On Petition to Reheae..
Counsel for the relator have filed an exhaustive petition to rehear, complaining of numerous errors in the Court’s opinion, as well as misapprehension as to petitioner’s contentions.
With due regard to the insistence of petitioner, we did not misconstrue Code Section 2340.1 as applicable to the primary issue involved. O'ur construction of the words “now or hereafter employed”, appearing in Code Section 2345.3 is made the subject of further argument by petitioner that the Tenure Act shold be given a retroactive effect. We concede that the issue is debatable but cannot agree that our conclusion was incorrect in the light of what we consider controlling authority, and more especially Brown v. Newman, Tenn. App., 282 S. W. (2d) 677.
Another alleged ground for rehearing is that the Court was in error in citing cases as relied on by petitioner, to wit, State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 184 S. W. (2d) 366, and Dowlen v. Fitch, 196 Tenn. 206, 264 S. W. (2d) 824, 41 A. L. R. (2d) 791, such cases being cited by the defendant Board of Education. While the opinion erroneously recites that the foregoing eases were “cited by appellant” (petitioner here), it is manifestly an error in dictation. They clearly support the view of the respondent Board of Education that the Act should be given a prospective rather than a retroactive construction. This error consists of using the wrong word in dictating the opinion, which clearly appears by a cursory examination of the text.
*266■ It is insisted that we should not follow onr decision in State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore,■ snpra, because “the statute was intended to cover a class of teachers entitled to the benefits conferred by the Act.” In support of the contention, which is a reargument of the determinative ■legal question, counsel again rely upon cases from foreign ■jurisdictions, and especially that of Andrews v. Union Parish School Board, La. App. 1938, 184 So. 574. The petitioner’s counsel then proceed to discuss certain cases, which were cited in the original opinion as supporting a prospective construction of an alleged Tenure Act, Montgomery v. Board of Education of Los Angeles,-137 \Cal. App. -668, 31 P. (2d) 243, and others, and attempts to distinguish them from-the Tenure Act of this State. It is true there is a diversity of opinion in these cases but we are dealing with our own. statute as determining the legislative intent; and, as observed, if the Legislature had intended the Act to cover specific cases, such as the one now before us and Brown v. Newman, supra, it would have said so and not left the issue open to judicial construction.
It is next insisted that, “The Supreme Court is not bound to decide this case against appellant (petitioner here) by reason of its denial of certiorari in Brown v. Newman,” citing and relying on Bryan v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S. W. (2d) 85, and Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S. W. (2d) 749.
We have not ruled the legal question “against appellant” solely upon the authority of Brown v. Newman. The ease, however, is directly in point and, needless to say, this Court gave it careful consideration on petition for certiorari and declined to grant the writ without filing a written opinion. Prom a purely technical point of view we are not bound by the opinions of the Court *267of Appeals. But these opinions are viewed with the greatest respect and will not be lightly overruled; and certainly not when the views expressed by that court are in full accord with sound reason as well as the weight of authority. For this reason we denied certiorari in Brown v. Newman.
In Bryan v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., supra, the court used this language [174 Tenn. 602, 130 S. W. (2d) 88]:
“We have repeatedly pointed out that a mere denial by this court of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals does not commit us to all the views expressed in a particular opinion. We are primarily concerned on such application with the result reached. ’ ’ (Emphasis supplied.) In the Lingner case, supra, it was held:
“The Supreme Court will no more hesitate to investigate again a question of practice decided by the Court of Appeals in a ease in which the writ of certiorari was denied than it would hesitate so to do in a case disposed of on direct appeal. ’ ’
Where, as in the instant case, the Court of Appeals has given a sound interpretation of a statute and construed it according to the manifest intention of the Legislature, we are not disposed to give it a different construction.
The last error complained of relates to the question of petitioner’s right to a judicial review and for the writ of mandamus to reinstate him as a teacher in the public schools of Kingsport. This question was fully dealt with in the original opinion and, feeling that it was correctly decided, there is no reason to again review it.
The petition to rehear is denied.