dissenting:
On April 17, 1975, local police, armed with a warrant, entered and searched appellant’s dormitory room in Holy Cross Hall, King’s College, Wilkes-Barre. They found 69.9 grams of marihuana, and on the basis of this evidence, *439appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance 1 and sentenced to a two year term of probation.2
The police officer’s affidavit of probable cause in the application for the warrant stated:
On 4/17/75 the above affiant received certain information from a confidential informant which is the basis of the probable cause for the issuance of this search warrant, a search warrant for the person and premises of Richard Forster located at 133 N. Franklin St., Wilkes-Barre, Pa. room 720, Holy Cross Hall. On April 15, 1975 on the Kings College Campus the informant observed Richard Forster hand to a W/F age approx 19, approx 5'5", long blond hair, heavy set, a tin foil packet in exchange for $15.00. During the transaction the informant overheard Richard say that it was good T.H.C.3 and that he still had an ounce left. The informant approached the girl when Richard left and stated that the informant was interested in buying some T.H.C. however could not remember the name of the fellow she had just bought from, and she stated “Oh that was Richard Forster and that he was at room 720.” The informant later pointed Richard out to the affiant. I verily believe that the informant is very reliable and the information received is true and correct, because information received in the past from this informant has led to the arrest and subsequent convictions of certain individuals on 6/5/74 R.B., 6/11/74 J.M., 9/18/74 J.K., and 10/15/74 J.L.J. Sworn to (or affirmed) and subscribed to before me this date 4/17/75—
Appellant contends that this statement is insufficient to show probable cause, and that his pre-trial motion to suppress should therefore have been granted. Spinelli v. Unit*440ed States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). Specifically, he contends that the facts set forth in the officer’s affidavit were insufficient to support an independent judgment by the issuing authority that appellant probably had contraband in his dormitory room. Cf. Commonwealth v. Scavincky, 240 Pa.Super. 550, 359 A.2d 449 (1976).
Appellant’s contention must be decided by reference to two cases recently decided by this court: Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 Pa.Super. 12, 335 A.2d 361 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Frye, 242 Pa.Super. 144, 363 A.2d 1201 (1976).
In Kline the issue, as here, was whether there was probable cause to believe there were drugs at the place to be searched. The police in Kline had received information from three informants. Two of the informants were young girls who had purchased drugs from one Morgan Arthur; they said that Arthur had gone to his apartment and returned with drugs.4 The third informant was a confidential informant who said that he had seen Arthur and an associate selling drugs during a two week period; he confirmed the address given the police by the two girls as Arthur’s residence. We held the recitation in the affidavit insufficient to show probable cause to believe that drugs were being kept at the apartment. While the informants’ statements did show that Arthur was a drug dealer, there was no factual support for the girls’ conclusion that Arthur had gone to his apartment to pick up drugs. The confidential informant’s statement also failed to tie Arthur’s apartment in with his drug business. Since “[pjrobable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home,” 234 Pa.Super. at 17, 335 A.2d at 364, the issuing authority erred in issuing the warrant; we therefore affirmed the suppression order of the lower court.
*441In Frye we faced the issue once again. There a confidential informant told the police that he had seen Frye sell to a third party a kilo brick of marihuana, and that Frye had said to the third party that if he wanted more “to call him after 10:30 p. m., 2-22-85 and no later than 1:30 a. m. 2-23-75 because this would be the best hours to catch him at home because he would be out taking care of business.” In approving the warrant, the majority in Frye acknowledged Kline, but distinguished it, stating that “the nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched was provided by Frye’s admission that he was conducting at least part of his unlawful operations from his home.” 242 Pa.Super. at 149, 363 A.2d at 1204.
While the question is close, the present case is more like Kline than Frye. Here, unlike in Frye, there was no reference by appellant, however indirect, to his dormitory room. It was the purchaser who told the informant the number of appellant’s room, and that was only in response to the informant’s query regarding appellant’s identity. In this respect, indeed, the affidavit is even weaker than the affidavit in Kline, for there the police had been told by the purchasers, not simply the dealer’s home address, but that the dealer had gone to his home to pick up the drugs.
Granted, the facts set forth in the affidavit made out probable cause to believe that appellant had sold marihuana, and had more marihuana for sale. But on the crucial question — where was the marihuana? — there was nothing. It might be in appellant’s room; it might just as easily be in his automobile, or gym locker, or somewhere else on campus.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, § 1 eí seq.; as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113 (1977 Supp.).
. By order of Dec. 30, 1975, the term was reduced to one year.
. “T.H.C.” is a reference to tetrahydrocannabinol, the intoxicating agent in marihuana.
. The premises searched in Kline were Arthur’s apartment; Kline was there when the warrant was served.