dissenting:
The majority has accurately and properly highlighted a problem area in our recent decisions concerning the right of the Commonwealth to appeal adverse rulings of pre-trial orders suppressing evidence. It is clear that the Commonwealth may only appeal such an order when the appeal involves a pure question of law and the order has effectively terminated or substantially handicapped the prosecution. The statement of the law, however, is much easier than its application, as demonstrated by our recent decisions.
I cannot, however, accept the “little pushing and pulling” engaged in by the majority in its commendable effort to resolve this problem.
In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), it was stated:
“An appellate review of the validity of the order of suppression cannot harm the defendant whereas the denial of the right to such review does harm the Commonwealth.” Id., 411 Pa. at 64, 190 A.2d at 308.
In Commonwealth v. Deren, 233 Pa.Super. 373, 337 A.2d 600 (1975), in writing for the majority, I stated:
“We interpret this to mean that any time the Commonwealth alleges that its case will be either terminated and *13concluded or substantially prejudiced by a suppression order, we must review the suppression order only on its merits. Stated another way, when the District Attorney from one of the counties of this Commonwealth directs an appeal from the suppression of evidence, we must accept such an appeal as the Commonwealth’s good faith certification that the case will be terminated or substantially prejudiced by such an order, and determine only if the suppression was proper.
To apply any other test could permanently exclude evidence even if it was improperly suppressed. Such a result is contrary to our function in this matter, which is to ascertain that all evidence received is proper and to insure that the rights of all parties are protected. The District Attorney, representing the people of this Commonwealth, and he alone, has the right and duty to present the Commonwealth’s case with all the legally available evidence that he, in his judgment, believes to be substantially necessary to the case.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Rose, 211 Pa.Super. 295, 235 A.2d 462 (1967), the Commonwealth appealed a suppression order and Judge Jacobs, writing for the majority, stated: ‘[sjince appellee has not filed a motion to quash, we will assume that the suppression order will substantially handicap the commonwealth and hear the appeal.’ 211 Pa.Super. at 296, 235 A.2d at 463. When we are correctly willing to assume substantial prejudice we must also be willing to accept the Commonwealth’s stated position that it will be substantially prejudiced by the suppression order.” 233 Pa.Super. at 377-78, 337 A.2d at 602.
I see no reason to abandon that position now since, in my opinion, it clearly and positively solves the problem and, absent evidence that the District Attorneys of this Commonwealth are abusing this reliance upon their good faith certification, seems a logical test, simple in its application.
In addition, the “compromise” suggested by the majority is in fact merely a shifting of the dispute. I am certain that, *14under the majority’s holding, the disputes and divisions will continue over whether or not the proposed statement in the Commonwealth’s brief satisfies the test of Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra.
Turning to the merits, as I believe we must, I would reverse the suppression order of the lower court.
The issue presented, a pure question of law, is novel, and I have been unable to find any appellate decisions dealing with the problem.
Ross Township and Shaler Township are adjacent municipalities in Allegheny County. A police officer of Ross Township, in the course of his duties, discovered evidence indicating the existence of a gambling operation in Shaler Township. The Ross Township policeman applied for and was issued a search warrant by a Shaler Township magistrate for the search of premises in Shaler Township. The search warrant was properly executed by Shaler Township policemen accompanied by the Ross Township policeman.
The sole question involved is the authority of the Ross Township policeman to serve as the affiant on the warrant and to have the warrant issued to him. The application reveals that the police officer of Ross Township signed as the affiant and in the space indicated for “address of private affiant” gave an address. There is no indication that the affiant was acting as . a police officer in so applying, although the probable cause section does reveal that the affiant’s police activities formed the basis for the request and that a part of the investigation was conducted within the boundaries of Shaler Township.
I am aware of no authority for the proposition that only police officers may secure search warrants, nor am I aware of any limitation by municipal residence of the affiant on the validity of an affidavit, whether made by a policeman or a private citizen. The execution of a search warrant, of course, must be by law enforcement officials within their jurisdiction, as the warrant here involved was executed! It seems to me only reasonable and logical that an officer *15investigating a crime in his jurisdiction who comes upon proper probable cause for a warrant in another jurisdiction can seek, secure on his own affidavit, and execute a warrant in another jurisdiction so long as he is accompanied and supported by local law enforcement officers acting within their proper jurisdictional limits.
I would reverse the order of the lower court and remand for trial.
VAN der VOORT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.