Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Blatt :I regret that I must dissent.
I agree with the majority’s initial conclusion that, absent proper notice to the appellant of the temporary nature of the appointment, his promotion did not qualify as temporary under Rule XII of the Civil Service Regulations of the City of Scranton (Civil Service Regulations) and was, therefore, permanent in nature.
*265The affairs of the City of Scranton, however, are governed by a home rule charter adopted subsequent to our decision in Wolkoff v. Owens, 12 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 74, 314 A.2d 545 (1974). As noted by the lower court, Scranton, as a home rule charter community, is consequently no longer governed by state legislation otherwise applicable to Second Class A cities and may, pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, now exercise any power or perform any function not denied by the State Constitution, by the city’s home rule charter or by the General Assembly, Murray v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 509, 394 A.2d 1055 (1978). The city, therefore, may not enact any ordinance which is inconsistent with any previously enacted statute which affects the rights, benefits or working conditions of any employee of a .political subdivision. Section 302(b) of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, Act of April 13, 1972, as amended, 53 P.S. §1-302 (b). So, in matters concerning city employees, I believe that the Second Class A City Law, Act of April 11, 1931, P.L. 38, as amended, 53 P.S. §30471, would apply to Scranton only in the absence of a home rule charter or, in the presence of a charter, if the charter contained a provision inconsistent with a prior state statute. See Murray v. City of Wilkes-Barre, supra.
Article 8, Section 801 of the Home Rule Charter of the City of Scranton protects the rights of individuals who have been promoted to positions in the city service not to be removed from those positions except for just cause, but removal from an existing position is not synonomous with abolition of the position. That is to say that, under Scranton’s home rule charter, in the absence of just cause, an employee cannot be removed except for just cause from a position as long as the position continues to exist. This proscription, how*266ever, does not prohibit the city from abolishing an existing position, as is recognized by the provisions of Rule XIII of the city’s Civil Service Regulations which establishes procedures to be followed “[whenever any permanent position in the Competitive Class is abolished or made unnecessary.”
The right of municipalities to abolish positions for economic reasons has been long recognized, of course, Borough of Canonsburg v. Flood, 36 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 81, 387 A.2d 951 (1978) and a hearing is not required where a police officer is affected by a reduction in the size of the police department undertaken for reasons of economy. Almy v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 46, 416 A.2d 638 (1980).
It seems to me that there is no longer a position here to which a legal entitlement exists and, therefore, no position to which the claimant can compel his reinstatement. Consequently, a hearing prior to reversion to his previous rank would be unavailing. Mamallis v. Millbourne Borough, 401 Pa. 375, 164 A.2d 209 (1960).
Furthermore, the appellees contend that the appellant’s appointment was invalid because it was made in violation of the examination and grading procedures set forth in the city’s Civil Service Regulations, a question which the lower court, having determined the appointment to be temporary, declined to address and which the majority, now having found the position to be permanent, has failed to decide.
Rule II, No. 2 of the city’s Civil Service Regulations provides that:
No appointing officer shall appoint, promote or employ any subordinate officer or employee in the Classified Service, or in any way change the official status of any such officer or employee, *267except in. accordance with these rules and no such appointment, promotion, employment or change of status made in contravention of any provision of these rules shall be valid.
In view of the controlling nature of.the city’s Civil Service Regulations, it appears to me that, once the majority has determined the appointment to have been a permanent one, it should remand the matter to the court below for a determination as to whether or not the appointment was validly made. Although the claimant cannot seek reinstatement to Grade 9, inasmuch as that position no longer exists, he can assert a right to promotion to the position of Captain Grade 7, but only if his original promotion was made by means of a valid appointment to a permanent position. Radosti v. Township of Lower Makefield, 30 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 297, 373 A.2d 1156 (1977).