted on appellants’ motion, double jeopardy would bar reprosecution. Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977). Still, although appellants maintain on appeal that the prosecutor engaged in intentional misconduct to necessitate a mistrial, they failed to request one. Instead, the defense took a chance on acquittal. “ ‘A party may not remain silent and take chances on a verdict and afterwards complain of matters which, if erroneous, the court would have corrected.’ ” Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 382, 305 A.2d 14, 16 (1973), quoting Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 455, 192 A.2d 693, 702 (1963).
In Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 Pa. 512, 359 A.2d 393 (1976), our supreme court held that where an objection to improprieties in the prosecution’s summation was sustained, counsel’s failure to request a mistrial or curative instructions rendered those alleged errors waived on appeal. The court found that “Brown ha[d] been granted all that he had requested.” Id., 467 Pa. at 518, 359 A.2d at 396 (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Glenn, 459 Pa. 545, 330 A.2d 535 (1974). In my view, this case is directly controlled by Brown.
Once an objection is sustained by the trial court, it is the responsibility of the objecting party to request specific relief by way of cautionary instructions or a mistrial (See Pa.R. Crim.P. 1118(b)), if he so desires. If cautionary instructions are deemed unsatisfactory, the aggrieved party must again object and suggest correction or elaboration. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 475 Pa. 331, 380 A.2d 747 (1977). If one believes cautionary instructions would reinforce objectionable matter in the jurors’ minds, he may elect against them. Similarly, there are cases, such as the present one, in which one may not wish to terminate a case before it goes to the jury. Such is the option of the objector. Necessarily, once that choice is made in the lower court, a contrary position may not be asserted on appeal. Thus, it is my opinion that appellants have waived the issue of the alleged improprieties, and that they are now without a remedy.
*577I have reviewed the other issues raised by appellants and find them to be without merit. I would therefore affirm the judgments of sentence.
VAN der YOORT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.