concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority as to their disposition in No. 00173 Philadelphia, 1984 (Frank and Theresa Alice) and in 1051 Philadelphia, 1982 (Francis and Elizabeth Morgan). I respectfully dissent only as to the majority’s disposition in No. 00972 Philadelphia, 1984.
I believe this case to be controlled by our en banc decision in Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa.Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984). In Cathcart we found “... that there was [a] sufficient basis for the lower court’s determination of when the statute of limitations began to run ... [and that there was] no question of fact which would [require] a jury’s resolution.” Id., 324 Pa.Super. at 146, 471 A.2d at 505. I believe the same to be true in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in appellant, Bagian’s case.
In Cathcart, we stated: “whether the statute of limitations has run on a claim is usually a question of law for the judge; however, at times, a factual determination by the jury may be required.” Id., 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 140, 471 A.2d 502 (emphasis added). The majority states in its opinion that “... whether a plaintiff has exercised due diligence in discovering an injury and its cause is usually a jury question.” Maj.Op. at 62 citing DeMartino v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 313 Pa.Super. 492, 510, 460 A.2d 295, 299 (1983). I do not believe this to be the best statement of the law in asbestos related cases as this position effectively undermines this court’s decision in Cathcart.1 The majority’s position would allow an asbestos injured plaintiff, who raises the issue of due diligence in *71discovering his injury and its cause, to usually be entitled to a jury resolution of that issue. A jury resolution of due diligence would effectively determine whether plaintiff complied with the statute of limitations. I believe this is contrary to Cathcart’s express intention to leave the question of compliance with the statute usually in the hands of the judge.2
Our review of this case, as in Cathcart, involved whether there was a sufficient basis for the lower court to determine when the statute began to run, and/or whether there was a question of fact which required a jury resolution. Cathcart. Id. I conclude that there was a sufficient basis for the trial court to determine that Mr. Bagian knew or reasonably should have known that he was injured and that his injuries were caused by another party’s conduct before October of 1977.3 Consequently, I conclude that there was no issue of fact requiring a jury resolution. Id.
Crucial to my conclusion is Mr. Bagian’s receipt of his medical report from the Navy Shipyard Infirmary following his physical examination. This report listed as a significant finding, “LOCALIZED PLEURAL THICKENING IN THE RIGHT HEMOTHORAX.” While Mr. Bagian testified that he did not pay much attention to this report and that he *72thought nothing was wrong, he admitted that he looked at the report. Accordingly, I believe he was charged with the knowledge of his injury as of the date of the receipt of this report: June, 1972. I reached this conclusion even in light of the stringent requirements needed to grant summary judgment.4 Even granting all favorable inferences to plaintiff as the moving party, it is beyond dispute that plaintiff reviewed this document which highlighted his injury. It is also beyond dispute that plaintiff resorted to unusual methods to obtain this document. As the lower court recounted, the plaintiff created a fictitious doctor to obtain his medical report:
*73In 1972, however, the plaintiff engaged in an intricate subterfuge to discover the results of a “medical exam [he] had at the Navy Yard.” N.T. at 54. Because “[t]hey don’t want to tell you anything if you don’t have a doctor,” N.T. at 53, the plaintiff requested that the results of his annual Personnel Health Inventory at the Philadelphia Naval Yard be sent to a fictitious “Dr. Sardarian.” There was no Dr. Sardarian; in reality, the medical report was sent to the plaintiff’s brother-in-law. The plaintiff admitted on questioning that his brother-in-law subsequently gave the plaintiff this report and that the plaintiff read it. The letter from J. Caruso, Capt. MC., U.S.N. to “Dr. Sardarian” dated June 27, 1972 was attached to the deposition as an exhibit. N.T. at 53-55, 67-68. Under the hearing “significant findings,” it stated: “CHEST X-RAY: LOCALIZED PLEURAL THICKENING IN THE RIGHT HEMITHORAX.” The defendant denied that he ever showed this report to anyone else while conceding that his two sons were physicians. N.T. at 53, 67. (Lower Court Op. at 4-5).
Additionally, it is not an issue that the plaintiff knew he was working with asbestos as early as 1941; that he was aware of the dangers of working with asbestos by 1971; and that he was aware that the deaths of several Navy Yard workers were related to “... breathing that damn junk all these years....” Plaintiff was also told in 1971 that exposure to asbestos “caused asbestosis, which frequently or sometimes developed into mesothelioma or some cancer or something.” I believe plaintiff’s receipt of the medical report, combined with the environment in which he worked, put him on notice of his injury. Furthermore, plaintiff had a duty to “diligently investigate the facts upon which a potential action [could be based].” Pocono International Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 84, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983). Accordingly, under Cathcart plaintiff clearly knew, or reasonably should have known, that he was injured. As to Mr. Bagian’s knowledge *74that his injury was caused by another’s conduct, Cathcart, supra, the lower court stated:
The second prong of the Cathcart test requires that the plaintiff know, or reasonably should have known, that his injury was caused by another party’s conduct. Since the plaintiff sought the medical report of an x-ray which had been taken at his work place, the Navy Yard, he obviously suspected that he had been injured through the conduct of his employers and/or those who manufactured and supplied the material with which he worked. See N.T. at 54. This conclusion is inescapable in light of the chronology outlined by the plaintiff in his deposition concerning precautions then taken at his work place to safeguard workers from asbestos exposure. In the deposition, the plaintiff stated that it was in 1971 that he first became aware of the danger of asbestos through the deaths of fellow pipe coverers and through the precautions taken at his work place to limit exposure to asbestos. A year later, according to the plaintiff’s testimony, he sought information as to results of his own chest x-ray and then learned that it revealed pleural thickening. Armed with this information, he reasonably knew or should have known “that his injury was caused by another party’s conduct.” (Lower Court Op. at 13, 14).
I believe the lower court had a sufficient basis to conclude that there was no genuine issue as to whether Bagian should have known that his pleural thickening was an injury and that it was caused by exposure to asbestos prior to Dr. Paisley’s diagnosis in November, 1977.
In concluding that the statute of limitations, combined with our decision in Cathcart, preclude plaintiff’s cause of action, I emphasize the important policy concerns connected with the statute. In Gravinese v. Johns-Manville Corp., 324 Pa.Super. 432, 471 A.2d 1233 (1984) this court stated:
Statute of limitations are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to human *75affairs. An important public policy lies at their foundation. They stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time is constantly destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which renders proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extended to the limit prescribed, is itself a conclusive bar. The bane and anecdote go together.
Schmucker v. Naugle, 426 Pa. 203, 205-206, 231 A.2d 121, 123 (1967), quoting United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 43 S.Ct. 100, 102, 67 L.Ed. 261 (1922). See also Insurance Co. of North America v. Carnahan, 446 Pa. 48, 284 A.2d 728 (1971). Accordingly, I would affirm the lower court’s decision, and respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition on this matter.
. I note that Cathcart involved a factual scenario considerably more appertinent to the case before us than DeMartino. Cathcart involved *71this court’s review of a grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff in an asbestos case. DeMartino involved this court’s review of a grant of summary judgment in a dental malpractice case. Accordingly, I believe this court’s statements as to summary judgment in Cathcart are better authority for the case we are reviewing than those found in DeMartino.
. This is not to imply that Cathcart disregards the issue of due diligence. However, I believe that Cathcart’s intent was to incorporate the issue of due diligence within its "reasonably should know” standard, thus leaving this matter usually within the judge’s responsibilities. Cathcart held that the statute begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been: (1) injured; (2) by the cause of another party’s conduct. Id., 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 136-37, 471 A.2d at 500.
. Plaintiff brought his cause of action against defendant in October of 1979. Accordingly, with the two year statute of limitations, if plaintiff was on notice of his injury and that his injury was caused by another prior to October of 1977, his cause of action would be barred by the statute of limitations.
. The requirements for summary judgment are significant:
Ordinarily, summary judgment should only be entered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035. And see Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970); Bollinger v. Palmerton Area Com. Endeavor, Inc., 241 Pa.Superior Ct. 341, 361 A.2d 676 (1976). Furthermore, summary judgment is only proper in cases which are clear and free from doubt as to the existence of a disputed factual question. See Mallesky v. Stevens, 427 Pa. 352, 235 A.2d 154 (1967); Toth v. Philadelphia, 213 Pa. Superior Ct. 282, 247 A.2d 629 (1968). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party’s pleadings, as well as admissions on file, giving to them the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Hankin v. Mintz, 276 Pa.Superior Ct. 538, 419 A.2d 588 (1980); Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, Inc., 219 Pa.Superior Ct. 198, 280 A.2d 570 (1971). The record as a whole should be examined in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue about a material fact must be resolved in that party’s favor, that is, against the entry of summary judgment. See Bowman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 Pa.Superior Ct. 530, 369 A.2d 754 (1976); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 234 Pa.Superior Ct. 452, 341 A.2d 174 (1975); Schacter v. Albert, 212 Pa.Superior Ct. 58, 239 A.2d 841 (1968). And see Hankin v. Mintz, supra; Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, Inc., supra. In disposing of such a motion the court’s function is not to decide issues of fact, but solely to determine whether there are material issues of fact to be decided. See Hankin v. Mintz, supra; Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, Inc., supra.
Woytek v. Benjamin Coal Co., 300 Pa.Super. 397, 404-05, 446 A.2d 914, 917-18 (1982), quoting Community Services of Clearfield, Inc. v. Local 2665, American Federal of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 292 Pa.Super. 238, 242, 437 A.2d 23, 25 (1981).