concurring.
“As a general rule, in criminal cases the accused can be convicted, if at all, only by evidence that shows that he is guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, evidence that he has committed other crimes that are remote and wholly disconnected from the offense with which he is charged is ordinarily inadmissible .... ” 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 194, p. 294; Young v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 164, 261 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1953).
*235There are exceptions to this general rule. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr. App.1972); 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 195, p. 300. One exception is that evidence of an extraneous offense may be admissible to refute a defensive theory raised by the accused. Albrecht v. State, supra. When a defendant raises the defensive theory of alibi, he places his identity in issue. Jones v. State, 587 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Owens v. State, 450 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Once the issue of identity is raised, evidence of an extraneous offense may become admissible. “It must be remembered, however, that even though evidence of another crime may be relevant to the instant proceeding, such evidence should not be admitted unless the commission of the other crime is clearly proved and the accused is shown to have been its perpetrator.” 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 195, p. 300. Further, the extraneous offense is admissible on the issue of identity only, in addition to the above requirements, if there are some distinguishing characteristics common to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial. Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The question presented in the instant case is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense on the issue of identity.
The State offered evidence of the attempted aggravated rape as charged in the indictment. T_ H_, an A & M University student, testified that about 5 p.m. on March 31, 1979 she was working alone in a garden in the back yard of the house where she lived at 706 Park Place in College Station. She related appellant approached her and asked to use her telephone as his car had broken down. She gave a description of his clothing and noted he wore sunglasses. Appellant followed her into the house, pulled a knife and ordered her into the bedroom. He tried to pull down her pants. A struggle ensued, and T_H_screamed, grabbed at the knife, and the appellant left the house. She clearly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.
The appellant offered evidence of alibi— that at the time of the offense he was playing cards and watching games at Willie Idelburd’s place.
The State, contending that identity had thus been called into issue, offered an extraneous offense on the issue.
E_ S_, an A & M University student, testified she lived at the Casa Del Sol Apartments, No. 1402, in College Station. On March 26,1979, about 9 p.m., she was alone in the laundromat of the apartment complex. The appellant entered the laundromat wearing sunglasses and with a broken beer bottle and forced her from the building into a field. From there he forced her to a nearby lawyer's office and into an enclosed walkway. There he raped her. E_S-made a positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.
The majority and the dissent do not disagree as to the general rule prohibiting the use of extraneous offenses, nor the exception to such rule, where the defensive theory of alibi places identity in issue. Each conclude the issue of identity was raised in the instant case by appellant’s alibi defense authorizing the use of an extraneous offense if it were otherwise admissible. Each seem to agree that the evidence shows that appellant was the perpetrator of both offenses. They disagree over whether there were sufficient distinguishing characteristics common to both offenses to authorize the admission of the extraneous offense.
It is observed that the offenses occurred within five days of each other in the city of College Station, Brazos County. Each victim was a white A & M coed and the assailant in each case was a black man wearing sunglasses who was identified by each victim as the appellant. Each of the victims were alone at the time at or near the place they resided when the offenses occurred. The victim in the instant case was in the yard of her house. About 5 p.m. she was lured into the house by the ruse of appellant’s need for a telephone. There he placed a knife to her throat and attempted *236to rape her. The victim in the extraneous offense was in the laundromat of the apartment complex at 9 p.m. With a broken beer bottle he forced her into a field and then into an enclosed walkway near a lawyer’s office where he raped her. In both incidents the appellant used a sharp object to the throat of the victim to enforce his demands.
The dissent, in concluding there were not sufficient distinguishing characteristics common to both offenses to make the extraneous offense admissible, notes the instant offense was in broad daylight at 5 p.m. while the extraneous offense was after dark at 9 p.m. Unless one has an obsession with B-grade horror movies of the 1930’s and 1940’s where the phantom strikes only at the stroke of midnight, he knows the stalking rapist often bides his time until he knows his chosen victim is alone, whether it is 5 p.m., 9 p.m. or any other hour of the day or night. The dissent seems to indicate a lack of similarity because in the instant case the offense occurred inside the house while in the extraneous offense the victim was forced to an outside location. The dissent overlooks the extraneous offense was eventually committed in an enclosed area, and overlooks that it was detection that the appellant sought to evade in both cases. If he had attacked the victim in the instant case in her yard at 5 p.m. in the daylight, he might have been observed. Likewise, in the extraneous offense if he had stayed in the laundry room he might have been interrupted by other apartment complex residents. By going out into the dark he sought to avoid observation. The evasion was present in both cases.
The dissent contends that there “is no evidence that the two offenses were committed in the same neighborhood,” but does not define what it means by “neighborhood.” Surely the dissent does not contend that an extraneous offense can never be admissible unless committed in the same neighborhood as the instant or primary offense. Proximity in time and place may be a factor, but it must be considered along with the other facts and circumstances. Here the offenses occurred in the same city and county at 706 Park Place and near the Casa Del Sol Apartments. Both victims were A & M coeds. After hearing the evidence, the local district judge stated they occurred in the same neighborhood.
The dissent also relies on the fact that the kind of sunglasses worn on both occasions were not shown by the record. If the victims were experts and could have testified that the sunglasses were Ray-Ban, Christian Dior or Brand X, this would have been desirable, but this does not detract from the fact that the assailant in each case, identified as appellant, wore sunglasses in an apparent effort at disguise or to make identification more difficult.
The dissent acknowledges that a sharp instrument was placed to the victims’ throats, but notes one was a knife and another was a broken beer bottle. This the dissent claims is “less similar” than two pistols. While this may be so, it does bear on the common mode of the commission of the offenses. A person prone to commit a certain type of an offense may resort to whatever weapons are available at the time.
Considering the proximity of time and place, the mode of the commission of the offenses and the other similarities, I would conclude that there were distinguishing characteristics common to both offenses, and that this along with identification of appellant as the perpetrator of both offenses authorized the admission of the extraneous offense on the issue of identity.
It is further observed that the court in its charge limited the use of extraneous offenses to the issue of identity.
I concur in the result reached.